

**MALAYSIAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF
PALESTINIAN PRESIDENTS' IMAGE DURING
CRISES 1996-2016**

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MALAYSIAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF PALESTINIAN PRESIDENTS' IMAGE
DURING CRISES 1996-2016

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SEPANJANG KRISIS TEMPOH 1996-2016

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TESIS YANG DIKEMUKAKAN UNTUK MEMPEROLEH
IJAZAH DOKTOR FALSAFAH

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work in this thesis is my own except for quotations and summaries which have been duly acknowledged.

04 September 2019

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P82368

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ABSTRAK

Mengekalkan imej yang baik bagi pemimpin politik adalah penting bagi menjamin kelangsungan mereka dalam arena politik. Imej pemimpin politik, termasuklah presiden sesebuah negara akan terganggu apabila berhadapan dalam situasi kritikal. Maka usaha untuk memperbaiki imej tersebut apabila mereka berhadapan dengan keadaan krisis. Usaha untuk memperbaiki imej tersebut biasanya dilakukan menerusi laporan media, sama ada dalam atau luar negara, dan pelaporan tersebut boleh berbentuk positif atau negatif. Kajian ini dijalankan ke atas pelaporan berita yang dilakukan oleh media di Malaysia, khususnya akhbar *News Straits Times* (NST) terhadap presiden Palestin iaitu Yasser Arafat dan Mahmoud Abbas serta pemaparan kedua-dua mereka semasa situasi krisis. Kedua-dua teori pemulihan imej dan perspektif pbingkaian digunakan untuk membantu kajian ini. Sejumlah 2715 buah berita mengenai isu-isu di Palestin telah ditemui dalam lingkungan 21 tahun dari tahun 1996-2016. Sebanyak 531 berita adalah berkaitan dengan presiden Palestin, manakala 456 berita yang lain adalah mengenai krisis yang berlaku. Kajian ini mengguna kaedah analisis kandungan menemui tiga jenis krisis utama yang dihadapi oleh presiden Palestin, iaitu krisis politik, sosial dan ekonomi. Isu-isu politik tersebut termasuklah proses keamanan, konflik dalaman, tekanan dari pihak luar, serangan dan sekatan daripada pihak Israel, serangan daripada pihak Palestin, ancaman daripada pihak Israel, pertempuran, demonstrasi, perisikan daripada Israel, penculikan dan kerosakan hubungan. Isu-isu sosial pula termasuklah isu rasuah, pembocoran maklumat, penipuan, pemalsuan informasi, khabar angin dan fitnah daripada pihak Israel. Manakala isu-isu ekonomi pula adalah krisis kewangan. Presiden Palestin telah menggunakan kesemua strategi pemulihan imej, iaitu penafian, penghindaran tanggungjawab, pengurangan kerosakan, tindakan pembetulan, dan pengakuan kesalahan. Semua strategi tersebut telah dikenalpasti dalam 50 buah berita. Bilangan strategi sub-pemulihan imej yang digunakan ialah sebanyak 61. Sub-strategi yang digunakan adalah penafian mudah, memindahkan kesalahfahaman, provokasi, kekalahan, serangan kepada penuduh, memperbaiki/menyelesaikan masalah, mengakui/ memberitahu, dan pernyataan maaf. Berita bercorak neutral adalah berita paling banyak dalam akhbar NST, diikuti dengan berita yang condong ke arah positif, negatif dan seimbang. Presiden Arafat dilihat lebih banyak menerima liputan berita berbanding Presiden Abbas. Kajian ini dilihat memberi sumbangan dari segi menyesuaikan jenis krisis dengan strategi pemulihan imej, memandangkan ia penting untuk memahami krisis dan menentukan strategi tindak balas yang paling sesuai untuknya. Memerhati pbingkaian krisis dari sudut media tertentu membolehkan pengurus krisis dan organisasinya memberikan tindak balas yang berkesan menerusi strategi pemulihan imej yang betul bagi mengurangkan imej buruk pemimpin tersebut. Sumbangan yang lain pula adalah dengan menggabungkan pemulihan imej sebagai teori perhubungan awam bersama dengan teori pbingkaian sebagai teori kewartawanan dalam kajian ini.

ABSTRACT

Maintaining a good image of political leaders is significant to ensure their political life. The image of political leaders, including presidents of any country, is threatened when they are facing critical situations. There is a necessity to repair the image of presidents when threatened with crises. This effort of image repair by presidents is mostly covered by local or foreign media, and this coverage might be positive or negative. This study examines the coverage by the Malaysian media, specifically *New Straits Times* (NST), on the Palestinian Presidents, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas and their portrayal towards several crises. Both image repair theory and framing perspective were used to guide the study. A total of 2715 news stories have been found about Palestinian issues in the 21 year period covered from 1996-2016. A total of 531 stories were related to Palestinian Presidents, 456 stories were on crises. This study employing content analysis has revealed three main crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents, namely political, social, and economic crisis. The political crises included: peace process, internal conflict, foreign pressure, Israeli attacks, Israeli blockade, Palestinian attacks, Israeli threats, clashes, demonstrations, Israeli spying, kidnapping, and relations breakdown. The social crises included: corruption, information leakage, cheating, false information, Israeli rumours, and Israeli slanders. The economic crises included only financial crisis. Palestinian Presidents have used all the main image repair strategies, namely denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. These strategies have been included in the 50 news stories. The number of used sub-image repair strategies was 61. The employed sub-strategies were simple denial, shifting the blame, provocation, defeasibility, attack accuser, correct/solve problem, confess/admit, and apology. Neutral slant of news stories was the most prevalent slant by NST, followed by positive, negative, and balanced slants respectively. But President Arafat received more coverage than President Abbas. The contribution of study came through matching the types of crisis with image repair strategies since understanding the crisis and determining its type is important for choosing the most suitable response strategy for it. Observing the framing of crises by certain media provides crisis managers and their organisations the most fitted crisis response through using image repair strategies which reduce the damaged image. Another contribution is by combining image repair as public relations theory with framing as journalism theory in this study.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	Agence France-Presse
AP	Associated Press
FATAH	Palestinian National Liberation Movement
IRT	Image Repair Theory
NST	New Straits Times
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
SCCT	Situational Crisis Communication Theory
UKM	Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
UMNO	United Malays National Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Crises are influencing all countries in the world including our own country. If the crisis is not brought under proper management or control it will cause a chain of crises (Fener & Cevik 2015). In the current years, the scale and number of disasters has emphasised the need for a specific form of public relations that allows individuals or organisations to overcome any form of a crisis situation with some credibility (Henslowe 1999).

Doubtlessly, public figures and politicians will often face crises at some points, and their reputation became highly valuable. Mainly, their reputations depend on perceptions of their public, and whenever their reputations are threatened, image repair becomes necessary. The political figures, especially the presidents of parties are the face of their political parties. The presidents of parties personify their parties. In political communication, the discourse of image repair is central to the role of media. A positive public image is considered as the core of any political figure, and the political discipline is preoccupied with image destruction or image building and the media plays an important role in that (Chimbarange et al. 2013).

Image repair theory founded by William Benoit in 1995 is one of the most suitable developmental approaches and models for crisis communication (Ulmer 2012). Producing image repair theory was to understand the available communication options for organisations or individuals who face threats to their own reputation. In fact, image restoration theory is specifically relevant to crisis response. The reputation

or image of a person is extremely significant. Suspicions or accusations of wrongdoing have a set of adverse influences (Benoit 2005).

Describing or framing a crisis may affect the public's evaluation of the responsibility of organisation for that crisis. Studies of framing should be beneficial to both crisis management and crisis communication (Cho & Gower 2006). Framing analysis in crisis communication provides useful insights for crisis managers to choose suitable strategies to respond to a crisis to reduce the damaged image (An & Gower 2009).

Almost daily, mass media including television, radio, and newspapers feature some organisations and their personnel in crises (Wooten & James 2008). Mass media, including television, radio and, newspapers, allows the geographically dispersed people to know information about other ethnics, neighbourhood countries and groups, and also events in the same group (Tuchman 1978).

Newspapers are significant sources of information to the public, communities, and policymakers. Newspapers are able to provide a forum for debate and opinion, influence public policy, make recommendations and give advice, and set the public agenda through identifying newsworthy subjects and issues (Wells et al. 2001). Mass media in general and newspapers in specific play pivotal role as supervisors of information (Ibrahim et al. 2012).

The coverage of any newspaper could have a positive or negative influence on the image of political leaders. Over the years, the media have become the main reliable information sources for searches of individuals about information regarding events occurred around globe. Understanding the various ways of media framing about prominent news information is important. The importance of a news story can be increased by news media through the spent amount of time in reporting on the issue. Newspaper reporters' play a significant role in opinion development among the audience and when the focus is framed only positively or negatively toward the news story, the other story sides are excluded (Freyenberger 2013).

1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND

Palestine is located at the centre of routes connecting three continents made it the meeting place for cultural and religious impact from Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia (Arnaiz-Villena et al. 2001). Palestine is considered to be always the land of passage, and it was also a site of cultural exchange and encounter for this reason. Palestine was a part of “Greater Syria”; it has few natural landmarks, and it has no “natural borders” aside from the Mediterranean sea. The Sinai Peninsula provides Palestine with one geographical marker and the Jordan Valley another one, but they did not offer any “natural” protection to its inhabitants against hostile incursions. The borders of Palestine were variable since they were largely man-made (Krämer 2008).

Palestinians are Arabs who had lived and have a cultural or historical tie to the geographical area that shapes Gaza Strip, West Bank, and constitutes present-day Israel (Zanotti 2014). The population in occupied Palestine was the Palestinian people who lived there since time immemorial and they have lived there forever. The Palestinian people are the occupants and the original inhabitants of this territory. They are determinate and fixed, and so they absolutely shape a distinguishable population. They have always been in possession of their land so they have the right to create a state therein (Boyle 1990).

The argument is really futile about whether Palestinians are a nation or are entitled to be a nation. A group of people would be a nation when the group members perceive themselves as a nation, and they are prepared for pursuing their interests, defining their identities, and making personal sacrifices for keeping that perception. Palestinians have demonstrated the authenticity and depth of their own nationhood perception (Kelman 1983).

In Palestine, the most ancient recorded people were the Canaanites. They lived in city-states such as Jericho, and they became urbanised (Arnaiz-Villena et al. 2001). The Canaanites have settled the land of Palestine before the Israelites (Krämer 2008). A confederation of Hebrew tribes that was called the Israelites finally defeated most

of the Canaanites around 1125 B.C but they found more struggle and difficulties with the Philistines (Palestinians). Philistines had controlled Jerusalem, which was a Canaanite town, and also have established their independent state on the southern Palestinian coast (Arnaiz-Villena et al. 2001). The name “Palestine” was not new; it has existed in Egyptian and Assyrian sources to describe the southern Levant coastal plain (Krämer 2008).

In the time period from 1840-1947, the placement of borders was according to the desires of British, French, and Ottoman Empire without considering the needs of Palestinian people. In 1841, determining the borderline was just a political move without any actual formal expression in the region (Biger 2004). A minority of Zionists European Jewish in the mid to the late of 1800s have started the planning, fundraising, writing, and talking to establish a homeland for Jews away from the European Christian. The considered location as a possible new homeland for Jews was both Uganda and Argentina. But soon after that, the ambition of Zionists has focused on Palestine which is considered as a holy land for Muslims, Christians, and Jewish (Spangler 2015).

By the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century, political Zionism tended to colonise an existing country to be a Jewish state but they faced two main challenges: First was mobilising the Western powers support to establish a Jewish homeland in an existing country whether Argentina, Cyprus, or Palestine. Second how to turn an overwhelmingly Muslim country such as Palestine into a Jewish State (Safty 2014).

In 1882, Britain has taken over Egypt and they have involved in shaping the borders of Egypt including the Border with Palestine which was under the control of the Ottoman Empire. After controlling Egypt by British, the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, has tried to re-establish the Ottoman control over the Sinai Peninsula as advised by the German ambassador Marshall von Biderstock. Here, the area became under the control of Egypt even it belongs to the Ottoman province of Hijaz. On 1 April 1892, the Sultan has sent a telegram to Egypt which addressed the issue of the Egyptian control on some areas that located outside its boundaries and reconfirmed

the rule of Ali's dynasty. Based on that telegram, on 13 April 1892, the British has considered the line of Aqaba–El-Arish as the boundary of Egypt even if the Ottoman Empire rejects this interpretation (Biger 2004).

Almost in the same time period in the late of 1880s, but in a different place, the emergence of Zionism was as a national revival movement in eastern and central Europe due to the growing pressure on the Jewish there (Pappe 2007). Mostly, the struggle between Palestinians and Zionists has started only by the 1880s. Before that, the Palestinian population comprised mostly Muslims, other Christian, and a Jewish whose culture and language were Arabic but with different religions. The Jewish were living safely in the Muslim world than their living in the Christian world. Zionists European Jews have started to join the Palestinian community by the 1890s (Spangler 2015).

The Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901 was the tool of Zionists to colonise Palestine. Most of the Zionist movement leaders at the beginning of the 20th century have linked their national revival with colonising Palestine. Others like Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism was more hesitated, but in 1904 after his death, there was agreement towards colonising Palestine (Pappe 2007). The first Zionist leaders were successful politicians such as Chaim Weizmann who has convinced the Western leaders that his movement was an extension of their European imperialism. Weizmann has succeeded to get the support of both reluctant and powerful Jewish for the Zionism cause (Safty 2014).

The year 1906 was the second phase in delimiting the boundaries of Palestine. Like what happened before in 1892, this process was the outcome of the political development in the Egyptian and Ottoman Empire relationship. In 1906, the line was not defined but it was only considered as an administrative line that divided two territories which were under the role of the Ottoman Empire. Mentioning Egypt existence was avoided by the Ottoman Empire in the agreement that was signed in May 1906 and has discussed the issue of dividing line between Jerusalem and Hijaz district with Sinai district. The British authorities have ignored the legal meaning of the line, and they have considered it as an international border (Biger 2004).

For the first time, Palestine was turned as a territory with clear borders as a result of World War I, especially because of the vacuum in the region after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Post-war, both Britain and France, as victorious countries have redesigned the map of the region including Palestine which was divided and controlled by the two countries. The Zionist organisation was another political actor (Biger 2004). Immediately after joining the war by Ottoman Empire in November 1914, the British Jewish Home Secretary Herbert Samuel has met the Foreign Secretary Sir Edmond Grey. As a supporter of the idea of Zionist, Samuel has presented a proposal for establishing a Jewish independent region in Palestine and the positive approach of Grey has encouraged this proposal. In January 1915, Samuel has proposed in a memorandum to his party leader and Prime Minister that his government should request controlling Palestine once the war is over (Biger 2004).

The Zionists have intentionally neglected the existence of the indigenous population of Palestine which was fully developed and cultivated most of the arable lands (Harms & Ferry 2008). The political Zionists have mostly identified Judaism and Zionism as the same or at least the entire Jewish people interest. This equation is very misleading since there are Jews, including religious Jews who are not Zionists (Kuhn 2002). Additionally, the conflict was not between Palestinian and Jews, but it was between Palestinian and Zionists. The Zionists aimed to Judaize Palestine but Palestinians aimed to control their own society and live in the face of the agenda of superpower and Zionists (Spangler 2015). In 1915, a secret British military map known as Lawrence map was published to be as an official map which contained the separation line between Palestine and Egypt (Biger 2004).

When both of Arabs and Zionist organisation have joint the demands over the lands of the Ottoman Empire, both Britain and France have started an official negotiation. In 1915, Britain was represented by Sir Mark Sykes and France was represented by Georges Picot. In March 1916, both sides have signed an agreement after holding a discussion for five months about a post-war division of the lands. The name of the Sykes-Picot agreement was retrieved from the name of the two countries representatives. Both of Italy and Russia also have signed the agreement later. According to Palestine part of the agreement, the lands that located between Ras El

Naqura until Sea of Galilee supposed to be controlled by France, including the Upper Galilee such as northern part of Jordan River, Lake Hula, and Safed town. The other lands of Acre and Haifa cities, the plain between them, and Haifa bay supposed to be held by British. The other parts of Palestine supposed to include an international area and an Arab state (Biger 2004).

The call for recognising the Zionist aspirations to Palestine has started. Then, following exhausted and long negotiations with the representative from British, France, Russia, the United States governments, the Zionist Organisation has achieved the 'Balfour Declaration'. The declaration was as a letter that has been published on 2 November 1917, which was sent to Lord Rothschild from Lord Balfour the British Foreign Secretary. The letter stated the promise from the British government to establish a national home for Jewish in Palestine, and the government will do the best efforts to ease achieving this aim (Biger 2004).

Technically, the British administration of Palestine supposed to be as a trust until being ready for self-government, but it was also subject to some conditions for fulfilling the 1917 promise to establish a national home for Jewish in Palestine (Bunton 2007). The League of Nations in 1919 has recognised the Palestinian people as an independent nation in League Covenant Article 22(4) (Boyle 1990). In 1920, a paramilitary organisation was established by Jewish community in Palestine by help of sympathetic British officers to defend the Jewish colonies in Palestine, colonise whole Palestine, and the ethnic cleansing of its native Palestinian inhabitants (Pappe 2006).

The extended negotiations between Britain and France have led to San Remo conference between them on 24 April 1920. The outputs of the conference have resulted a mandate for ruling both Mesopotamia and Palestine by Britain, and both Lebanon and Syria by France. The conference asserted on deciding the separation line position that supposed to divide both Britain and France administrative areas, and deciding the internal delimitation lines inside their administrative areas (Biger 2004).

The League of Nations has formally recognised the British Mandate governing over Transjordan and Palestine only in 1922 (Boyle 1990). Although, Palestine has a recent recognition by League of Nations as British mandate in 1923, but it was considered as a crown colony and mandated effectively during the period of the inter-war (Bunton 2007). During the British mandate to Palestine, the Arab revolution has erupted in April 1936, and it was the main reason beyond the first public discussion regarding the future of Palestine (Biger 2004). In 1939, the British military has subdued this revolution after expelling the Palestinian leadership and the cruel British attacks that included arresting, killing, and wounding many Palestinians and villagers, especially in the countryside (Pappe 2006). In 1937, the British Royal Peel Commission has suggested the partition of Palestine into two states (Pappe 2006).

Haganah Zionist troops were attached to the British forces during the Arab revolution, which has enabled the Jews from practicing the attack tactics in rural areas and implementing a punitive mission to the Arab villages. Haganah special units have entered the Palestinian villages to search the Arab volunteers and for distributing leaflets that warned the Palestinians from cooperating with the Army of Arab Liberation. The resistance by Palestinian villagers to the incursion of Haganah was faced with random killing and firing by Hagana to those villagers and it was called by Zionists as 'violent reconnaissance'. During this revolution, several files were created by Zionist experts for Palestinian villages to be used later against the Palestinian (Pappe 2006).

The writings of founding father of Zionism Theodor Herzl have discussed the expulsion of the Palestinian people and the possibility to takeover of Palestine in the future. Later in 1942, the Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion has adopted more extreme strategy when he asked the Jewish commonwealth to Mandate the whole Palestine during a meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in New York. This state should be also, exclusively Jewish in both its ethnic composition and socio-political structure (Pappe 2006).

Later on 24 October 1945, when Palestine was still under the British mandate, the United Nations was founded (Akasaga 2008). By the end of 1946 Ben-Gurion had

realised that the British were on their way to leave Palestine, so he has begun on strategies that could be implemented in Palestinian after the movement of the British. The master plan was to expel all the villages in rural areas, and urban centres in Palestine (Pappe 2006).

In 1946, the terrorist underground Jewish militias have started to bomb the bridges, attacking the British military bases, and exploded the King David Hotel in Jerusalem which was the British headquarters (Pappe 2007). This campaign of attacks mostly led by Menachem Begin, the leader of Irgun the Jewish terrorist militias which finally has blown up the hotel on 22 July 1946, and killed around hundred people including British, Jewish, and Arab (Safty 2014). The terrorist Jewish militias that launched the attacks against British were armed by British Government during the Arab revolution years (Pappe 2007).

Then in February 1947, the British Government has decided to bring the issue of Palestine to the United Nations (Akasaga 2008). The plan of the expulsion of Palestinian people was prepared by Zionists earlier the decision of ending of the British Mandate in Palestine in February 1947 and turning the matter over to the United Nations. The partition plan of the United Nations in 1947 envisioned creating two nation-states west of the Jordan River, each state with its own clear national majority (Miller 2012). The Zionists in 1947 had the final update of the Palestinian villages' files which included the wanted people list also. A year later, these lists were used by Jewish troops during their searching and arresting operations in those villages. In the villages, the men mostly were lined up, then those whose names appeared on the lists were identified by some informants then they were picked out and shot on the spot (Pappe 2007).

On 15 May 1947, the United Nations General Assembly has decided to establish the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which included 11 Member states (Akasaga 2008; Biger 2004). The representative countries of the committee were Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Holland, Iran, India, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia (Biger 2004). UNSCOP was requested to investigate all the problems, issues, and questions that related to Palestine and to

suggest solutions about that. The committee supposed to present that in the regular session of the General Assembly in September 1947(Akasaga 2008; Biger 2004).

The inexperienced two years old United Nations has passed the fate of Palestine future for UNSCOP which none of its members have any experience in the issue of solving the conflict or even have much knowledge about the history of Palestine (Pappe 2007). On 31 August 1947, the UNSCOP has settled its mission, and they have agreed on terminating the British mandate, the independence principle, and the United Nations role (Akasaga 2008).

This step was followed by another step on 29 November 1947 when the newly formed United Nations General Assembly has adopted the resolution 181 during its second regular session (Akasaga 2008; Mark 1999; Pappe 2007). The United Nations General Assembly has decided a partition plan to divide historic Palestine into two states, one for Arab and one for Jewish (Akasaga 2008; Biger 2004; Mark 1999; Pappe 2007; Spangler 2015). The Assembly has recommended that Jerusalem city supposed to be placed under international regime or what was called a “corpus separatum” due to its religious significance to Muslims, Jewish, and Christians (Akasaga 2008; Mark 1999). Hence, Israel has captured 55 percent of the Palestinian lands, although the Jewish population has figured much less than half of the Palestinian population (Spangler 2015).

Through this Partition Resolution, it was clear that there was clear negligence by the United Nations to the indigenous Palestinian population. The United Nations has pledged for preventing any attempt for confiscating the lands of the other state, but what happened later has proven the betrayal of United Nations to its pledge (Pappe 2007). Palestinians were in an unusual situation after the 1948 war since they have a high national consciousness level, but without the political or national institutions to embody it. The Palestinian national identity was a predominant matter of their daily life. Suddenly, they found themselves uprooted from their homeland, and became refugees in their surrounding countries; they have faced new daily problems in finding work, food, and shelter to survive (Hamid 1975).

Most Palestinians have perceived Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as their only legitimate representative which has the ability for negotiating an agreement that will achieve the adherence and widespread acceptance among Palestinians majority (Kelman 1983). PLO and the Israeli Government signed Oslo Accords in 1993 (Al-Natour 1997; Sharif 2009) which led to the return of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat with his troops to Gaza in 1994 and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority after their return (Akasaga 2008; Rubin & Rubin 2005; Sharif 2009). Then, in 1996 Yasser Arafat was elected as the first Palestinian President of Palestinian Authority in the first Palestinian General Elections which was presidential and legislative elections (Brown 2005; CEC1996; Rubin & Rubin 2005). Then in 2005, Mahmoud Abbas was elected as the second President of the Palestinian Authority after the death of President Arafat (BBC 2009; Schulze 2013).

On the other hand, Palestine and Malaysia have strong bilateral relations and the Malaysian foreign policy was always supportive to the Palestinian issue. The following paragraphs are discussing this issue. The foreign policy of Malaysia towards the countries in the Middle East aimed to maintain and cultivate good political relations with them. The bilateral relations with Middle East countries remained close. This relationship linked with securing the national interests of Malaysia by enhancing economic, political, and social ties with the Middle Eastern countries. Additionally, the position of Malaysia especially with Palestine is well known. Malaysia supports the international efforts for fair conflict resolution that support restoring and respecting the Palestinian rights. The foreign policy of Malaysia towards Palestine is based on justice, self-determination right, and humanitarian values (Harun 2009).

The foreign policy of Malaysia over the issue of Palestine has reflected the Malaysian support to the Palestinian right of territorial integrity, self-determination, and for national liberation movements such as PLO. Since the Malaysian independence, the policy makers of Malaysia have paid a lot of attention to Palestine and Palestinian issue which appeared as a national liberation issue (Nair 2003). All the Malaysian Prime Ministers and their governments since the Malaysian independence in 1957 have championed the Palestinian issue. Although that efforts did not lead to

solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but it has increased the awareness of Palestinian cause (Mohamed et al. 2017b).

The Malaysian supports for Palestine started since the tenure of first Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. All the successors of the first prime minister have continued this policy of supporting Palestine (Mohamed et al. 2017a). Additionally, Palestine received the support of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) the dominant faction in the coalition of Barisan Nasional (BN) since the independence of Malaysia in 1957 (Koss 2019).

Malaysia in 1969 was the first country in Asia that allowed Fatah for opening an office in Kuala Lumpur which became later in 1974 the office of PLO (Yegar 2006). However, after electing Mahathir Mohamad as the Malaysian Prime Minister in 1981 he became totally supportive for Palestinian issue. Mahathir aimed to strengthen the position and relationship between Malaysia and other Muslim countries (Hassan 2007; Yegar 2006). In 1981, Mahathir accorded PLO to open office in Kuala Lumpur and gave it full diplomatic status and recognition which made Malaysia the first Southeast Asian country to do so (Harun 2009; Koss 2019; Nair 2003). Mahathir strengthen his relationship and support to PLO and continued condemnations for Israel and its vilified policies against Palestinians (Yegar 2006). During the tenure of Mahathir, he has a strong diplomatic and personal relationship with Yasser Arafat (Rosdi & Shafie 2016).

The commitment by the Malaysian government to support Palestine became high during the administration of Mahathir Mohamad and brought the attention of the world to resolve the crisis of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Mahathir was different from his predecessors Prime Ministers by drawing the attention to the Palestinian issue, speaking openly about it, and seeing the Malaysian foreign policy towards Palestine as an extension of the Malaysian domestic policy. Mahathir brought the Palestinian issue very close to his heart, and the support came from him and his administration was more than any other Malaysian Prime Ministers (Mohamed et al. 2017a, 2017b).

Malaysia supported Palestine and became as its voice in the United Nations and international organisations. The supportive foreign policy by Mahathir and his administration to Palestine comes due to sharing the same faith which is Islam and based on the humanitarian ground of Palestinian issue (Mohamed et al. 2017a). The support of Mahathir to the Palestinian cause came through his support for the Palestinian nationalist movements and his strong opposition to Zionism (Nair 2003).

In 1982, the Organisation of Islamic cooperation selected Malaysia to represent a foreign ministers committee which assigned the task to deal with resolutions on Palestine through the United Nations and other bodies (Nair 2003). Then, in 1983, a conference on Palestine issue sponsored by the UN was hosted by Malaysia (Antang 2005; Mohamed et al. 2017b; Yegar 2006). This conference showed the leading role by Malaysia to support the Palestinian cause. (Hassan 2007). A month later, the Summit Meeting of PLO in Algiers was attended by Malaysia and received special compliments from the Palestinian leader Arafat. Mahathir also invited Arafat to Malaysia who has accepted that offer. A rousing welcome was received by Arafat from Mahathir. Arafat also met the Malaysian king and spoke to large Malaysian audience (Hassan 2007; Mohamed et al. 2017b; Yegar 2006). During the visit of Arafat he was accorded Head of State status (Antang 2005).

After announcing the independence of Palestine by Arafat in 1988, Malaysia recognised the office of PLO in Kuala Lumpur as the embassy of Palestine and elevated it to be full resident diplomatic mission in 1989 and made it equal to other diplomatic missions in Malaysia (Antang 2005; Harun 2009; Koss 2019). Another official visit paid by Arafat to Malaysia in 1990 (Antang 2005; Hassan 2007; Nair 2003). After electing Abdullah Badawi as the Malaysian Prime Minister in 2003 he has stressed on his total support for Palestine and criticised Israel as all of his predecessors (Yegar 2006).

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Constantly, politicians are in the eyes of the public. Political figures may have many interviews with news media, sends out a lot of press releases on legislative wide range

issues, and deliver various different speeches on any given day. Due to crisis situations, politicians find themselves at the centre of attention all too often, and for official reasons, they are frequently thrust into the public eye. Politicians will definitely work to repair their embattled reputation in the middle of a crisis since their reputations are so valuable in the political sphere. Hence, the strategies of public relations, especially influential image repair discourse is substantial for politicians (Sheldon 2006).

Today, politicians must show themselves equally as decent and being good citizens, as well as individuals with an exceptional awareness of the challenges, strong ideas, and qualities of being good leaders. Exploring the image repair strategies, publication, and responses following a crisis is crucial to understand the media influence on political responses (Moran 2012).

Leaders and politicians are confronted with crises, and they have to repair their image when it is embattled or threatened after crises. Likewise, a country such as Palestine and its Presidents are facing the same. In dealing with that, Presidents need to solve those crises in many approaches, whether through denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of the event, corrective action, or mortification.

There is low knowledge about how the Malaysian media portrayed the image of the two Palestinian Presidents Arafat and Abbas during crises, the types of crises faced by these presidents, and how they handled them. Also, there is low knowledge about how the foreign newspaper *New Straits Time* was actively promoting the crisis response of the two Presidents. Benoit's Image Repair Strategies were used to analyse the framing of the response toward these crises.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the problem statement, the following research questions have been established for this study:

- i. What were the types of crises that affected Palestinian Presidents' image during their Presidential term as portrayed by Malaysian media?
- ii. What image repair strategies were used by Palestinian Presidents during crises time as portrayed by Malaysian media?
- iii. What was the slant of Malaysian media about Palestinian Presidents?

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main purpose of this study is to find out how the Malaysian media had covered the Palestinian Presidents and their reactions towards several types of crises to protect their image. Following are the specific research objectives of the study:

- i. To determine the types of crises that affected Palestinian Presidents' image during their Presidential term as portrayed by the *New Straits Times*.
- ii. To determine the image repair strategies used by Palestinian Presidents during crises as portrayed by the *New Straits Times*.
- iii. To investigate the slant of the *New Straits Times* about Palestinian Presidents.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The significance of this study is reflected in the importance of image repair theory and framing perspective to organisations and individuals. Some scholars (Benoit 2005; Jung et al. 2011; Kessadayurat 2011; Moran 2012; Roberts 2006; Rogers 2012) have generated the attention of image repair strategies. Other scholars (Entman 1993; Cissel 2012; De Vreese 2005; Druckman 2001; Hallahan 2005; Hallahan 1999; Scheufele 1999) have generated the recent interest and attention of framing in communication.

However, there is a limitation in the scope of existing research on both image repair and framing theories and their implication was rarely researched and questioned. This thesis sheds light on the implications of image repair as public

relations theory and framing as journalism theory by combining them together. Testing and understanding of the typologies of image repair strategies in response to different crises in this study was through framing research. Framing analysis provides useful insights for crisis managers to choose suitable strategies of crisis response to reduce the damaged image of an organisation or individual (An & Gower 2009). Understanding how the media framed crisis, and how the public perceived the crisis is helpful to choose the proper image repair strategies by those who face the crisis. The individuals or organisations that their images were threatened can use framing to repair their image.

Previous research (Benoit 2014b, 2006; Liu 2007) examined the coverage of the local American media on the image repair strategies used by only one of their Presidents on one crisis. However, this study is worthwhile since it has provided a unique application to image repair theory by examining the coverage of Malaysian media as a foreign media on the image repair strategies used by two Palestinian Presidents on different crises.

Studying the management of crisis across borders supports the notion about the effectiveness of image repair framework in explicating crisis situations in a cross-cultural context (Cheng et al. 2013). Additionally, studying image repair theory was mostly in the United States and just a few studies examined implementing image repair strategies in other cultures and countries (Len-Ríos 2010). Implementing this study across the geographic borders of Palestinian Presidents filled the gap in both the two previous studies. Moreover, previous literature did not elaborate on the typologies of image repair strategies. This study has more elaboration on those typologies by matching the different types of crises with the image repair strategies used to cope with these crises. The outcomes of this study may help scholars, public relations practitioners, politicians, and their organisations to understand image repair strategies and to have prospective measures once they face a crisis.

1.7 SCOPE OF STUDY

The overarching aim of this study was to find out how the Malaysian media had covered the image repair efforts by Palestinian Presidents to react to different types of crises. The literature review in this research covered the issues associated with the topics of crises, presidential leadership, image repair strategies, media coverage, and framing. This study analysed the contents of news stories from the *New Straits Times* on Palestinian Presidents.

All the news stories on Palestinian Presidents from the daily issues of NST within 21 year were collected and analysed. The time frame of this study was from 1996-2016. It was divided into two main phases: (1) the years 1996- 2004: 20 January 1996 to 11 November 2004 which marked the first day of electing Yasser Arafat as President until his death. (2) The years 2005-2016: 9 January 2005 to 31 December 2016 since the election day of Mahmoud Abbas until the decline of coverage.

The analysed stories were the issues related to research problem and research objectives; the unrelated stories to this research were excluded. Also, the study employed image repair theory seen through framing perspective. This study has included a geographically limited scope due to the boundaries and limits to get more data from the country of origin of those leaders.

1.8 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Image repair strategies: Introduced by William Benoit in 1995 as image repair theory. It includes five main strategies, namely denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing of offensives of event, corrective action, and mortification; each main strategy has its sub strategies or variants. The theory suggested that image or face is important for both organisations and individuals (Benoit 1995).

Image: It is the held perception by the audience which was shaped by words and acts, and influencing them through other actors (Benoit & Brinson 1994). Image

was used as a synonym to other concepts such as reputation, attitude, perception, belief, cognition, message, relationship, credibility, or communication (Grunig 1993).

Crisis: Is a negative sudden and unexpected incident that disturbs and threatens individuals or organisations (Coombs 2007b; Oliver 2004; Ruff & Aziz 2003). The use of crisis term is for dangerous, decisive and difficult situations, and refers to an extremely wide area of political, social, economic, mental, and environmental processes (Dubrovski 2007).

News slant: The slant essence is stressing on one side of the story and ignoring its other side at the same time (Entman 2007, 2010). It is a filtering process which aims to simplify the political reality and assigning relative weights. Slant is giving positive or negative correlation to the covered issue implicitly (Duggan & Martinelli 2011).

Type of response: It has two main approaches, proactive and reactive response. The proactive response is having an action in anticipating the environmental changes process. The reactive approach is reacting to the environmental changes that already happened (Bucurean 2015). The proactive response tends to avoid the crisis, and the reactive response tends to overcome the crisis (Jugo 2013).

Media attention scores: The attention scores are five criteria developed by Richard Budd in 1964 to distinguish the prominence of one news article over another. The rate of these five attention score was from zero to five; score of zero was given in case of absence of all the five criteria, and score of five was given in case of presence of all criteria. The five criteria were: (1) One point if the length of article headline is two columns or more in width; (2) One point if the article headline occupied more than half of the page; (3) One point if the article is placed above the fold or above the measured centre of the page; (4) One point if the article occupied $\frac{3}{4}$ of a column or more; and (5) One point assigned if the article appears on the front page, or the editorial/ principle page.

Peace and war journalism: Peace journalism is stressing on human rights, peace, pluralism, democracy, and respecting other opinions (Ibrahim et al. 2013). Peace journalism means promoting peace initiatives through journalism. It focuses on undermining the ethnic and religious differences and has no advocating for conflict. This journalism is focusing on the activities of reconciliation and conflict resolution (Raza et al. 2012). War journalism is focusing on demonising the enemy and stressing on violence (Ibrahim et al. 2013). War journalism means covering one side of the conflict picture by using military offensive language through journalism. The superficial narrative is used by the media outlet and there is no historical background for it (Raza et al. 2012).

1.9 ORGANISATION OF THESIS

This study comprises five main chapters, including the introductory chapter, literature review, research methodology, findings of the study, and discussion and conclusion of study. Chapter I discusses the introduction, background of study, statement of the problem, research questions, research objectives, significance of study, scope of study, and organisation of study.

Chapter II contains literature review on the life of Palestinian Presidents, PLO and Fatah, main Palestinian issues and crises, crisis from different perspectives, their occurrence and influence, efficiency of crisis leadership, presidential leadership, crisis communication and public relations role, crisis management and handling crisis, theoretical frame work including both image repair theory and framing perspective.

Chapter III discusses the research methodology of this study such as content analysis, Malaysian media scenario, newspaper under study, data collection of study, period of study, reliability, validity, research instruments, operationalisation of study, and data analysis. Chapter IV presents the analyses of findings and the answers of research questions. In addition, it evaluates the overall process of the research procedures. Chapter V contains the discussion and conclusion of the study, theoretical, practical, and methodological implications, limitations of study, and recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the literature that explains the life of Palestinian Presidents, PLO and Fatah, main Palestinian issues and crises, crisis from different perspectives, their influences and occurrences, characteristics and efficacy of crisis leadership, presidential leadership, crisis communication and public relations role, crisis management and handling, and framing and image repair relationship. This chapter also explores in details the theoretical framework including image repair theory and framing perspective, and research framework. A comprehensive review of the literature on both crisis management and crisis communication provides an initial determination of the use and value of the public relations by the organisations within crisis (Marra 1992).

2.2 MILESTONES OF YASSER ARAFAT'S LIFE

Yasser Arafat has taken the international spotlight more than any other politician in the world. He succeeded in remaining the leader of the longest-running revolutionary movement in the whole globe. Among all the political leaders in the world, the personality and behaviour of Arafat were unique, and he has played several sets of rules from others. Hence, he was considered as one of the most paradoxical, influential, and important political figures in the second half of the twentieth century and beyond. Arafat remained in power, his role as the leader and symbol of Fatah relatively unchallenged was since its establishment in 1965 and for decades thereafter. Even among PLO and Palestinian Authority leaders, no one was popular enough for imitating Arafat to be a political symbol (Rubin & Rubin 2005).

Arafat had a leading role in the revival of the Palestinians identity after the catastrophe "Nakba" of 1948 and the establishment of the contemporary national movement. Arafat was considered as a legitimate leader that would protect the national interest of Palestinian people, even from many of those who have bitterly criticised his stewardship. He succeeded to place the Palestinian struggle for self-determination at the international agenda centre and made the refugee communities become widely considered as a humanitarian problem into a strong national liberation movement (International Crisis Group 2004).

Arafat led the Palestinian national movement through his strong personality, his ability to maintain Palestinians' attachment to him, and his embodiment of the national cause for nearly four decades. His revolutionary charismatic legitimacy became a significant part that held Palestinian politics together. Arafat was considered as the father of the national family, reviver of the national liberation struggle, and won the loyalty of most of the Palestinian people. He became an icon of national pride for his enemies and supporters and won the personal devotion of his followers, and the respect of the Palestinians as a person capable of great feats (Jarbawi & Pearlman 2007).

In the early 21st and late of 20th centuries, Yasser Arafat was considered as a key figure in the political life. As Palestinian president, Arafat was the central player of the most contentious issue such as the negotiations and Middle East peace process. Undoubtedly, he became the most recognisable political figures in the world, especially with the extremely complex racial, economic, historical, and political issues of conflict in the Middle East (Fenton-Smith 2007).

Yasser Arafat is considered as a symbol of Palestinian struggle and nationalism, and his death has caused a shock for the Palestinian people. Arafat was greatly revered by his people from different political affiliations and parties, and he has an influence on grassroots opinion. By bringing the Palestinian cause to the forefront of international politics, and his struggle to achieve the Palestinian state, Arafat held high esteem by the Palestinians, despite American and Israeli efforts to sideline him (Mohan 2004).

Arafat was born on 24 August 1929 under the name Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Rauf Arafat Al-Qudwa Al-Husseini (PASSIA 2015; Rubin & Rubin 2005). Amin al-Husseini the distanced relative of Arafat led the Arab community during the British mandate of Palestine (Rubin & Rubin 2005). In 1948, Arafat has stopped his studies at the University of King Fuad I, which later became the University of Cairo to volunteer in the Egyptian army against Israel (Sharif 2009). Arafat joined the Arab-Jewish fighting after the end of British Mandate and their withdrawal from Palestine (PASSIA 2015).

In 1956, during the triple aggression on Egypt and the Israeli invasion to Gaza Arafat joint the forces of Egyptian resistance (PASSIA 2015; Sharif 2009). The Union of Palestinian Students was established by Arafat after his return to university. Arafat has rented an office for this union to defend the right of Palestinian students. This union became the General Union for Palestinian Students which included all the Palestinian students all over the world (Sharif 2009). In 1956, the Palestinian has achieved the membership of the international student congress in Prague, Czechoslovakia for the first time through Arafat who was wearing the keffiyeh which became his trademark later on (PASSIA 2015).

In 1956, Arafat has achieved his Bachelor Degree from Cairo University in civil engineering then he has travelled to Kuwait and became a successful contractor there. In Kuwait, Arafat has agreed with other five associates to create a clandestine Palestinian organisation by setting up the first Fatah cell which advocated the armed struggle to liberate Palestine. In the early of 1960s, Yasser Arafat has started to organise and mobilise Fatah. In January 1965, Fatah the Palestinian National Liberation Movement has started its first announced guerrilla raids against Israel under the name “Al-Asifa” the storm, and bombed the Israeli water carrier (PASSIA 2015; Sharif 2009).

Arafat then left for Lebanon and Syria to mobilise more Palestinians where he and other active Palestinians were arrested and persecuted by Israel. The locations of both countries were strategic since they bordered Israel which facilitates the raids of Palestinian fighters against Israel. Several members of Palestinian resistance were

arrested and harassed by Arab countries due to their reluctant for supporting the Palestinian resistance at that time (Sharif 2009). After the 1967 war and the capture of all the Palestinian land by Israel, the security in the neighbouring Arab countries has changed their policy against the Palestinian fighters. Hence, Arafat and other fighters from Palestinian resistance have taken this opportunity for recruiting more fighters and support (Sharif 2009).

Later on 2 March 1968, Israel attacked Karameh base for PLO and Fatah in Jordan, and that battle encouraged thousands of Palestinians to join Arafat and Fatah (PASSIA 2015). In February 1969, Arafat became the chairman of the Executive Committee of PLO (PLOEC) as a successor of the founder of PLO Ahmad al-Shuqayri and he got the international recognition and his own authority (Legrain 1999). Arafat became the head of the PLO by Arab supports. The Arabs thought that would be easier if Arafat led PLO beside Fatah (PASSIA 2015; Schulze 2013; Andersen et al. 2014).

Later in 1970, Arafat became the Commander-in-Chief for the forces of Palestinian Arab guerrilla (Schulz 2013). The Jordanian army attacked PLO forces in several areas in Jordan from the period of 16-22 September 1970, which led to the death of over 2000 Palestinian people and expelling PLO and Arafat to Lebanon as a new base (PASSIA 2015). Arafat has repelled Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt efforts for controlling PLO, and later he was expelled from Jordan to Lebanon. Arafat made from Lebanon his new base of operations and after his reaching there in 1971 he created a war zone on the border with Israel similar to the previous one in Jordan (Rubin & Rubin 2005).

Arafat has appeared on 13 Nov 1974 in the United Nations "bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun," and called the audience "Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand" (PASSIA 2015). Arafat has declared the Palestinians right of seeking independence and granting permanent observer status for PLO in the United Nations. PLO had gained international legitimacy, but it could not have direct negotiations with Israeli since it was not recognised by them. Also, Arab nations did not give PLO more independence of movement (Andersen et al. 2014).

After his first expel from Jordan to Lebanon, Arafat left Beirut to Tunisia on 30 August 1982 after the 6th June Israeli invasion into Lebanon (PASSIA 2015). The second “Intifada” in 1987 helped Arafat to achieve revolutionary nirvana state as what he had in Jordan in 1970 and Lebanon in 1982 (Rubin & Rubin 2005). The Palestinian uprising "Intifada" in 1987 has brought Arafat back from political hibernation to become the head of the newly constituted Palestinian Authority later (Mohan 2004). Arafat was also the President of the State of Palestine as proclaimed by the Nineteenth Palestinian National Council (PNC) meeting in Algiers on 15 November 1988 that also decided the formation of the State of Palestine as soon as possible (Legrain 1999).

Due to Gulf war and his support to Iraq against Kuwait in 1991, Arafat and PLO have lost their Saudi and Kuwaiti sponsors and Iraqi could no longer pay them. In addition, more than two hundred thousand of Palestinian refugees were expelled from Kuwait as a reaction to Arafat's support for Iraqi invasion to Kuwait (Rubin & Rubin 2005). On 13 September 1993, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have shaken hands during the signing the Declaration of Principles between PLO and Israel that gave the Palestinians partial control over West Bank and Gaza Strip (PASSIA, 2015). The Central Council of PLO was held in October 1993 for approving the policy of Arafat to accept the Oslo Agreement (Rubin & Rubin 2005).

Based on the signing of Oslo Accords, the motorcade of Arafat has crossed the Egyptian Borders to Gaza Strip on 1 July 1994 (Rubin & Rubin 2005). The return of Arafat to Gaza was after 26 years in the exile and that led to establish the Palestinian Authority. Arafat was elected on 20 January 1996 as the President of both Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian Legislative Council (Brown 2005; Mark 2004; PASSIA 2015; Rubin & Rubin 2005; Schulze 2013).

In 2002, the Israeli forces were deployed outside “Muqata’a” the headquarters of Arafat in Ramallah and created military sieges. The Israeli Cabinet declared that Arafat an "enemy", and the American President George Bush called Palestinians to replace Arafat (PASSIA 2015). Israel had besieged the "Muqata" and its troops fired shots toward the building and armoured bulldozers have broken the compound wall

(Rubin & Rubin 2005). Before his death, Arafat exercised the leadership of four important functions which were: the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the first elected President of the Palestinian Authority (PA); temporary Government of the Palestine state/ he head of the interim government in Gaza Strip and West Bank; and the head of Fatah (Boyle 1990; Legrain 1999; Mark 2004; Mohan 2004).

After the deterioration of Arafat's healthy situation, all his doctors have agreed and conferred that Arafat should go to Paris to treat his undetermined or undisclosed illness (Mark, 2004). Arafat lost consciousness on 28 October 2004. Arafat was flown from Ramallah after he was confined under Israeli armed forces virtual house arrest on 29 October to Amman and from there to Percy Military Hospital in France. A few days later, Arafat had fallen into a coma on 4th November, and he died on 11th November (PASSIA 2015; Mark 2004; Rubin & Rubin 2005). Official condolence messages were made by the world leaders after the death of Arafat showed ideological subtlety and great linguistic dexterity (Fenton-Smith 2007).

2.3 LANDMARKS OF MAHMOUD ABBAS'S LIFE

President Mahmoud Abbas "Abu Mazen" is a refugee politician who was born on 15 November 1935 in Safed during the British Mandate time (BBC 2009; Schulze 2013; Legrain 1999). In 1948, Abbas has left Palestine to Syria as a refugee and then worked as a teacher of an elementary school (Global Investment and Business Center 2017). Later on, Abbas has achieved his bachelor degree in law from the University of Damascus (BBC 2009; Global Investment and Business Center 2017).

President Abbas was also a founding member of Fatah and one of four official representatives of Fatah in PLO (BBC 2009; Legrain 1999; Jarbawi & Pearlman 2007). During the late 1950s, he helped to recruit the Palestinian in Qatar for Fatah, and later on, he has accompanied Arafat in many countries into exile such as Jordan followed by Lebanon and Tunisia (BBC 2009; Global Investment and Business Center 2017).

Then in 1968, Abbas became a member of Palestinian National Council and the Executive Committee of PLO (Global Investment and Business Center 2017). In the 1970s, he was one of the main initiators with pacifist movements and Jewish left-wing. His strong network with powerful people including Arab leaders and heads of intelligence services enabled him for becoming a successful fundraiser for the PLO (BBC 2009).

Since 1980, the PLO Department for National and International relations was headed by Abbas (BBC 2009; Global Investment and Business Center 2017). In 1981, Abbas has joined the Palestine Liberation Organisation Executive Committee (PLOEC) (Legrain 1999). Abbas has achieved his PhD in history in 1982 from the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow (BBC 2009; Global Investment and Business Center 2017). After the death of Abu Jihad, the chairman of the portfolio for the occupied Palestinian territories in May 1988, Abbas became his successor (Global Investment and Business Center 2017).

Based on his reputation as the dove of PLO, and his relations with the Israeli leftists, Abbas has headed the team of Palestinian negotiators during the secret talks of Oslo. Then on 13 September 1993, Abbas has signed the accord with Israeli on behalf of PLO (Global Investment and Business Center 2017). He has followed Arafat in 1993 to White House for signing Oslo Accords and he was considered as the key architect of Oslo accords (Mohan 2004; Schulze 2013; BBC 2009). Also in 1994, Abbas became the Head of Negotiating Affairs Department for PLO, and he signed in September 1995 the Interim Agreement on behalf of PLO. In April 1996, Abbas has become the secretary of PLO Executive Committee (Global Investment and Business Center 2017; Legrain 1999).

Abbas was appointed as the first Palestinian Prime Minister in the sixth Palestinian government in 2003 (BBC 2009; Schulze 2013; Mohan 2004). Abbas has different deep schisms in perceptions and political vision from Arafat, particularly regarding the use of violence which led him to resign from the Prime Minister post (Mohan 2004). Arafat tried to undermine him by granting him only the power that he was forced to give up and belittling him as a Palestinian “Karzai” (Jarbawi &

Pearlman 2007). Abbas has resigned after around four months beyond a power struggle with Arafat (BBC 2009).

After the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, he became the chairman of Executive Committee of PLO which is considered as the umbrella body that represents most of the Palestinian political factions (BBC 2009; Schulze 2013). In January 2005, Abbas became the second Palestinian President of Palestinian Authority by winning 62.3% of the votes, after the death Yasser Arafat (BBC 2009; Global Investment and Business Center, 2017; Schulze 2013).

During his presidential campaign for the succession of Arafat, Abbas has used the symbolism of Arafat to appease the Palestinian people for votes, and promised to uphold the legacy of Arafat and to fulfil the promise of Palestinian statehood. Abbas stressed on the key positions of Arafat, such as the right of return of Palestinian refugees, formation of an independent Palestinian state, Israel's disengagement from the Gaza and the West Bank, and discontinuing the construction of the Israeli wall (Mohan 2004; Nessman 2004). In 2007, Abbas has suffered after Hamas gained a victory in legislative polls; a few months later, Hamas has controlled Gaza by a military coup and Abbas ruled the West Bank only. Abbas was elected by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as "president of a future Palestinian state" in 2008 (BBC 2009).

Abbas had a relatively smooth way to lead Fatah after the death of Arafat (Al-Omari 2015). Abbas appeared confident by holding the General Conference of Fatah in 2009 that approved the new political program and elected new leadership. He was described as more powerful than before and his legitimacy became stronger (International crisis group 2009). Abbas has gained the support of Arab States and was well-liked by the Americans. He seemed to be in a comfortable political position to negotiate with Israel (Mohan 2004). Currently, like his predecessor Yasser Arafat, Abbas is holding the leadership of three posts related Palestinian institutions which are: Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, President of the State of Palestine, and Chairman of The Palestinian National Liberation Movement Fatah (Al-Omari 2015).

However, the advanced age of Abbas, expire of his legal presidential term, and his threats of resignation opened the question about the Palestinian succession for him (Al-Omari 2015). Unlike Arafat, Abbas has lack of charisma which made him unable for governing the system after Arafat. As a successor of Arafat, Abbas made a great effort in asserting his authority in a political system to replace his lack of charisma. Abbas could not command his own followers or gain fame as a military leader. Instead of that, he has worked behind the scenes, was soft-spoken, and relentlessly supported negotiations (Jarbawi & Pearlman 2007).

2.4 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PLO AND FATAH

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is considered as the umbrella that covers several Palestinian parties and factions (Al-Omari 2015; Zanotti 2014). PLO is considered as the official representative for Palestinian people (Sharif, 2009). The Marxist groups and Arab nationalist are some of the factions under PLO (Zanotti 2014). PLO is a general organisational framework that includes most of the Palestinian organisations like unions, professional associations, trade, commando groups, and prominent national figures that aimed to achieve the Palestinian national goals (Hamid 1975).The establishment of PLO was in 1964 (Hamid 1975), under the League of Arab States aegis in exile (Zanotti 2014).

Four hundred Palestinian delegates in May 1964 came from several countries and held their first meeting in Jerusalem at the Intercontinental Hotel (Rubin & Rubin 2005). Ahmad Al-Shuqairy, the first chairman of PLO has drafted its covenant, which stressed on the armed struggle to liberate Palestine (Frisch 2005). Shuqeiri who was at fifty-seven year old was handpicked as the leader of PLO by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. PLO had its own treasury, army, and own parliament which is the Palestine National Council (PNC) (Rubin & Rubin 2005). Following the 1967 Six-Day War, PLO asserted its own identity by waging a war of attrition against Israel from Jordan (Zanotti 2014).

The largest movement in the PLO is Fatah which has taken over the PLO leadership through Yasser Arafat who became the new chairman of PLO instead of

Shuqeiri in 1969 (Frisch 2005; Rubin & Rubin 2005; Zanotti 2014). However, both PLO and Fatah are intertwined and it is reflected by having the same leader Yasser Arafat as Fatah undisputed leader, and the Chairman of PLO (Frisch 2005).

Inside PLO, Fatah effectively controls the decision-making, and enjoys the highest representation, following by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PLO is working through a quota system that was applied since the 1970s which never significantly changed and each component party or factions is entitled to particular staff positions and shares of representative (Al-Omari 2015). PLO has faced several organisational changes and developments during a long time of transformation (Hamid 1975).

PLO has moved in 1974 to the international scene forefront. PLO has paid less attention to its internal structure and its relationship to the Palestinian community as a whole social, political, and cultural (Hamid 1975). PLO was recognised as the representative of the Palestinians and invited by the United Nations General Assembly to join the deliberations on the question of Palestine. On 13 November 1974, the leader of PLO Yasser Arafat has addressed the General Assembly in a landmark appearance. Arafat has concluded his speech by saying “Today I have come, bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand” (Akasaga 2008).

In United Nations in 1974 Arafat said, "Help me to succeed with the olive branch so that I can put down the gun." In 1975, PLO became a full member in Nonalignment Movement, and then eighty-six countries had recognised the PLO in the late 1970s (Rubin & Rubin 2005). To date, PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people, while the Palestinian Authority administers the areas over which Israel has given it a jurisdiction. PLO has embassies and missions in many countries with full diplomatic status in some countries, full membership in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the League of the Arab States, a representative in Washington, DC, and maintains a permanent observer mission to the United Nations (Zanotti 2014).

On the other hand, the establishment of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement "Fatah" which is a core and dominant movement in Palestinian politics and leadership was as clandestine movement in the late of 1950s but officially launched in 1965 (Al-Omari 2015; Løvlie 2014; Sharif 2009). The idea of founding Fatah came from young Palestinian graduates activists who were working in Gulf countries (Baumgarten 2005; Sharif 2009). Those Palestinian activists saw the need for a new type of Palestinian movement, especially with the thriving status of Israel and deteriorating the situation of Palestinian refugees (Baumgarten 2005).

Most of those founding members did not have any fanatical tendencies whether a secular or religious (Sharif 2009). The establishment of Fatah was led firstly from Kuwait, followed respectively by Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and finally Gaza and West Bank (International crisis group 2009). Fatah was established as a secular and leftist liberation movement that sponsored by the Soviet Union and it was founded and grew during the struggle of the anti-colonial period. It has a secular and revolutionary ideology and combined them with nationalist rhetoric that affected by the anti-colonial discourse which has helped it to achieve the sponsorship from the Soviet Union. At that time, the Soviet Union has sponsored several liberation movements around the world against the West and colonial powers (Løvlie 2014).

The ideology of Fatah focuses on Palestinian nationalism, "entity, state, and identity", establishing Palestinian state equal to other Arab countries, and liberation of Palestine by Palestinian action. The political program of Fatah depends on the war of liberation and armed struggle similar to Vietnam and Algeria models, politics for achieving of a sovereign Palestinian state, and mobilisation via nationalist appeal (Baumgarten 2005).

As a Palestinian form, Fatah considered the way to the unity of Arab must comes through the liberation of Palestine. Fatah has succeeded to mobilise all Palestinian society for its form of struggle, ideology, and political goals (Baumgarten 2005). The support for Fatah by Palestinians came because of its pragmatism and the promise for achieving some liberty after over than 60 years, and not only because of its secularist nationalism and revolutionary ideals (Løvlie 2014).

In the late of the 1960s, the foundations of recent Palestinian politics were framed, especially after the rise of Fatah and other commando groups that worked for having an independent struggle in Palestine. The legitimacy of Fatah was gained through the basis of deed and ideology, and after joining PLO in 1969, they brought this legitimacy with them (Jarbawi & Pearlman 2007). Some countries including Syria and Jordan have banned organising the election of Fatah since the beginning to the mid-1970. Since its classification as an illegal organisation by Israel, there was a necessity to keep the presence of Fatah clandestine in the occupied Palestinian territories. Then Fatah has started its limited above-ground activities through its student movement "Shabiba" in 1982, but holding its election was a difficult mission if not impossible (International crisis group 2009).

Fatah has benefited from being the dominant movement in PLO and the core of the Palestinian Authority that was founded in 1994 through its charismatic leader Yasser Arafat (Al-Omari 2015; International crisis group 2009). Fatah became the dominant party in the Palestinian Legislative Council and it has authored and formulated the constitution of the Palestinian Authority during Arafat's presidency to Palestinian Authority (Løvlie 2014).

2.5 MAIN PALESTINIAN ISSUES AND CRISES

This section discusses the main Palestinian issues such as refugee, Jerusalem, right of return, UN resolutions, and Israeli settlements. It also discusses several crises including Palestinian catastrophe, several wars between Israel and Arab countries, and the peace process. A review of several main Palestinian issues, events, and crises in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is necessary since they are considered as the base of the crises faced by Palestinian Presidents later on.

The Palestinian people have faced injustices and suffering including the use of violence against them. The actions of Zionism were as if the Palestinian people had never existed and also they never stop denying the very fact of the Palestinian people existence (Deleuze & Murphy 1998). The Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who is a Polish immigrant, has defended the right of non-indigenous Jews into

settlement anywhere in Palestine and he has denied all Arabs rights who were born in there from returning to their homeland (Halbrook 1981).

The collected topographic information by Zionist terrorist groups like Haganah prior to 1948, especially during the Arab revolution was totally useful for them in their attacks on the Palestinian villages. The information was used in search and arrest operations and led to mass torture and executions. The Zionists operations in 1948 have exposed that the early reconnaissance and excursions journeys and the data collection was not just an academic exercise in geography (Pappe 2007). Although the Trusteeship Council of UN has drafted in April 1948 statute for Jerusalem as an international city during the war, the western part of Jerusalem was seized by the Jewish, and the eastern part by Arabs and Jordan (Mark 1999). Later in April 1948, Deir Yassin massacre was committed by the Irgun Zionist terrorist organisation that was under the leadership of Menachem Begin who became the Israeli Prime Minister later on (Safty 2014).

The ethnic cleansing plan by Haganah is considered as a clear ethnic cleansing operation according to international law as a crime against humanity. This ethnic cleansing crime occurred in front of the whole world and witnessed by the UN observers and foreign reporters was not considered as a crime (Pappe 2007). Not much after the massacre, several numbers of prominent Americans Jewish such as Albert Einstein were against the visit of Menachem Begin to the United States. Those American Jewish attributed their disagreement on this visit to the similarity of 'Freedom Party' which led by Begin, the predecessor of the Likud Party to the Fascist and Nazi parties (Safty 2014).

A month after committing Deir Yassein massacre and several other massacres by Zionists, the British mandate to Palestine was over on 14 May 1948 and the British forces were disengaged (Akasaga 2008; Pappe 2007). Britain allowed the cleansing to take place, in front of the eyes of its soldiers and officials and hampered the UN efforts to intervene in a way that might have saved a number of Palestinians. The UN had only limited access to Palestine since the British authorities banned the UN outfit

to be present on the ground, thereby ignoring that part of the Partition Resolution that demanded the presence of a UN committee (Pappe 2007).

The establishment of Israel on Palestinian territories was proclaimed on 14 May 1948 by the Jewish Agency. Then the fight was broken out on 15 May 1948 immediately between Palestinians and Zionists, and then the Arab neighbouring states have sent troops to Palestine in the next day to support Palestinians (Akasaga 2008; Pappe 2007; Spangler 2015). The Arab states sent a small army in comparison to their real military capability in a trial to stop the ethnic cleansing that had been in full swing for over a month (Pappe 2007).

Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced by Zionist gangs who were supported by American, European, and British Jews to leave their own lands to other areas in Palestine and neighbouring countries. The Palestinian Catastrophe or Nakba is considered as a defiance to the partition resolution by the United Nations (Sharif 2009). The Palestinian refugee are the vast majority of Palestinian people who were displaced, driven, and or fled from their homes from 1947-1949 as a result of catastrophe "Nakba" in context of the establishment of Israel state (International crisis group 2004; Zanotti 2014). During the Palestinian catastrophe, the Zionist underground militias have destroyed over 531 Palestinian villages, and emptied almost 11 urban neighbourhoods from their indigenous people (Pappe 2007).

Even the number of displaced and refugees was varied greatly, but the estimated number was approximately 750,000 refugees in 1949 by the UN Economic Survey Mission. Almost 280,000 refugees left their homes to West Bank, 200,000 to Gaza Strip, 97,000 to Lebanon, 75,000 to Syria, 70,000 to Jordan, and smaller numbers to Egypt, Iraq, and other countries (International crisis group, 2004). The UN resolutions gave those Palestinians who were forced to leave their homeland in Palestine in 1948 a refugee status (Al-Natour 1997).

Later on 11 December 1948, the General Assembly of the UN during its 186th plenary meeting has passed the resolution 194 regarding Palestine. The resolution suggested permitting the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and living

peacefully with their neighbours as a sooner practicable date. Additionally, compensations should be paid for the properties of the Palestinians who were not willing to return, or for any damage or loss of their properties under the international law principles (UNISPAL 1948).

The Palestinian refugees' right of return is guaranteed under the UN Resolution 194 and international law, and it must be implemented. By leaving it unresolved, the refugees issue has the possibility of undermining any permanent peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel needs to understand that peace is impossible while it is denying justice (Arafat 2002). The establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was aftermath the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948; its objective was for offering a temporary solution for the Palestinian refugees (Elsayed-Ali 2006).

The Palestinians in the Diaspora also lived in diverse circumstances in insular communities in the operated camps by UNRWA and were fully reliant on its aids (Biggs 2015). Yasir Arafat (2002) mentioned that it is the time for Palestinians to state their vision and for the world to hear clearly that vision. Palestinians seek justice and fair solution to the Palestinian refugee's plight that have not been permitted to return to their homes for more decades.

Then in 1956 Israeli started its aggression against Egypt and as a part of the tripartite attack by Britain, France, and Israel. The Israeli invasion has started on 29 October which came beyond the decision of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser on 26 July for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and withdrawing the American and British offer for funding Aswan Dam building (Azmy & Saied 2015). Another aggression was Setback War on 5 June 1967 when Israel has waged a war and defeated Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Within a six days period, Israel has wrested Gaza Strip which was under Egyptian control, the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, West Bank and East Jerusalem which were under Jordanian control, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Therefore, Israel has controlled the entire historic Palestine area which constituted Palestine under the British Mandate (Sharif 2009; Spangler 2015; Zanotti 2014).

After the defeat of Arab states, the Security Council has adopted the resolution 242 unanimously on 22 November 1967. This resolution called to the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories in June 1967. The resolution also called to terminate all the claims of belligerency, recognise the political sovereignty and independence, and the right of living in peace for other states (Akasaga 2008; Sharif 2009). The resolution also called to a just settlement for the refugee problem. This resolution was accepted by Jordan and Egypt, rejected by Syria, and criticised strongly by PLO since it has reduced the question of the refugee problem (Akasaga 2008).

That was followed by another Israeli aggression against Jordan which was known as Karameh battle in February 1968. This battle is considered as a real turning point for Fatah when the Israeli army sent his huge force against a Palestinian refugee camp village. The decision of Arafat was bold by giving the orders for Fatah fighters to face the overwhelmingly superior Israeli force instead of their withdrawal (Baumgarten 2005). In fact, the name of that town was “Karameh” which means “dignity” or “honour”. Fatah fighters have beaten the Israeli and stood up to them. The symbolism of al-Karameh battle was huge since the regular Arab armies had failed three times to win the wars of 1948, 1956, and 1967, while Fatah had done that and won the war (Saada 2008).

Then on 6 October 1973, a major assault was launched by the Egyptian army through the Suez Canal against Israel in Sinai. Simultaneously, the Palestinian commandos have carried out several attacks against Israeli troops in Golan Heights to open the way for Syrian forces advancement. Other Palestinian commandos’ forces have advanced from Lebanon Mountains towards Jabal Al-Sheikh high hills in Syria to join the Syrian troops in their battle (Sharif 2009). Then on 22 October 1973, the resolution 338 was adopted by the Security Council which is considered as a confirmation of the year 1967 resolution 242 (Akasaga 2008).

Five years later in March 1978, the Israeli has invaded southern Lebanon. Based on the Lebanese request, Israel was asked by the Security Council for withdrawing its forces from Lebanon. Followed that the establishment of the United

Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). However, in June 1978 during the completion of Israeli withdrawal, the Israeli have handed their positions to its allies from Christians and other associated militias instead of UNIFIL (Akasaga 2008). On 17 September 1978, based on the United States President Jimmy Carter's invitation, Camp David Accords was signed following 12 days of secret negotiations. Israel was represented by its Prime Minister Menachem Begin while Egypt was represented by its President Anwar El Sadat. Camp David agreement was totally rejected by PLO, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and Yemen (Sharif 2009).

Then in 1982, the Israeli invaded Lebanon until 1985 and its invasion achieved some of its goals by weaken PLO there and working on continued rapid settlement in West Bank (Andersen et al. 2014). The Israeli aircrafts have attacked the main sport city in Lebanon on 5 June 1982 (Sharif 2009). On the same day, the Security Council in its resolution 508 has called to halt all the military activities immediately, but Israel has invaded Lebanon in the next day of the resolution. Israel has overrun or passed the UNIFIL positions. Then the resolution 509 of the Security Council has repeated the calls for a ceasefire and asked Israel for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon but Israel did not stop its invasion (Akasaga 2008).

On 17 September 1982, a massacre was committed in Sabra and Shatila, the two Palestinian refugee camps in south Beirut. Both Israeli forces and extreme Lebanese Christian Phalange militias who follow the Lebanese Maronite Church have massacred thousands of Palestinian civilians including children, women, and old people (Akasaga 2008; Sharif 2009). Despite the huge gap in weapons and numbers during the Israeli envision, yet that has unified the Arab forces to fight Israel together. The Palestinian revolution is not only a gun, or else it would be robbers and thieves. This revolution is a scissors of surgeon, a hoe of farmer, a hammer of worker, a Palestinian women that sewing at late night for her children, and a newborn child on Palestinian soil (Arafat & Bishara 1983).

Then, on 20 December 1983, the evacuation for thousands of Palestinians including the Palestinian leadership was carried out. The Palestinians were sent from Lebanese Tripoli to Tunisia, Yemen, and some other countries by ships which flying

the United Nations flag. This process occurred based on the request by Arafat to the Secretary-General of the United Nations who responded to that request for humanitarian grounds (Akasaga 2008).

Following that, the first Palestinian intifada broke out on 8 December 1987, after an Israeli forces vehicle have crushed Palestinian civilian labours which killed four and wounded other seven Palestinians (Harms & Ferry 2008; Sharif 2009). Several spontaneous demonstrations erupted in 1987 which came 20 years after the Israeli occupation to Gaza Strip and West Bank (Akasaga 2008). These demonstrations have been faced by Israeli forces which used live ammunition and tear gas. Then 20 years old Palestinian youth was killed and became the first martyr of that “Intifada” or shaking off (Harms & Ferry 2008).

The first "Intifada" or uprising in 1987 that rose up in Gaza and West Bank in opposition to Israeli occupation led to increase the international sympathy and attention to the Palestinian cause (Zanotti 2014). The unarmed Palestinian struggle “Intifada" against Israel enabled Arafat for opening new paradigm of diplomacy and politics, a year later at Palestinian National Council (PNC) meeting in Algiers (Baumgarten 2005).

On 15 November 1988, the Palestinian National Council declared the independent State of Palestine in their meeting in Algiers, and also considered Jerusalem as the capital of the state (Boyle 1990; Zanotti 2014). Arafat also has stated through the public pronouncements in 1988 that PLO is serving as temporary Government of Palestine State (Boyle 1990). Yasser Arafat has promised during his dialogue with the United States to accept the “land-for-peace” principle embodied in 242 Resolution by the Security Council and to recognise Israel’s right to exist (Zanotti 2014). Additionally, the Palestinian National Council declared its willingness to negotiate and settle the conflict based on the UN resolutions, especially 242 and 338 Security Council Resolutions (Benvenisti 1993).

One month after the declaration of independence, the United Nations General Assembly on 15 December 1988 has adopted 43/177 Resolution that recognised the

State of Palestine proclamation by National Council of Palestine (Akasaga 2008; Boyle 1990).

A few years later, the Peace Conference on the Middle East was held in October 1991 in Madrid-Spain and the chairmanship of the conference was under both the United States and the Soviet Union. A representative of the UN Secretary-General attended the conference as an observer. The conference has brought the parties of the conflict together, face-to-face, for the first time including several Arab countries, Palestine, and Israel (Akasaga 2008). That was followed by the secret talks which started in January 1993 in Oslo between PLO and Israelis upon the Norwegian government invitation. These meetings were totally secret, even the United States which was aware about the meetings has no information about their substances. After eight months of discussions, the announcement about the accord came out on 20 August 1993 (Harms & Ferry 2008).

On 9 September 1993, an exchange of letters happened between Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to precede the Declaration of Principles. Setting the stage for settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has come out from the Declaration of Principles and the letters (Benvenisti 1993). Oslo Agreement was signed on 13 September 1993 in the White House lawn between Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israeli Government (Al-Natour 1997; Benvenisti 1993; Harms & Ferry 2008; Pundak 2001; Sharif 2009).

Oslo Accords was not a final settlement or peace treaty, but it was an interim agreement or agenda to discuss such things (Harms & Ferry 2008). In the Declaration of Principles, both Palestinians and Israelis have agreed that the status of Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, and boundaries issues would be discussed in the permanent status negotiations (Mark 1999). Based on the Oslo Accords, the Palestinians were promised by freedom in May 1999. Instead of fulfilling that promise, the Palestinian people have suffered from the growth of illegal Israeli settlements on Palestinian land, increasing and restricting of freedom of movement, and doubling of Israeli settlers since 1993 (Arafat 2002).

On 4 May 1994, both Palestinian and Israeli have concluded an agreement in Cairo to implement the first phase of the Oslo Declaration of Principles. The formal date for beginning the interim period was on 1st July (Akasaga 2008). On 1 July 1994, Arafat has returned to Gaza. Then, the Palestinian Authority establishment was in 1994 after the return of Arafat (Akasaga 2008; Rubin & Rubin 2005; Sharif 2009). Hence, West Bank and Gaza Strip were controlled by the Palestinian Authority which functioned under PLO administrative capacity (Sharif 2009).

The negotiations and signing of the interim agreement were in Taba resort at the Red Sea in Egypt on 24 September 1995. The ceremony which known later as Oslo II was held at the White House four days later by attendance from Arafat, Peres, and Rabin (Harms & Ferry 2008). Oslo II agreement indicated several issues such as Palestinian elections, trade conditions between the two countries, release of Palestinian prisoners, and transfer of land (Sharif 2009). The Agreement has also indicated that implementing of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 to be through the final status application (Al-Natour 1997).

A year after, on 20 January 1996 Yasser Arafat was elected as the first Palestinian President of Palestinian Authority in the first Palestinian General Elections (Brown 2005; Rubin & Rubin 2005). The Palestinian General Elections was for both Presidential and Legislative (CEC1996; Pina 2006). This election occurred based on the Palestinian Elections law in 1995. Only two candidates run for elections, Yasser Arafat and Samiha Khalil. Arafat achieved 88.2 per cent of the votes while Khalil got only 11.5 per cent (CEC 1996). Arafat became the first Palestinian President after winning the election overwhelmingly (Pina 2006). The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) became the legislative arm for the Palestinian Authority and has the power to approve all the position in the cabinet and to confirm the Prime Minister. Fatah party which headed by Arafat has with its affiliated candidates won the majority of seats (Pina 2006).

In January 1997, the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron was signed between PLO and Israel which concerned about the Israel Forces redeployment in Hebron city of West Bank. Also, a timetable was created for further the Israeli

forces redeployment from other places in West Bank, and to continue the negotiations of the permanent status (Akasaga 2008).

On 23 October 1998, following eight days of talks in Maryland, both PLO and Israel have wrapped up Wye River Memorandum in Washington. The agreement was signed by both the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has and attended by President Clinton and King Hussein of Jordan. The agreement has included: transferring 14.2 per cent of lands in West Bank to the Palestinian control, withdrawal of Israeli troops from 13 per cent in West Bank, resuming the negotiations of permanent status by both sides, and taking actions against terrorism by Palestinian Authority (Akasaga 2008).

Then, on 11 July 2000 Camp David II summit has started, three months before the beginning of second intifada based on the invitation of the American President Bill Clinton in Camp David, Maryland (Akasaga 2008; Harms & Ferry 2008). The summit was accompanied with press blackout, and lack of produced maps or written records. The Israeli proposals were transferred orally through the American mediators to the Palestinians (Harms & Ferry 2008). The summit ended without reaching an agreement between both sides on the issues of permanent status such as refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, and borders. Both sides, however, have committed for continuing the negotiations as soon as possible to reach an agreement (Akasaga 2008). The return of Arafat to home was as a hero who did not give up anything during the summit (Harms & Ferry 2008).

On 28 September 2000, al-Aqsa Intifada or the second Intifada started with several waves of protests after the controversial visit of Ariel Sharon, the Likud Party leader who became Israeli Prime Minister later to al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Sharon was accompanied by heavy Israeli forces escort which included around 1000 officers and soldiers (Akasaga 2008; Harms & Ferry 2008). The reported results of the fifth day of clashes indicated almost 1,500 injuries, with at least 50 people killed mostly from Palestinians (Akasaga 2008).

Then, on 9 January 2005, Mahmoud Abbas was elected as the second President of the Palestinian Authority after the death of the first President Yasser Arafat in 2004 (BBC 2009; Schulze 2013). This year also marked the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza in August, although there was some opposition in Israel against this decision it was taken by Ariel Sharon the Israeli Prime Minister. The completion of the withdrawal process was in September and the settlements were handed to Palestinian Authority. This withdrawal came after occupying Gaza Strip since 4 June 1967. However, Israel has only withdrawn from inside Gaza, but it has kept control over the borders of Gaza, territorial waters and airspace (Akasaga 2008).

After that, the majority of seats for the second Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006 were won by Hamas movement. Following the results of elections, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was asked by President Abbas for forming a new Palestinian Government. Then a power struggle and friction occurred between Hamas and PLO coalition which eventually led to armed conflict (Akasaga 2008).

In February 2007, new reconciliation efforts were started in Mecca based on the invitation of the Saudi King, and both Hamas and Fatah leaders have agreed on sharing the power within the Palestinian Authority. Hence, a new national unity government was formed in March with Ministers from Hamas, Fatah, and Independents. The newly formed government has asserted in its programme on respecting the international legitimacy decisions and the signed agreements by PLO (Akasaga 2008). However, in June 2007, Hamas violently took over Gaza Strip and became the de facto authority there. The response of President Abbas was through dissolving the national unity government and creating an emergency cabinet which led by Salam Fayyad as a Prime Minister (Akasaga 2008).

On the other hand, on 27 December 2008, offensive airstrike attacks by Israel were launched against Gaza Strip and then followed by ground offensive invasion on 3 January 2009. Israel has continued its attacks despite the pressure from the international community and Security Council. Palestinians have lost over 1440 people the majority were civilians, while Israel lost 13 people including 4 civilians. The 22 days of the Israeli war against Gaza have increased the dire humanitarian

situation. The estimated number of displaced Palestinians who lived in UNRWA shelters was over 46 000 people. The accessibility of Palestinian people for drinking water, food, sanitation, and electricity services during the war was extremely limited. Also, several health facilities such as hospitals and clinics were destroyed or damaged by Israeli forces (Zanotti 2009).

Another attacks were launched by Israel on the Gaza Strip in the mid of 2014 until starting the ceasefire on 26 August 2014. According to preliminary statistics, the number of Palestinians killed reached over 2131 including 501 children. The number of displaced Palestinian people who remained in the UNRWA shelters was around 110 000 people. The destroyed Palestinian houses reached almost 18 000 which left over 108 000 homeless people (OCHA 2014).

2.6 CRISIS OCCURRENCE AND INFLUENCE

A review of studies was conducted on the topic of crisis; specifically authors have focused on the occurrence and influence of crisis. Crisis can occur and strike any organisation, is inevitable, and can happen at any place and time in any number of forms. This is true even if there is awareness within the organisation and actively attempts to prevent the crisis. Crisis can be infliction on different levels, individual, organisational, or other manifestations of crisis (Coombs 2010; Harrison 2005; Lee et al. 2011; Ray 1999; Selzer 2013). There are common elements among the previous studies where they stressed that crisis is inevitable and causes a negative influence on organisations and individuals.

A crisis is an operation out of the ordinary, and it is a critical turning or decision point in a situation. Often it occurs during an unstable situation when many issues need to be solved. It can start as a slow-moving incident that could not be controlled, or it can occur immediately and leads to the crippling of decisions. It is an escalation of events and requires a crucial and abrupt response. Mostly, a crisis has little tolerance for error, little information, and a great deal of ambiguity (Roosen 1997).

Although, the definition of Roosen (1997) was clear and important, it did not state how the response to crisis should be taken. Having a crucial and abrupt response to the crisis is not enough since the response should be effective. As discussed by Fred Garcia (2006) that ineffective response causes unfavourable circumstance or competitive disadvantage.

Crises are increasingly significant in political, social, environmental, and economic forces, and are able to create faster change than single phenomena. Crises have the possibility to cause harm and create systematic and widespread disruption. Yet, crises may be forced to renewal, growth, and constructive change. Crises are able to change the held beliefs, create shifts in populations and demographics, reshape institutions, undermine the stability of economic, and alter ecosystems. Thus, understanding these events is important, especially by clarifying and understanding the communication processes role in the managing, meaning, resolution, and onset of crises (Sellnow & Seeger 2013).

Discussing the effectiveness role of the communication process by Sellnow & Seeger (2013) in a crisis situation was vital since it raises awareness about the communication efficiency in recovering from the crisis. Definitely, all crises are problems, yet not all problems are crises. The situations of problems influence limited people's number, and handling them can be faster with limited resources, and they do not get attention from media and others. In contrast, crises are unexpected serious events that can threaten the survival of an organisation and include long-term implications. The crisis has a possible significant influence on many audiences of an organisation, and it disturbs business routine (Zappala & Carden 2004).

Effective crisis response is not only for protecting the reputation, but it is also a competitive advantage. Effective crisis response has a direct influence on the productivity of the company, stock price, demand for its product, and other success quantitative measures. Ineffective crisis response causes a competitive disadvantage, and can even put the existence of enterprise in a risk (Fred Garcia 2006).

Crises fix the spotlight on those in power, and they have the ability for shaping destinies of organisations, breaking and making political careers, and shaking the bureaucratic orders. Crises occur in several forms and shapes starting from human-made incidents, natural disasters, and conflicts that affect the societies order and peace negatively (Boin et al. 2005). In several professional studies, daily reports, corporate and entrepreneurial papers, often it can be encounter quotes about business difficulties, several conflicts, and natural disasters of smaller and larger proportions. They are influencing industries, companies and even countries that are linked to the crisis in one way or another (Dubrovski 2007).

Crisis are various and they started from apparently small, localised events that interrupt the ability of an organisation from achieving its objectives to both national and international crisis that disturb the political and social framework within which global organisations operate. Additionally, crisis event can quickly alter tactical, strategic capabilities, and the ongoing of the organisation, which can create a state of uncertainty and chaos that influence the entire organisational structure (Flynn 2005). Mostly, the term crisis used for dangerous, future decisive, difficult situations and it refers to extreme wide area of political, social, economic, mental, and environmental processes. A corporate crisis is a critical, unfavourable, undesired, and short-term situation in a company based on both external and internal reasons which has direct threat to the company growth and existence (Dubrovski 2007).

Harming stakeholders and organisations is the common elements of all crises (Alpaslan 2004). But the risks of crisis are high, especially for governments and their public relations staff, because the task of the government is to ensure public health and safety (Lee et al. 2011). Crisis mostly induces anxiety and anger among stakeholders. A crisis with internal causes is considered as high crisis responsibility since they can generate more anger and cause more reputational damage than those with external causes or what can be called a crisis with low responsibility (Strömbäck & Kioussis 2011).

The discussed above by several scholars about the huge negative influence of crisis on organisations, individuals, public, and threatening the existence of

organisations shows the importance of preparing solution scenarios any upcoming crisis. Preparing for crisis might help organisations and individuals to overcome the crisis or at least reduce its acuteness.

2.7 CRISIS FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

Although, there are several existed works of literature on crisis topic, yet the definition of crisis is diverse. This study is trying to offer an overview of similarities and differences in scholarly point of view about the crisis. A crisis is an event that able to ruins the reputation of an organisation and disrupts its normal operations in just days and even can write off organisation if the crisis is badly managed (Tench & Yeomans 2006). Additionally, a crisis defined as unexpected, sudden, and negative situation or incident that threatens to disrupt the operations of an organisation (Coombs 2007b; Oliver 2004; Ruff & Aziz 2003). A crisis is a negative and largely irregular shock to an entity; it appears from a bad business decision that gathers turns and steam into a crisis or can be a disorderly shock to a firm (Maldonado & Vera 2014).

Crisis is a critical period after an event that might has a negative influence on an organisation in which decisions have to be made, which will influence the organisation's bottom line. It is a time of exploration, requiring the rapid processing of decisive action and information to attempt to minimise the organisation's harm and to make the most of a potentially damaging situation (Harrison 2005). Mostly, the term of crisis used for dangerous, decisive and difficult situations, and refers to an extremely wide area of political, social, economic, mental, and environmental processes (Dubrovski 2007).

It can be seen that most of the above-mentioned authors emphasised on suddenness and negativity of crisis event. For the purpose of this study, the crisis is identified as an inevitable, unstable, and sudden situation that can occur at any time or place by threatening organisations or individuals and harm them in different forms. Solving these crises requires understanding them to repair the reputation of those

organisation or individuals. Yet, the other following scholars asserted on the characteristics of crisis and how to handle those crises when they occur.

Crisis can be handled by a person immediately with direct training and responsibility, or mostly with good common sense. It may require the cooperative effort of more people that may require bringing people into work from home or a team of colleagues and outside contractors/agencies. If there is no control on any issue it may cause a crisis (Oliver 2004). The situation of crisis includes four elements used for assessing its potential reputational threat: (1) The type of crisis; (2) Sharpness of damage; (3) History of crisis; and (4) History of relationship (Coombs 2006). Analysing the situation of crisis is a significant step to understand the influential use of crisis responses. The selection of crisis response is influenced by identifying the situation crisis (Coombs 1998).

The types and responses of crises should be identified and then explain how those types influence the selection of responses. William Benoit, the theorist of image restoration theory already explained how specific type of crisis influences the effectiveness of its responses. Crisis managers start choosing the response strategy by identifying the type of crisis, which conceptualised as the frame used by the public to interpret the event (Coombs & Holladay 2002). The type of crisis must be determined by practitioners since the response of crisis depends partially on the type and duration of the crisis (Cutlip et al. 2009).

From the studies of (Coombs 1998, 2006; Coombs & Holladay 2002; Cutlip et al. 2009) there was an agreement that selecting a suitable crisis response should be according to the crisis type. The following are types and sub-types of crises that were written by several scholars from different fields and specialisations. Most scholars wrote about crises types based on their knowledge related in their fields. Hence, that affects extending the categorisations of crisis. Notwithstanding the aim of this study is not to create a debate about those differences of categorisation, but to find the common categories that were stated in most studies. Exploring several points of view about the types of crises offers a good opportunity for modifying the related types to be used in this study.

Crisis can be classified in several ways such as reputational, economic related, psychopathic acts, natural disasters, physical, informational, and human-resource-related (Maldonado & Vera 2014). Crises contain unpredictable incidents such as sudden resignation, workplace violence, or termination of a top executive; natural disasters such as floods and hurricanes; and on-site emergencies such as industrial accidents and plant fires (Zappala & Carden 2004). Hutchins (2008) classified crises into two main types which are human-induced and natural-induced. The natural-induced crises were such as fires, tsunamis, hurricanes, and cyclones. The human-induced include explosions, terrorist attack, corruption, and scandals.

The focus on human and natural induced crises means focusing on the external factors that caused the crisis more than the internal factors which made by organisations or individuals themselves. Ignoring the internal crises might not be helpful in selecting a suitable response for them.

The pioneers of public relations Cutlip et al. (2009) defined three types of crises: (1) Immediate crisis: for this type, there is no time for planning and research that's why it is considered as the scariest unexpected and sudden type of crisis. It includes among others: earthquake, bomb scare, plane crash, fire, death of a key officer, product tampering, and shooting at workplace by disgruntled former staff. Avoiding the delay, conflict, and confusion requires working out in advance on how to react towards this type of crisis by the top management. (2) Emerging crises: this type gives more time for planning and research, but it has sudden erupt brewing for a long time. It includes for example overcharges on contracts of government, workplace sexual harassment, low morale and employee dissatisfaction, and substance abuse on the job. Convincing the top management for taking corrective action before reaching a critical stage in the crisis is a challenge. (3) Sustained crises: the crisis that remains for months or maybe for years despite the best management efforts. In this case, public relations is unable to control the speculation or persistent rumours reported by the media. It seems that countering information or denial is unable to stop the rumours.

Gundel (2005) classified types of crises into four types: (1) Conventional crises: they are predictable crisis and the probabilities of their costs of prevention,

impact, losses, and occurrence are well known; (2) Unexpected crises: this type of crisis is unpredictable and therefore no prevention for them was carried out, and its occurrence is rare comparing to conventional crisis but they are more threatening; (3) Intractable crises: the possibilities of intractable disasters impact are rare, but they are more dangerous than unexpected crisis, and some of its damages are irreversible. Interference in intractable crisis is almost impossible because of the features of systems concerned; and (4) Fundamental crises: they are the most dangerous type of crises since they are neither susceptible nor predictable to risk. The responses to this type are not sufficient or are unknown since the crisis surprisingly occurs. Although (Cutlip et al., 2009; Gundel 2005) have different types of crisis, the similarity of their classification was related to the occurrence of crisis whether with prior knowledge or suddenness.

Mitroff (2005) mentioned seven types of crises that appeared as a result of the huge businesses complexity. Those types are: (1) Natural disasters: such as: floods, fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, and mudslides; (2) Economic: such as: market crash, labour shortage, labour strikes, labour unrest, major earnings decline, major fluctuations and decline in stock price, and hostile takeovers; (3) Informational: such as: false information, loss of proprietary and confidential information, tampering with records of computer, and losing information from computers; (4) Reputational: such as: gossip, rumours, false rumours, slander, sick jokes, tempering with corporate logos, and damage to corporate reputation; (5) Human resources: such as: losing key executive or personnel, corruption, rise in absenteeism, accidents and vandalism, workplace violence; lack of succession plans, labour shortage, labour unrest, and labour strikes; (6) Physical: loss of key facilities, loss of key and material supplies and equipment plants, product failures, major plant disruption, explosions, breakdowns of key equipment, and poor quality control or product design; and (7) Psychopathic acts: terrorism, hostage taking, kidnapping, workplace violence, product tampering, and criminal or psychopathic acts.

Santiago (1997) categorised four types of crisis: (1) Natural disasters: earthquakes, typhoons, tidal waves or tsunamis, floods, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, tornadoes, and famines and plagues; (2) Actual disasters: explosions, plane crashes,

fires, transport collisions and accidents, mining cave-ins, construction mishaps, and shipwrecks (3) Man-made crises and systems breakdown: war, strikes, riots, revolution, rebellion, closing of a plant, crime waves, discontinuation of railroad line, power failures; and (4) Other crisis: such as: continuing emergencies, crises of and litigations, scandalous or controversial incidents, and litigations that includes problems of product liability suits, product recalls, long-term attack on a company, and suits of minority stockholders for mismanagement.

Shaluf et al. (2003) indicated two main categorisations of crises; every categorisation includes types and sub-types. (1) The first categorisation is conflict type situation: (a) External crisis: war including all type of wars, terrorism, threats, blockades, embargos, and relation breakdown. (b) Internal crisis: political systems and dictatorships, terrorist attacks, demonstrations civil disturbances, riots, sabotage, internal conflicts including ethnic and religion conflicts, executive kidnappings, strikes, and hostile takeovers. (2) The second categorisation is non-conflict crisis type: (a) Economic crisis: financial crisis and non-financial crisis. (b) Social crisis: product tampering, counterfeiting, price fixing, poor or faulty training, recalls, blackmail, cheating, corruption, malicious slander and false rumours, copycat threats, miscommunication/ misinformation, offsite sabotage/product tempering, boycotts, discriminations, sexual harassment, loss of proprietary information, and other problems such as hooligans, etc.

Shrivastava & Mitroff (1987) have classified the type of crisis into four main cells: (1) Economic and technical failures within the internal organisation: which occur because of the failure in core technology of companies including product injuries, undisclosed information, major industrial accidents, and computer breakdown; (2) Technological and economic failures within the firms environment: that cause crisis in the organisation such as natural disasters, large-scale systems failure, societal crises like political or civil, hostile takeover, and widespread environmental destruction; (3) Internal social processes and systems failures: it is primarily caused by managerial or operator errors, faulty control systems, failure in decision- making systems, intentional harm by psychopaths or saboteurs, unhealthy working conditions, organisational breakdown, sabotage by insiders, communication

breakdown, illegal activities, on-site product tampering, occupational health diseases, and failure to adapt/change; and (4) The social environment of corporations failures: it occurs when institutions or agents react to the corporation adversely in the social environment and includes counterfeiting, symbolic projection, off-site product tampering, terrorism, sabotage by outsiders, and executive kidnapping.

The above four studies included variety of crisis types that can face organisations or individuals which are wider than other studies. The studies of (Mitroff 2005; Shaluf et al. 2003) contributed to constructing the types of crises in the coding sheet of this study. The following paragraphs are including the categorisation of crises types from organisational perspective and types of crises that could influence day to day activities of organisational process.

Coombs & Holladay (2002) defined twelve types of crises which are: (1) Rumour: through spreading of false information that aims to harm an organisation; (2) natural disaster: an act of god event that occurs naturally and damages an organisation; (3) Malevolence/product tampering: the damage mostly occurs against an organisation by external agent; (4) Workplace violence: by attacking the current staff on the job from their current or former colleague; (5) Challenge: confrontation by claiming from disgruntled stakeholders that an organisation is running in an unsuitable manner; (6) Technical breakdown accident: industrial accident occurred because of an equipment or technology failure; (7) Technical breakdown product recall: through recalling a product from the market because of equipment or technology failure; (8) Megadamage: a technical breakdown accident that cause huge environmental damage; (9) Human breakdown accident: an industrial accident that resulted from human error; (10) Human breakdown product recall: by recalling a product because of human error; (11) Organisational misdeeds with no injuries: Through deceiving external stakeholders by management but without causing injury; and (12) Organisational misdeed management misconduct: through violating knowingly the regulations or laws or by management.

The study of Coombs (2006) was associated with his previous study Coombs & Holladay (2002). He categorised the crisis into three main clusters: (1) Victim

cluster: the organisation itself is a victim of this type of crisis: (a) Natural disaster: which is an act of nature and cause damage to the organisation such as earthquakes; (b) Rumours: such as spreading damaging and false information about organisation; (c) Workplace violence: by attack from former or current staff on current staff onsite; and (d) Product tampering/Malevolence: that caused by external agent to an organisation. (2) Accidental cluster: the organisational actions that led to these types of crises were unintentional. (a) Challenges: by claiming from stockholders that an organisation is running unsuitable activities; (b) Megadamage: where mostly technical accident caused an environmental damage; (c) Technical breakdown accidents: where an equipment or technology failure causes an industrial accident; and (d) Technical breakdown recalls: where an equipment or technology failure causes a product recall. (3) Preventable cluster: in this case the organisation knowingly violated regulation or law, took unsuitable actions, or place people at risk: (a) Human breakdown accidents: that an industrial accident caused by human error; (b) Human breakdown recalls: that recalling the product caused by human error; (c) Organisational misdeed with no injuries: where an organisation deceive its stakeholders without injury; (d) Organisational misdeed management misconduct: when management of organisation violate regulations or laws; and (e) Organisational misdeed with injuries: when injures occurred to stakeholders by management and place those stakeholders at risk.

However, there was no big difference between the first and second study Coombs & Holladay (2002) and Coombs (2006). In the study of 2006, Coombs just tried to combine every four of the twelve types of crises under one category, and added only one more type which was “Organisational misdeed with injuries” to increase the number to 13 types instead of 12.

Similar to Coombs & Holladay (2002), Pearson & Clair (1998) did not group the types of crises under specific categories, but they have provided variety of types of crises that can influence organisations: Hostile takeover, extortion, product tampering, product/service boycott, product recall, plant explosion, terrorist attack, workplace bombing, work-related homicide, assault of customers, personnel assault, sexual harassment, counterfeiting, bribery, information sabotage, computer tampering, copyright infringement, executive kidnap, security breach malicious rumour, vehicular

fatality, natural disaster that destroys organisational information base, natural disaster that disrupts a major product or service, natural disaster that eliminates key stakeholders, natural disaster that destroys corporate headquarters, environmental spill, and escape of hazardous materials.

Richardson (1994) focused on the following potential crisis that mostly concentrates on the activities of an organisation and influences the modern society and its regularity: (1) Ecosystemic disasters: it is a cumulative effect type that arises from organisational activity gather combined force and threatens the widespread destruction of life forms; (2) Socio-technical disasters: are particular incidents in organisations that usually include huge economic and social costs and might cause loss of human life; (3) Business-economic failure crises: such as increasingly competitive marketplaces, hostile takeover bids, and market shifts. They arise through a change in the business conditions around the organisation and influence affect negatively on an unprepared and unresponsive organisation; and (4) Sociopathic attacks on the organisation: its main reason lies in the complex personalities of dangerous people such as blackmailers, kidnappers, political terrorists, production saboteurs, and product tamperers.

Some of the known crises that faced by organisations and companies and required crisis communication response strategies after they confronted with them included Exxon oil spill, Tylenol, Sears, AT& T, and Coke and Pepsi. The crisis of shipping company Exxon Valdez occurred after spilling of oil tanker and leaking of Bhopal gas in Alaska (Benoit 1997b, 2018). Johnson and Johnson faced the crisis of Tylenol capsules poisoning that caused several human victims (Benoit, 1996, 1997b, 2018; Benoit & Brinson 1994).

Sears faced crisis of auto repair and consumer fraud from the California Department of Consumer Affairs (Benoit 1996, 1997b, 2018). AT& T faced the crisis of interruption of services of long-distance telephone due to power outage New York City which blocked millions of calls halted the air service for hours (Benoit 1997b, 2018; Benoit & Brinson 1994). Finally, the accusation of Pepsi to Coke of subsidising

McDonald's as its largest customer. But Coke denied that charges of Pepsi (Benoit 1996, 1997b).

The researcher identified three main types of crises, and some of the sub-types are in line with the purpose of this study and related to the Palestinian case: (1) Political crises which include both external and internal crisis: (a) External crises: are these crises that occur with other countries including: war, attacks, threats, blockades, clashes, foreign pressure, and peace process; (b) Internal crises: which are the crises that occur inside the country itself such as internal conflict, power struggle, demonstrations, riots, and kidnapping. (2) Social and reputational including false information, rumours, information leakage, corruption, cheating, slanders, and counterfeiting. (3) Economic and financial: those crises such as financial crisis, unemployment, prices increase, market crash, labour shortage, employee dissatisfaction, and labour strikes.

2.8 EFFICIENCY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CRISIS LEADERSHIP

Several numbers of studies discussed the issue of crisis leadership. Those studies argued about the efficiency, role, and characteristics of crisis leadership that allow leaders to cope with a crisis.

The deeply rooted belief in the significance of public leadership is joined by rapid and often superficial estimation of leadership performance. Despite the importance of the symbolic performance, it is not the only performance dimension by which crisis leadership should be estimated (Boin et al. 2013). There is a belief that the development of leadership itself is in crisis since it does not sufficiently combine the leadership concept that supports the practice of leadership in organisations. By exploring this concept, only leadership development can support an organisation to meet the demands brought about by a crisis. The concept of leadership is a significant structure to recast the development of leadership in context as cultural change instead of individual change (Probert & James 2011).

In history, it might be true that great leaders are those who turned crisis into prosperity, but many of them have failed in achieving that. If one understands the requirements of corrective leadership conflict with the best practices of classical crisis management may be more leaders would be successful at turning crisis around (Boin & Hart 2003). Governments, organisations, and their leaders are affected when terrible things happen. But they will not be forgiven if they do not pay attention to rectify the terrible things that happened. Many leaders have failed to act on or understand this lesson in the initial early crisis phases. An organisation overcomes a crisis with its operations, reputation, and financial condition intact is determined less by the hardness of the crisis than by the response effectiveness and timeliness (Fred Garcia 2006).

During a crisis, leadership is an essential matter. Mostly, it is believed that leadership is the responsibility of an individual who takes control and has every answer. The crisis response success is the result of certain leadership development through an ongoing effort of the team in long planning before the occurrence of an emergency, coordination during the crisis, and careful review after the crisis event (Kielkowski 2013). In crisis times, leadership is considered as an integral part of the outcome of a successful crisis management. Obviously, crisis leaders are facing different challenges from normal operations. Leaders are required to employ skills and knowledge in crisis management beyond their day-to-day work. Leaders are required for being well prepared for any crisis or unknown since the crisis is not a normal part of work environments (Muffet-Willett & Kruse 2009).

During crisis, leaders are expected to do their best to keep the people out of harm. Leaders are expected to provide directions and make important decisions within the toughest circumstances. They are expected by their organisations members and communities to minimise the influence of crisis. When the response to a crisis is well made by policymakers so the damage will be reduced, and when they fail the damage will be increased (Boin et al. 2005).

Crisis leader might try to push through reform package and take advantage of the window of opportunity in order to show their effective leadership during the crisis,

which is not unconscionable during normal times. Leaders can barely expect any dividend at all, in the recent crisis context. Even if the leaders are granted emergency powers, even if the coverage of the press is muted or supportive, and even if parliament supports remarkable measures, they cannot avoid radical reform if they do not at least try to establish support for themselves (Boin & Hart 2003).

An organisation must be guided by leaders through formal practice and planning with the understanding that a crisis might not go as planned and may need a flexible response. Leaders should lead the process of decision making while permanently assessing options. The key factor to the success of crisis management is the leadership. Leadership ensures the preparation of business to any crisis in the pre-crisis phase, and ensure it is successfully navigating recovery and response (Kielkowski 2013). The above paragraphs show that leadership is an integral part in the time of crisis. Hence, corrective leaders should be aware of a crisis and understand it from its early phase. Leaders are required to make suitable decisions and give right directions then act immediately by employing the important knowledge and skills. Disregarding the crisis by leaders from its early phase might lead to fail to overcome it.

During times of crisis, crisis leadership is more than managing public relations and corporate communication, since the activities of PR and communication are insufficient to cope with the crisis. Crisis leadership is not only about the parameters of legal responsibilities and risk management, but it is about the building of trust within an organisation and its external stakeholders (James & Wooten 2010). Under crisis circumstances, decision making does not only require identifying the priorities of interventions, but also the ability to manage and cope with that crisis to face the rare public resources. This means making the leadership function of communicating the effects of a crisis to citizens, stakeholders, and media (Jong et al. 2015).

Communicating in an effective way is very important for leaders. The effective communication is necessary so the response will be coherent and cohesive during managing a crisis, developing response teams, and garnering support for the time-consuming planning process. Within the business, individual groups will rigidly

follow their recovery plans without considering the big picture and crisis response will not be well coordinated if there is no strong leadership (Kielkowski 2013).

The communication process, public relations activities, contact with public and media, information gathering and was a common element in (James & Wooten 2010; Jong et al. 2015; Kielkowski 2013) studies that help to manage and cope with a crisis. Leaders need some skills to effectively manage the detection of crisis phase. These skills contain interpersonal sensitivity, perspective taking, and sense-making. Sense making is helpful for crisis leaders to make connections between various information pieces, and to realise a series of events that may seem unrelated. Interpersonal sensitivity and perspective taking allow crisis leaders to react in the best advantage of the stakeholders, empathise with others, and ensure the wellbeing of those involved in the crisis. Crisis leaders face the obstacles of gaining knowledge to come up with a crisis plan, understanding the cultural implications of their actions, and realising cultural cues in a new context (Maldonado & Vera 2014).

The increasing chaos made the traditional leaders of crisis to become a leader model that work co-ordinately with their team and make scenario analysis by combining various points of view for creating the best solutions. Crisis leadership is also considered as timely and optimally assessment process of adverse condition influences whatever the reason is (Fener & Cevik 2015). The need for leaders to handle the crisis in a clever way is undeniable. Such crises require leaders for acting in exceptional ways to advance and threat beyond routine strategies of problem-solving for resolution and to move beyond early emotional responses (James et al. 2011).

Crisis leadership is seen as essential matter, category of behaviour, capacity of mobilisation, characteristic of a person, process of staff training and mobilisation in a specific direction, and an attribute of a hierarchical position in the organisation. The contribution of leaders to the leadership process is given through their skills, motivation, legitimacy, and personality (Felicia & Ioana 2012). The studies of (Felicia & Ioana 2012; Maldonado & Vera 2014) seem to be clearer than (James et al. 2011) since they have stated the need for skills and knowledge by crisis leadership to face a

crisis. The study of James et al. (2011) was more ambiguous by saying leaders need to act in exceptional ways to solve problems without stating that ways.

Crisis leadership is important for several reasons: (1) The events of crisis are inevitable; (2) Nations and organisations' leaders can create a difference in the extent to which people are influenced by a crisis; (3) In the absence of crisis leadership, stakeholders who are adversely influenced by the crisis will not be able to recover from the damage; and (4) Regardless of the damage that has occurred because of the crisis, effective leadership can create the possibility of being better off following the crisis than it was before (James & Wooten 2010).

At least there are two elements that distinguish the leadership during a crisis: (1) The speed in taking actions and decisions; (2) The publicity and scrutiny that join a firm and by extending its leaders during the crisis time. For being competent at crisis, leadership ultimately requires leaders to enhance their social and human capital through experience, education, training, natural ability, or practice (Wooten & James, 2008).

There are a set of practical tips for leadership and crisis management on social media: (1) Engage, listen, and be present in every place that has a talking about your organisation by stakeholders; (2) Develop transparent social media communications in all phases of crisis; (3) Develop a pre-crisis strategic social media plans; (4) Develop an international or national and local social media presence; (5) Know key influencers or social media voices among your stakeholders; and (6) Use the power of tweets characters and amplify re-tweets, photo, and codes (Gruber et al. 2015).

The democratic leadership is the participative leadership that was thought to be the most influential leadership style and matching the needs of employees (Felicia & Ioana 2012). Crisis leadership has two different phases: (1) Emergency phase: when your task is to buy time and settle the situation. (2) Adaptive phase: when you build the ability to succeed in a new reality and solve the implicit crisis causes (Heifetz et al. 2009).

Leadership during crisis times should be a main managerial competency. Regardless of the circumstances, requisite skills of effective leadership are the same whether in times crisis or relative peace and being a good general leader should be during various crises (James & Wooten 2010). Effective crisis leaders must enhance a flexibility mindset and demonstrate resilience within their employees in later crisis stages. Leaders must draw on a particular set of competencies during the time of crisis that will lead the crisis to resolution in a way that enhances or preserves financial and other resources, employee commitment and morale, an overall image with stakeholders, and the firm's operational capabilities (Wooten & James 2008).

In the crisis, effective leaders grasp the importance of the underlying event, demonstrate situational awareness, and understand the possible influence of the crisis on the company and its stakeholders. Those leaders also show self-awareness and the ability to redirect their energy and attention to mobilise a rapid response and so they save the enterprise value of their companies. Effective leaders in the organisation do not see crisis response as an interruption in their supervision but as the test of that supervision (Fred Garcia 2006).

Learning from failures is a significant preparedness facilitator for both expected and existed crisis. The situations of crisis highlight any main problem in the activities and designs of an organisational system. When perceptions of leaders about risk are distinguished by ignoring or contradiction for preparation of crisis, it is improbable that the organisation will adopt practices of organisational crisis management. On the other hand, when leaders show concern about future crises risk, it is possible that the organisation will foster programmes of crisis management (Carmeli & Schaubroeck 2008).

However, many people ignore the other responsibilities of leadership that connected with organisational crisis. It can be caused by a lack of both job experience and formal training that prepare executives for a leading crisis. Leaders find themselves in need for moving beyond the emotional response to threat in such a way that allows them to engage in an influential risk taking, communication, and decision making during the containment stage and damage control of a crisis (Wooten & James

2008). From what is mentioned above, it is vital to realise that crisis leadership should lead to recovery from the crisis and create better opportunities through the taken actions and decisions. The decisions should rely on education, training, practice, and experience, not on emotions.

On the other hand, the effectiveness and perceptions of leadership are associated with proactive personality. Proactive personality is defined as being initiative to improve the current circumstances or creating new circumstances; it includes challenging the current status instead of adopting with it passively. Proactive people don't wait for the opportunities and information passively, but they seek those opportunities and information actively to improve things. Proactive behaviour includes identifying opportunities for improving the current status by creating suitable conditions. In comparison, reactive people are showing the opposite style by being more passive and less proactive, they also fail to identify the opportunities to change things, and they prefer to adapt with the current circumstances than changing them (Crant 2000).

Proactivity focuses on future action and more self-initiated which aims to create changes that have mostly led to several positive outcomes. Leaders are supposed to be more proactive in their thinking and planning for mastering the uncertainty of the environment, and bringing the important changes without losing their focus on the main missions (Wu & Wang 2011). Proactive people are mostly scanning for opportunities then act on them, taking actions, showing initiative, and persisting until making a meaningful change (Bateman & Crant 1993; Crant 2000; Crant & Bateman 2000). A further proactive approach would lead to more control over workloads through getting more preventive work than the intervention of crisis (Worth 1996).

Proactive people tend to influence environmental change, while reactive people who are less initiative in making a change. The term proactive is mostly used to describe the behaviour of people. Proactive behaviour is considered as a process that is active more than being passive or counteractive, primary means more than

being secondary control, and transcendent more than being acquiescent, (Bateman & Crant 1993).

A proactive response is considered as taking action in anticipation process of environmental changes. The reactive response is considered as reacting to environmental changes that already occurred (Bucurean 2015). A proactive response is controlling a possible incident before it occurs instead of waiting to respond after the occurrence of the incident. Reactive response is taking a response action after the occurrence of the incident (Anuar et al. 2010).

It can be understood that crisis leadership was associated with proactive personality or proactivity which is considered as its underpinning. Proactive leadership should be initiative and scanning for future opportunities through anticipating the crisis to prevent or control it than responding or intervention of crisis. From the researcher's point of view, during crisis time, the importance of leadership is highlighted as an essential matter to cope with any crisis. Leaders should understand the crisis, being able to take control, being well prepared, planning, giving clear directions, facing different challenges, having creative decisions, communicating in an effective way, and having enough skills, knowledge and experience to settle that crisis despite its seriousness.

2.9 LEADERSHIP AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

The concept of leadership is elusive; sometimes, it is used in an institutional sense, but often it is used in a personal sense for describing individual activities in some particular positions of power. Leadership is a process of mutual influence among leaders and their followers (Price & Wren 2007). The meanings of leaders and leadership are intertwined because separating the two words from each other is difficult; talking about one word means automatically considering the other words. When talking about leadership it is important to discuss the qualities, characteristics, and attributes of leaders (Bertocci 2009).

The leadership quality is a decisive weakness or strength institutions and organisations. Within all human activities, providing the necessary leadership and being able to step up the plate is the key achievement determinant. The need for leaders today in all levels is much greater than ever. Generally, leaders are not born, yet they are made; an individual becomes a leader when there is a need for a leader and that person rises to the occasion (Tracy 2000).

In general, leadership is characterised as the following: (1) Inspiring trust by living up to the adopted values and consistency in behaviour; (2) Setting the direction and communicating a clear vision for followers to follow; and (3) Empowering others to follow by trusting them and motivating them to perform effectively. Leaders also should have a set of skills and personal characteristics such as effective skills, communication skills, commitment to achieve, coherent values and beliefs, and integrity and honesty (Pardey 2007).

Positive leadership means raising outcomes such as positive emotions, virtuous behaviours, energising networks, interpersonal flourishing, and thriving at work. Strategies of leadership are helpful in raising a positive organisational climate including encouraging collective forgiveness, encouraging gratitude expressions, and modelling and encouraging compassion acts. Positive communication is a strategy of positive leadership; enabling this strategy in organisations requires using supportive strategies, especially when there is a need to deliver corrective or critical messages, unique contributions, best-self demonstrations, and provide feedback on strengths (Cameron 2008).

Leaders have the ability to know what should be done and how to accomplish it, who should do that, and what the result from that. Leaders have an innate ability to see the big picture, empowering their followers for achieving lofty and great goals, being able to delegate the job and attracting people for doing their task effectively and efficiently. Leaders are able to know their current status, what was achieved and what should be achieved, and how they are going to achieve that. Leaders also are able to deliver their vision and message to the followers (Bertocci 2009).

For both bureaucratic and political leader, crisis management which includes preventing, preparation, response, and reconstruction is considered as a tough task. Crisis management was always a tough mission; crisis leaders have faced difficulties to have right decisions, especially with the stress, organisational chaos, inaccurate information, and media pressure. Changes in the context and nature of recent crises make these decisions almost elusive (Boin & Hart 2003).

The characteristics of individual leaders are a critical part of the leadership, and first and foremost presidential leadership is characterised by the leadership between those presidents and other social forces and actors. Leadership is considered as a collective activity that gathering people to pursue what was found valuable for them. This collective pursuit of values made leadership not only as an individual phenomenon but also as a moral and social phenomenon (Price & Wren 2007).

By analysing around 400 of presidents' statements; presidents have spoken about what leaders should do and what leadership is. Presidents through their statements have defined leadership as goal oriented, a responsibility, morality, visionary, principles-based, and a search for the common good. However, presidents mostly complemented these definitions with more discussions about what leaders do, and clearly establishing leadership as being active than passive (Carpenter 2007).

The essence of the presidency is leadership, but effective presidential leadership should prioritise national demands against pressures of their partisan (Azari et al. 2013). Mostly, presidents seem to be engaged in crisis management and reaction. Presidents are paying more attention to new and unforeseen problems, and consequently public opinion concerns about these new problems more than other problems (Cohen 1995). Crisis time may create an increased opportunity for the emergence of charismatic leadership. Charismatic leadership demonstrates an intersection of factors and forces with the leaders, followers, and the situation that they are involved in (Bligh et al. 2004).

Often, it is thought that charismatic leaders are emerging in crisis times. In the condition of stress, leaders were significantly perceived as more charismatic than

leaders in the condition of no-stress. Leaders who have experienced stress condition before the intervention of crisis have shown better task performance and greater charismatic behaviour level than those who did not experience stress condition. Leaders might be able to face the debilitating influence of stress only through increased experience in several situations of crisis (Halverson et al. 2004).

Charismatic leaders seem to have the influence that is helpful for creating remarkably powerful degrees of consistency between cognitions of individual's, feelings behaviour, and the outcomes of that behaviour if they did not exist before, or increase consistencies if they existed before in weak form (Boal & Bryson 1988). The charisma of leaders is a combination of personal traits including the ability to bear dissonance and ambiguity; the personal appearance; the probably be linked to a possibility for risk-taking and other traits. The charisma cannot be learned through experience or courses, yet it is more like magnetism that attracts the followers and it is considered as the essence of leadership (Bertocci 2009).

From the argument above, it can be understood that being a leader does not mean having only special skills, knowledge, or personal characteristics but adhering to values, beliefs, integrity, morality, virtue, and common good. Leaders can also make other people as leaders through empowering and motivating them. Leaders should also prioritise public interests than their private interests.

2.10 THE ROLE OF CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

No organisation is excluded from having a crisis. The lack of preparation for crisis mostly causes unnecessary perceptual damage, emotional, and financial suffering for organisations (Francis John 1992). Recently, crises are influencing people across the globe. The occurrence of crisis is anytime and anywhere when an unpredictable and unexpected thing happens and creates a serious threat and requires an immediate response. Throughout the time of crisis, understanding communication is a significant part to have successful dealing with the crisis event (Malone & Coombs 2009).

Crisis communication is considered as the messaging act within and after the event of a crisis. Communication shows the very heart of crisis management and it is an ongoing long-term process involving a set of management functions and organisational dynamic (Harrison 2005). Good communication move side by side with effective information management. Poor communication and information management during crisis time have caused disastrous results (Ashcroft 1997).

Crisis communication aims to identify possible outcomes and consequences, explain the specific event, and provide particular harm-reducing information to influenced communities in an accurate, candid, complete, honest, and prompt manner (Reynolds & Seeger 2005). During the crisis, communication takes place at every stage and level. Thinking about which media should be contacted to prioritise and how to oversee a coordinated response should be before the crisis occurrence (Lee et al. 2011).

Communication occurs in all stages of crisis including pre-crisis stage such as preparation and prevention, during crisis and intervention stage, post-crisis stage when assessing the responsibility, blame and cause, and the recovery and repair stage. Communication occurs both internally and externally to the organisation and its several public and stakeholders (Malone & Coombs 2009). Crisis communication is spreading and collecting information by the team of crisis management. Crisis communication term can be used as a strategy or information. As a strategy, crisis communication refers to messages use to repair the relationship between the organisation and stakeholders. Crisis communication refers to the need of spread and collects the information in crisis time (Coombs 2005).

Crisis communication is the collecting, processing, and disseminating of required information addressing the situation of crisis. Crisis communication contains the dissemination and creation of crisis messages to people outside of the team, along with the processing and collection of information for decision-making of the crisis team. Crisis communication is considered as a crucial element in effective crisis management; communication is the heart of crisis management (Coombs 2010).

During a crisis event, efficient and effective communication can be an issue of life and death. If an organisation fails to understand and measure what happened, and fail to follow the essential principles of crisis communication, the consequences can be disastrous and far-reaching. The goal of all crisis communication is to protect both profitability and reputation of the organisation (Anthonissen 2008). The dialog between the organisation and public before, within, and after the occurrence of crisis is crisis communication. The designed tactics and strategic details for dialog aim for minimisation of damage to the organisation image. Effective crisis communication can eliminate or alleviate the crisis and sometimes can improve the reputation of organisation more than what it was before the crisis (Fearn-Banks 2007).

In the past decade, communication became a watchword for all functional areas and organisations. Hence, new concepts such as integrated communication, storytelling, and branding have emerged in communications and marketing. Stories are considered as powerful and influential communication tools to deal with crises (Eray 2018). When an organisation faces a crisis, its customers immediately start to become sceptical of how they buy or use the services or products of that organisation. Crises and threats that have the possibility of tarnishing or disrupting the image of an organisation are always threatening organisations today. Some organisations may face various crises in a day, but the threat level of those crises might be low (Wright 2009). Communications between organisations and people are extremely important during a crisis. Unsuccessful communications could influence the perception of people negatively about the organisation (Boin et al. 2013). Lacking or poor handling of communication can influence the organisation and its activities negatively (Jugo 2013).

During the time of crisis, the lack of fluent, adequate, timely, and accurate information has a strong influence on the people's trust of their organisation, which endanger their obligation and cooperation towards the resolution of crisis. At the same time, the lack of accurate information might lead to open rumours and diffusion of defeatist declarations by the members of an organisation which considered massive threats in crisis time. As a result of insufficient communication, the situation of crisis becomes more dangerous not only because of its media influence or apparent

consequences, but also because of the negative impact to the intervention capability and efficiency, and the morale of their own personnel (David 2011).

The above argument shows the vital role of communication in dealing with a crisis. The successful dealing with a crisis event requires understanding the communication process which supposes to be at every stage of the crisis. The communication process mostly includes collect information about the crisis, then disseminating them to the public and media. Poor crisis communication leads to undesirable results for organisations or individuals through influencing the perception and trust of their public negatively. Effective crisis communication can improve the reputation and reduce or settle the crisis.

Crisis communication has emerged within management as an outcome of new specialisation. The key to successful crisis communications is the preparation for crisis, although there is no agreement among crisis management expert about the proper reaction during the situation of crisis. Preparation for crises means to have procedures for detecting and reacting swiftly on these crises. In crisis management, one of the most critical areas is effective relations with news media (Barton 1990).

Crisis communication research is related to public relations practitioners by its usefulness to identify the factors that influence the perceptions of the stakeholders before, within, and after organisational crisis (Ferguson et al. 2012). In a situation of crisis, effective crisis communication and effective crisis management can enhance and support the image of an organisation or individual, reduce the damages of image and reputation, and restore or maintain that image (Ashcrof, 1997; Ferguson et al. 2012; Jugo 2013; Kash & Darling 1998; Seeger 2006). Communication can be used to prevent reputational damage or repair the reputation at the same time. The main success comes from intervention, preparation, and prevention of crisis (Kash & Darling 1998).

The use of proactive programmes of public relations can be for building relationships with specific publics. When there is a crisis, they have the ability to prevent crisis and make the public to be supportive. The concern of public relations is

about the positive reputation and aims to improve this reputation or create and avoiding the negative one and trust is the heart of it. The fear of negative image is the main reason for hiring public relations agencies, developing a department of public relations, or both (Fearn-Banks 2011).

A common element between the studies of (Barton 1990; Fearn-Banks 2011; Kash & Darling 1998) was the preparation for crisis as a key to successful crisis communications. Additionally, there was a discussion by (Ashcrof, 1997; Fearn-Banks 2011; Ferguson et al. 2012; Jugo 2013; Kash & Darling 1998; Seeger 2006) that successful crisis communication should influence the perception of public about the image and reputation of organisation or individuals positively, improve the reputation, repair the tarnished image or reduce it. The significance of the previous discussion lies in the vital role of crisis communication to the continuity and existence of organisations or individuals.

Communication is considered as crucial to the control of a crisis; it serves to either manage the situation or create further confusion. In order to manage the crisis in a competent way, the organisation must act and organise to protect its public image and long-term corporate interest; hence, an effective plan of communication becomes critical. Crisis communication allows an organisation to have a suitable response in order to minimise the damage and maintain public confidence. Experts of public-relations have clarified general ways in which an organisation should communicate with its stakeholders, including media (Ray 1999).

Most works of literature in crisis public relations showed how to implement and plan techniques of crisis communication. A crisis public relations model suggested that the used practices and processes of crisis communication during the crisis in an organisation have a significant influence on its relationships with its publics. Public relations also appeared to be an important and relevant function to the management of crisis that provided a valuable contribution to the overall of response by an organisation to a crisis (Francis John 1992).

There is a need for information during crisis or the threat of crisis. Through communication, the information is shared with others, collected, and processed into knowledge. Research of public relations itself follows the practice pattern which followed by theory and research (Coombs 2010).

Crisis communication shows a rapidly growing body of research that drawn from a number of domains, including public relations, organisational communication, corporate communication, political communication, presidential rhetoric, and marketing (Strömbäck & Kioussis 2011). Since the emergence of public relations term in the early of 20th century, it was crisis-driven. The development of most of the programmes in public relations was designed for preventing crisis or recovering from it (Fern-Banks 2001). Wright (2009) considered crisis communication management as public relations function, which increased importance to achieve of the organisational goals. There is plenty of media coverage for the organisations that face crisis situations.

There are several forms of conflict, most of these conflicts being under the specialisation of public relations. It means that processes and strategies of communication must be evolved by professionals of public relations for affecting the course of the conflict to the organisation benefit. Public relations is placed for earning the effect within organisations through focusing on achieving the organisations objectives (Wilcox Francis 2006). There was much discussion about crisis management in the area of public relations. Unlike the other areas of public relations, planning looked mostly at reacting to rather than creating events. Crisis management is considered as a death or life issue for an organisation (Morris & Goldsworthy 2008).

Public relations plays a pivotal role during crisis time (Cooley & Cooley 2011; Guth 1995). In crisis management, public relations is playing a pivotal role since it is placing crisis in its context, providing information, conveying the message of an organisation to its public, and defining an event. Crisis communication research has covered several areas including crises types, crisis strategies, strategies applications, crisis aftermath, etc. (Cooley & Cooley 2011).

Newsom & Haynes (2007) stated that even no one likes to think about disasters, there is an expectation for the people of public relations to consider and plan for the possibilities of the worst-case. The term crisis communication contains issues management within its meanings since interfering in developing situation is good for public relations before turning into a crisis. The first response of the media in any crisis is to contact the creators of the organisation's public relations image.

Crisis communication means controlling the message. There is no difference between crisis communication and other areas of public relations. Crisis communication begins with choosing the public relations officers who have the trust of the head of an organisation. The public relations officers must have the ability to be the ultimate insider and to make the judgment calls about what the risks are for an organisation. To do so, the public relations officers must have as much access to information and operations as the organisation's head does (Dilenschneider 2010).

In their studies, (Cooley & Cooley 2011; Dilenschneider 2010; Fern-Banks 2001; Guth 1995; Morris & Goldsworthy 2008; Newsom & Haynes 2007; Strömbäck & Kioussis 2011; Wilcox Francis 2006; Wright 2009) discussed the issue of public relations role in facing a crisis. Despite the overlap between different fields about the issue of crisis management, public relations is still playing a significant role in managing the crisis whether in communication other field. Organisations and individuals who face a crisis need the efforts of public relations professionals to lead them to safety.

One of the most critical aspects of modern communications is crisis public relations management. Influential crisis management protects companies, their reputations, and can salvage their existence. Preparedness is considered as the key to public relations crisis management through identifying the crisis before it happens and making it under control (Tench & Yeomans 2006). Crisis communication management is one of the increasingly significant public relations tasks to achieving of goals of organisation. When an organisation fails to live up to its expectations and promises, negative outcomes can happen for consumers, starting from inconvenience

to death. Whenever an organisation is faced with a crisis that influences negatively on its image, a domino impact of events starts to happen (Wright 2009).

The efforts of crisis communication must take into account what management does and says in response to the crisis, how stakeholders react to response strategies, and define the crisis situation. The response of crisis communication is a reactive as managers respond to the crisis event (Strömbäck & Kioussis 2011). The management of organisational crisis public relations includes a group of organisational and theoretical characteristics that appear to affect the ability of an organisation to respond to, ready itself, and recover from a crisis event (Flynn 2005).

Ferguson et al. (2012) said that when a crisis hits an organisation, professionals of public relations are called upon as experts of communication for playing a key role in maintaining the confidence of the stakeholders to mitigate damage in the organisation. The activities of communication involved in responding to a crisis, include response priorities, the source of messages, priorities of crisis management, determining the optimal timing, and the specific messages conveyed to the media or to individuals; these have implications for the organisation and for the managers of crisis.

Organisations face crisis daily from these apparently small, localised events that interrupt the ability of an organisation from achieving its objectives to both national and international crisis that disturb the political and social framework within which global organisations operate. Organisational crisis public relations management includes a group of organisational and theoretical characteristics that appear to affect the ability of an organisation to respond to, ready itself, and recover from the crisis event. In the organisational life, crises are considered as a fact. A crisis event can quickly alter tactical, strategic capabilities, and the ongoing of the organisation, which can create a state of uncertainty and chaos that influence the entire organisational structure (Flynn 2005).

In the current years, the scale and number of disasters has stressed on the need for a specific form of public relations that allows an organisations to overcome any

form of a crisis situation with some credibility (Henslowe 1999). Crisis often involves both management and communication responsibilities. Usually, crisis communication is handled by the department of public relations. Crisis public relation and crisis communication are used as interchangeable terms (Marra 1992). Most executives focus on public relations and communications as a reactive strategy during a crisis. They are also aware of the negative outcomes associated with an organisational crisis (Wooten & James 2008).

Planning for a crisis and gathering support for the effort and time it takes to develop a contentiously plan is challenging when a business is concentrated on the daily operations requests. Effective crisis communication exceeds all updates to business executive. It requires comprehensive and diligence plan for communicating with employees, regulators, vendors, and clients for early detection of issues. Communication must be consistent and accurate. Effective communication from and to the team of leadership must be consistent, accurate, and directed appropriately (Kielkowski 2013).

The recent opportunities and challenges facing the government staff of public relations within a crisis are much than ever before. Excellent crisis communications can help to prevent a crisis, help an organisation to recover more quickly, learn more from a crisis, and hasten the end of a crisis. The phase of post-crisis recovery is when both crisis management teams and crisis communicators must verify that these promises for communication and information are fulfilled. If not, the government will lose the trust of its stakeholders about its ability to respond and prevent future emergencies (Lee et al. 2011).

It can be understood from previous studies (Ferguson et al. 2012; Flynn 2005; Henslowe 1999; Kielkowski 2013; Lee et al. 2011; Marra 1992; Strömbäck & Kiouisis 2011; Tench & Yeomans 2006; Wooten & James 2008; Wright 2009) that public relations has a very large diversity of tasks in crisis time. The variety of tasks assigned to public relations shows the heavy burden duty of public relations professionals and officers. Probably the main reason for this heavy work lies in relying on public relations mostly after the crisis occurs. Therefore, organisations and individuals

should pay more attention to public relations and always liaise with public relations people not only react to crisis but to be prepared to any crisis and prevent it.

2.11 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HANDLING

In current strategic management, crisis management is considered as an essential and critical part. Crisis management is a crucial to the viability for the continued existence of an organisation and to ensure its stability before any growth objectives can be perused. Efficient crisis management requires a disciplined and systematic approach based on managerial sensitivity, vigilance, and a good understanding of the significance of both organisational readiness and careful planning (Chong 2004).

Influential crisis management protects organisations, their reputations and can salvage the existence of these organisations. Preparedness is considered as the key to public relations crisis management through identifying the crisis before it happens and make it under control (Tench & Yeomans 2006). Having a detailed plan of action for several types of possible crises can make the difference between succumbing and surviving to the crisis. Crisis management is much more than a simple matter of avoiding risk and setting up contingency plans. Therefore, crisis management is very important for all organisations, since influential crisis management helps to ensure the continued well-being of an organisation (Sui Pheng et al. 1999).

Crisis management itself is a complicated process. Media pressure, inaccurate information, organisational chaos, and stress are just some of the factors that complicate making the right decisions for crisis leaders. Changes in the context and nature of recent crisis make these decisions almost elusive. It is very clear that the violent political conflict, public disorder, industrial accidents, and classic contingencies-natural disasters are continuously making a threat for us. But, when those problems transpire on modern the world stage, the influence of their socio-political affects is more than any previous time (Boin & Hart 2003).

Crisis management is a mixture of applied common sense, an experience of both staff and other people, and devoting of time concentrating on the problem.

Therefore, crisis management aims to develop plans that can consider and understand the whole scenario with the implementation of all involved people (Parsons 1996).

Crisis management is a strategic planning process for the occurrence of a negative event or crisis that aims to remove the uncertainty and risk which allows the organisation control that situation (Fearn-Banks 2011). The management of the crisis is a continuous and dynamic function and not just an interrupted process started when a disaster occurs. The success of practices of crisis management depends on the degree of their integration into the overall structure and strategy in an organisation (Mobarek 1999).

Crisis management is special procedures for solving the occurred problems due to crisis. The crisis is an undesirable event happen to an organisation with unfavourable outcomes at an unstable time. In the organisation, there might be interference of these outcomes with the normal operations, it could cause close the scrutiny of government or media, it could risk the positive public image, or it could damage the organisation's bottom line (Devlin 2007).

Crisis management is the ability to overcome any urgent situation that may appear when the minimal damage amount is caused to the organisation in any context. Any organisation that has the misfortune to experience any sort of an urgent situation, must be able to cope with that and to be seen as able of doing so. Otherwise, it will suffer from damaging its credibility and image with its own workforce and its public (Henslowe 1999). Crisis management is a critical function and the consequences of failure can cause losses for the organisation, serious harm to the stakeholders, or even might end the existence of the organisation. Considering situations of crisis, organisations need to prepare contingency plans in realising the fact that things sometimes go wrong (Felicia & Ioana 2012).

Crisis management is defined as the total of activities aimed at reducing the effect of a crisis. This effect is measured in terms of public institutions, damage to people, and critical infrastructure. Effective crisis management protects infrastructure, saves lives, and restores trust in public institutions (Boin et al. 2013). Crisis

management is considered as taking control and seizing the initiative of what has occurred before it engulfs the organisation. The key to corporate survival is the planning to manage the issues and crisis, since the crisis simply will not wait (Regester & Larkin 2008).

Improving crisis management is helpful to protect organisations and their stakeholders. Crisis management tries to make the world a safer place. Crisis management must aim to protect and to assist stakeholders at risk by crisis unlikely to be effective and benefit the organisation (Coombs 2010). Marra (1992) considered crisis management as an organisational function that "puts out the fire." Crisis managers supervise the response of the whole organisation to the crisis. This response includes coordinating the safety, bringing an event under control, production, communication, legal, and financial components of the crisis.

Crisis management is very important because without it and without a plan to achieve necessary goals crisis grows and relationships are damaged in both long and short term. Organisations can lose their members, credibility, and customers. Governments can also suffer and agencies can have difficulties in getting funding after losing the confidence of the legislative or the executive branches (Gottschalk, 2002). Crisis management relates to image management, brand, and corporate reputation. It has increasing importance after the loss of billions of dollars lost to all types of organisations, because of reputation and brand erosion, as well as declining the confidence of the stakeholders because of scandals (Ferguson et al. 2012). The importance of the public is needed to be considered to have effective crisis management. To have effective crisis management, there is a need to understand that different publics possess different characteristics. Therefore, there is a requirement to have different rhetorical strategies to communicate with each public (Kessadayurat 2011).

Increasing of political salience, complexity, and scope of crisis raises the riskiness for policy makers. Both psychological and physical influence of crisis is increasingly interpreted as a product of past policies of preparedness and prevention, also strategic political choices made during time of crisis that play down or up the

significance, urgency, and unsuitability the events. It is assumed that policy makers have well preparation for any crisis that may occur and they will take effective measures to protect the public, reduce harm, and compensate damages. Any behaviour or event against these standards might create strong criticism and increases public unease (Boin & Hart 2003).

In this section, most of the researchers above Boin & Hart 2003; Boin et al. 2013; Chong 2004; Coombs 2010; Devlin 2007; Fearn-Banks 2011; Felicia & Ioana 2012; Gottschalk, 2002; Kessadayurat 2011; Marra 1992; Mobarek 1999; Henslowe 1999; Parsons 1996; Regester & Larkin 2008; Sui Pheng et al. 1999; Tench & Yeomans 2006) asserted on the importance of crisis management and its advantages to organisations and individuals. These advantages include strategic planning, protect organisations and their existence, setting up contingency plans and develop them, avoiding risk, and problem solving.

Yet, mentioning the advantages of crisis management is not enough. To maintain, develop, and benefit from these advantages, crisis management should be non-stop and continuous effort. The argument of Mobarek (1999) has drawn attention to the importance of this issue. This requires a high level of integration by crisis management team in the structure of an organisation.

2.12 FRAMING AND IMAGE REPAIR RELATIONSHIP

The definition of “image” by William Benoit the theorist of image repair theory in his article Benoit & Brinson (1994) was built upon the definition of Erving Goffman (1967) who is a lead theorist of framing theory. Additionally, (Goffman 1967, 1971) studies have supported image repair theory of Benoit (Dardis & Haigh 2009; Hearit 2001).

Framing analysis is helpful in crisis communication for providing useful insights for crisis managers to choose the suitable strategies of crisis response to reduce the damaged image of an organisation or individual. The test and development of typologies of crisis response strategies (e.g. Benoit 1995; Coombs 1999; Coombs &

Holladay 1996) was through framing research (An & Gower 2009). Other researches also studied image repair theory through framing research, and how to apply both image repair and framing theories in a crisis situation including (Barnett 2008; Cheng et al. 2013; Coombs 2007; Fortunato 2008; Schultz et al. 2012).

Additionally, not only image repair theory was applied in a crisis situation, yet other several studies discussed how media has framed a crisis including An & Gower 2009; Coombs 2007b, 2010; Fortunato 2008; and Schultz et al. 2012. The ability to apply both image repair and framing theories in a crisis situation is another link between the two theories which support including these theories in the theoretical framework for this thesis.

The provided image repair strategies by organisations or individuals has a good chance to be in the news coverage, which consider a good chance for framing the coverage of crisis. Organisations that do not have image repair strategies to respond to a crisis might lose opportunity of framing the crisis (Caldiero et al. 2009). The image building depends on the media portrayal of an event which influences the perception of public (Idid 2018). Mass media influence the way of framing an image by people on others, since it disseminates a huge part of information (Kunczik1997).

Framing also has an influence on the reputation since framing a problem or an issue is effective in shaping public opinion, and building the support of people (Mahon & Wartick 2003). Creating and repairing the image through press releases is a significant since they are mostly associated with framing issue (Harlow et al. 2011). Hence, based on the previous paragraphs it can be said that understanding the perception of public about a crisis and how the media framed that crisis is important matter for choosing the proper image repair strategies by those who are facing the crisis. The organisations or individuals that their images were threatened could benefit from the framing of crisis.

Moreover, framing is about focusing on some aspect of the story and ignoring others which affect the perception of people (Entman 2007, 2010; Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007). So when the NST have chosen to focus and report about the used

image repair strategies by Palestinian Presidents, it means that NST tended to help those presidents and support their image. NST is linked to United Malays National Organisation UMNO (Manan 2001), and it is considered as government-controlled newspaper (Chibundu 2013). That could reflect the willing of Malaysian government and media to support Palestine and the image of its presidents, which might affect the perception of people positively.

2.13 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework for the current study is based on Image Repair Theory seen within framing perspective. Image Repair Theory was introduced by William L. Benoit for the first time in his book “accounts excuses and apologies a theory of image restoration” in 1995. Image reputation or face is significant for both individuals and organisations, and image repair discourse is a resource to repair the image when it is threatened (Benoit 1995). The use of this theory is to determine the image repair strategies used by Palestinian Presidents on different crises as portrayed by Malaysian media. Hence, image repair theory and framing perspective are considered as the most suitable theoretical framework to guide this study. The current study is guided also by relevant literature on both image repair and framing.

The roots and origins of framing were found in both works of the psychologist/anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972) and the sociologist Erving Goffman (1974). Then it was introduced to journalism by the sociologists Gaye Tuchman later (Shi 2007). The use of framing is to investigate how the Malaysian media has portrayed the Palestinian Presidents’ image during crises. Knowing about the Malaysian media coverage on this issue is important, since this portrayal could change the public opinion of the audience about Palestinian leaders, and could affect the international relations between the two countries.

2.13.1 Image repair theory

Public relations is an essential process for reducing harm, responding to the needs of stakeholders, and repairing an organisation’s image after the crisis. The suitable

apologia strategies typologies to explore corporate rhetoric of post-crisis stage received a contribution and development from several authors. Yet, the existing research of public relations and rhetorical mentioned several consistent principles for communication in the post-crisis stage (Seeger et al. 2001).

Crisis communication field must boost the influence of its thought leadership. The world is facing a huge number of destructive crises. Although there are various developmental approaches and models to crisis communication, current thought leadership present five crisis communication theories. These theories have various development stages, they include: (1) Image repair theory focuses on communication strategies that should be employed by individuals or organisations when they face a threat or attack on their reputation or image (Benoit & Pang 2008); (2) Situational crisis communication theory concentrates on corporate apologia and creating understanding about how the public attribute responsibility for the threat of an organisation (Coombs & Holladay 2002); (3) Complexity theory is used to understand the uncertainty, nonlinearity, and self-organising nature of crisis (Sellnow et al. 2002); (4) Corporate apologia is helpful to understand how organisations apologise for transgressions (Rowland & Jerome 2004); and (5) Organisational renewal theory explains practical guidance about how organisations can use communication to renew, learn, transform, and grow following a crisis (Ulmer 2012).

When a reputation is threatened by crisis, organisations and individuals are forced to respond and defend their image (Cheng et al. 2013; Strömbäck & Kiousis 2011; Roberts 2006). Organisations and individuals should minimise negative publicity, return the organisation to economic stability, and regain public confidence through justifications, explanations, apologies, rationalisations, or excuses for behaviour (Roberts 2006). Post-crisis is a time for self-analysis, self-doubt, recovery, and healing when unique opportunities may be created or additional negative effects occur. It is the time for audits, interviews and explanations, investigations, criticism, blame, and revelations by the media (Ray 1999).

Strengthening and maintaining the relationships of organisation with their publics or using strategies of communication might be the best protection to repair and

sustain a long-term of positive reputation (Ferguson et al. 2018). Mostly, all the countries and their people are associated with both negative and positive stereotypes and generalisations which exist whether wrongly or rightly. Image repair theory one of the central theories in crises communication which analyse the communication efforts of organisations and companies and used to repair the image (Avraham 2018).

Crisis managers need a clearer picture of their audience reaction to image restoration strategies and to understand how to save organisational images through a crisis. Understanding how publics react to various image restoration strategies in several types of crises is important for crisis managers, and they need to learn when specific response strategies should be used or avoided (Coombs & Schmidt 2000).

Previous studies (Benoit & Pang 2008; Cheng et al. 2013; Coombs & Schmidt 2000; Seeger et al., 2001; Strömbäck & Kioussis 2011; Ray 1999; Roberts 2006; Ulmer 2012) have a consensus on when a crisis occurs, it mostly affects the image of organisations or individuals which requires to respond to that crisis to repair or defend threatened image through giving explanations, justifications, excuses, etc to regain the confidence of the public. The image of individuals is routinely threatened in both public and private life. Several approaches were classified and undertaken for defending or restoring the image of individuals. The image of individuals is valuable and they need to strive for ensuring that their image at its best (Dewberry & Fox 2012).

Defining the term "face" can be as a positive social value that effectively claims by an individual himself through the assumed line of others that the individual has taken through a specific contact. A face is the delineated self-image regarding the suitable social attributes even if others might share it. Similar when an individual creates a good reflection of his religion or profession through creating a good reflection for himself. After the occurrence of an incident, the person that face is threatened may try to reinstate it through means of one type of strategy, while the other participants may expect or desire to employ a different type of practice. Doing a face-work is compulsory when the face is threatened, yet whether this initiated and

mostly occurred by the offended, or the person that his or her face is threatened, or by just witness, is often of minor significance (Goffman 1967).

In the past decades, the concepts of standing, prestige, corporate reputation, esteem, image, goodwill, and identity have a close relationship or were used synonymously (Wartick 2002). Face, in politeness theory is understood as the feeling of every individual of self-image or self-worth; there is a possibility for enhancing, maintaining or damaging this image by interaction with others. There are aspects of face, one is positive and the other is negative. The positive face of individuals is reflected in their desire for being appreciated, approved of, respected, and liked by others. The negative face of individuals is reflected in their desire not to be put upon or impeded, and having the freedom for acting as they choose (Thomas 2013).

In public relations, the term image is an umbrella that covers all activities of communication and their influences that occur between organisations and their publics. In other words, image is the symbolic relationships between organisations and their publics that occur through the interaction of communication. The use of image was as a synonym of other concepts such as reputation, attitude, perception, belief, cognition, message, relationship, credibility, or communication. In psychology, image is considered as a cognition type (Grunig 1993).

Designing a recurring discourse type was after suspected or claimed wrongdoing for restoring image, face, or reputation. The meaning of "image" is the perceptions of the source shaped by the source words and acts; the image of individuals can be affected by statements of other actors to the audience as well. After threatening our reputation, we are encouraged to offer apologies, explanations, justifications, excuses, defences, or rationalisations for behaviour. The individuals who were prominent to the source at the time are considered as the audience members (Benoit & Brinson 1994). Image refers to the perception of stockholders or publics about organisation or individual (Chimbarange et al. 2013).

The image, reputation, or face is valued, and when that image is threatened, people are urged to try to restore their reputation. "Image" is the perception of

individual, or organisation, or group held by their audience, shaped by the actions and words of that individual, and by the behaviour and discourse of other relevant actors. Threats to the image of someone often prompt an image restoration discourse (Benoit 1997a).

The studies of (Goffman 1967; Thomas 2013) referred the term face or image to self-image, and how people can see themselves through social attributes and interaction with others. In contrast, Grunig (1993) considered the image as the interaction between audience and organisations, and the studies of (Benoit 1997a; Benoit & Brinson 1994; Chimbarange et al. 2013) referred to the perception of audience about an organisation or individual. This current study depended on the definition of Benoit since it was a part of image repair which is used theory here.

In this research, image is defined as the impression, perception, and reflection of the audience towards an organisation or individual. Yet, this image might not reflect the reality of an organisation or individual, and if the perceived image by the audience is negative that will threaten them. This image comes through the knowledge, cognition, experience, and information of the audience that can be gained from different sources including other people and media.

The reputation of organisations is important since they need to keep their image for attracting customers and investors. Initially, the theory of image repair was called the theory of image restoration; its first application was in 1991 to political discourse for “President Reagan’s Iran - Contra discourse” (Benoit 2013). After introducing his theory in 1995 as Image Restoration Theory, William L. Benoit tended to rename the theory to be Image Repair Theory in most of his studies after 1995, including (Benoit 1996, 1997b, 2005, 2006, 2013). For this reason, the theory was stated in two different names in of the following literatures.

However, in the recent literatures, the theory of image restoration was renamed to be image repair theory since the image of an organisation or individual might be improved but not totally restored its previous status (Benoit 2008). Additionally, Benoit (2000) explained why he has tended to prefer image “repair” than image

“restoration”, since “restoration” might mean that the image of someone was restored to its previous state. Occasionally, there should be an acceptance that image repair or restoration may not work at all. Benoit also, clearly acknowledged that image is affected by the behaviour and discourse of other relevant actors, and not focusing exclusively on the text of the organisation or person engaging in the image repair.

In many of his studies (Benoit, 1995, 1997b, 2005, 2006, 2013, 2014b; Benoit & Brinson 1994; Brinson & Benoit 1996), Benoit has explained about his theory and listed five main strategies of it. The main strategies have several sub-forms/ sub-strategies. Those strategies are considered as relatively exhaustive and a desirable compromise with moderate abstraction level. Obtaining this typology was through communication and sociology literatures (Benoit & Drew 1997). Table 2.1 shows those strategies.

(1) Denial strategy has two variants or sub-strategies: (a) Simple denial: The individual or organisation may simply deny the accusation or the wrongful act and state that offensive act did not happen; (b) Shifting the blame: By referring the wrongful acts to another party or others.

(2) Evasion of responsibility: Attempting to evade responsibility for the offensive act; it has four variants/sub-strategies: (a) Provocation: The individual or organisation does not deny committing the offense and claims that lack of responsibility or offensive action was merely a reasonable reaction to someone else's prior wrongful or offensive act; (b) Defeasibility: The individual or organisation in this case refers that offensive act or mistake to the lack of information or control; (c) Accident: When the individual or organisation state that mistake or wrongful act has occurred accidentally; and (d) Good intentions: When the individual or organisation can assert that the mistake was performed with good intentions and asking the audience to relieve the actor of some responsibility for the act.

(3) Reducing offensiveness of event: the organisation or individual who misbehave may try to minimise the perceived offensiveness of that act. It has six variants or sub-strategies: (a) Bolstering: By counteracting negative feelings, and

strengthens the positive effect of audience or qualities of individual or organisation; (b) Minimisation: By reducing the unpleasantness or severity of the offensive act outcomes. (c) Differentiation: May reduce the negative feelings by comparing the act to other similar acts; (d) Transcendence: By justifying the acts through appealing to values or other more important ends and use them to reduce the unpleasantness of the wrongful act; (e) Attack the accuser: It may minimise the credibility of the source of accusations and or make it appear as if the victim worth his or her fate; and (f) Compensation: Offering to compensate the harmed party or victim may reduce the act offensiveness and harm of the individual or organisation image.

(4) Corrective action: (a) By promising to correct or solve the problem that contains restoring the state of affairs existing before the offensive action, or (b) Promising to prevent the recurrence of the offensive act. Also, an apology might accompany this strategy, and it can prevent repetition of the problem or repair it. (5) Mortification: (a) By confessing of wrongdoing, or (b) Apologising and begging for forgiveness of the audience. If the apology is honest, an admitting of guilt or the wrongful act will accompany it.

Table 2.1 Image repair strategies of Benoit

Image Repair Strategies	Key Characteristic
Denial	
Simple denial	Did not perform act
Shift the blame	Another performed act
Evasion of responsibility	
Provocation	Responded to act of another
Defeasibility	Lack of information or ability
Accident	Mishap
Good intentions	Meant well
Reduce offensiveness of event	
Bolstering	Stress good traits
Minimisation	Act not serious
Differentiation	Act less offensive than similar acts
Transcendence	More important values
Attack accuser	Reduce credibility of accuser
Compensation	Reimburse victim
Corrective action	Plan to solve/prevent recurrence of problem
Mortification	Admit wrongdoing/ apologise

Recently, image significance cannot be overstated in society. When the reputation is threatened, communicative entities are encouraged for presenting an image defence such as justifications, excuses, explanations, apologies, or rationalisations for behaviour. Using denial strategy is through simple denial by stating not to perform the act, or shift the blame by stating that another one is responsible about it. Evasion of responsibility is through arguing that act was provoked and responded to the act of another, or defeasibility due to information or ability lack, or saying that the event was an accident, or stressing on good intentions. Reducing the offensiveness of an incident is through bolstering and stress the good traits, or minimisation by stating that the incident is not that serious, or differentiation by showing that the incident is similar to others or is less offensive, or transcendence by showing the more important considerations, or attack the accusers by reducing their credibility, or compensation of the victim. Using corrective action is by offering a plan for preventing the problem, or solving that problem. Finally, practicing the mortification comes through apology (Holtzhausen & Roberts 2009).

The theory of image restoration is a viable approach for understanding and developing messages that respond to corporate image crisis, and it is a predominant paradigm for analysis of crisis communication. The construct of this theory is considered as very beneficial as an ethical framework for a crisis, retrospectively as a responsive strategy and prospectively as an ethical guideline (Roman & Moore 2012).

Image repair theory (IRT) started to grow in a range of scholarship since it was introduced by William Benoit. There is a belief that this theory must move on and become fully useful, usable, and used by practitioners of public relations. There was an exclusive use throughout image repair theory development as a retrospective framework. It is believed that the theory of image repair will break into an active career and will be more mature in public relations job, and it must be prospectively shown to work (Smudde & Courtright 2008).

Image restoration theory built upon apologia theory. The organisation in image restoration theory is working on determining the threat for image or reputation and

determining the targeted public and tries to persuade them for restoring and maintaining the positive image (Fearn-Banks 2007).

Image restoration is a crisis communication approach to recover the image of an organisation. In particular, communication is considered as the fundamental means for restoring the image of an organisation or person after a crisis. Through using communication, an entity is allowing others for influencing and understanding its image by shaping the experience of people that lead to their interpretations about the organisation or person (Kessadayurat 2011).

Image repair theory is helpful for having a better understanding of how organisations can work to repair threats to the reputation or image of organisations after a crisis. In present thought leadership, the largest area of investment is concentrated on the role of the reputation or image during a crisis. Image repair theory focuses on communication strategies that should be employed by individuals or organisations when they face a threat or attack on their reputation or image (Ulmer 2012).

The framework of Benoit's image repair theory was utilised by large enormous published case studies, including corporations, politics, and celebrities crisis. Image restoration is considered as the most fruitful framework for informal research of crisis communication. The name of this framework was developed over the years. The framework was known as the image restoration theory (IRT) until late 2005. While in 2008, Benoit and Pang have called the framework by image repair theory or the theory of image repair discourse. However, the change was in the name only, but the concepts and abbreviation still the same as IRT. Image repair theory offered potential crisis response strategies, which were drawn from interpersonal and rhetorical communication (Coombs 2010).

The great value and the praise received in several studies (Coombs 2010; Fearn-Banks 2007; Kessadayurat 2011; Roman & Moore 2012; Smudde & Courtright 2008; Ulmer 2012) on image repair and its use in crisis came from using it as a potential response to crisis when the image is threatened.

There is a need for messages of image repair whenever an image is threatened. Identifying the audience of any organisation is important; in the situation of crisis, there are many potential audiences such as the stockholders, customers, government regulators, and accusers. The company must prioritise its audiences regarding their impertinence, and which audiences try to convince. Both advantages and disadvantages of the available media must be considered, which are delivering the messages to the audience with one or more strategies. Effective image repair suggests that accused people should take suitable corrective action and admit that fault immediately. The effectiveness of strategies is not equal; some strategies can work well together, but others do not. The given strategy could be persuasive and could be not (Benoit 2005).

Scholars as (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997; Coombs 2007b; Coombs & Holladay 2002) stated that choosing the most appropriate crisis response comes after understanding the situation of crisis. Also, using image repair strategies must match the charges and after understanding the attack. The effectiveness of defence comes through selecting the appropriate strategies for the charges, embedding these strategies effectively in the discourse, and creating a persuasive response.

Matching the strategies of crisis response with the crisis situation is important for protecting the reputation and comes through identifying the crisis type and assessing the crisis situation by crisis manager (Coombs & Holladay 2002). The evaluation of public to the reputation of an organisation and to its crisis comes through its response to it. As a descriptive system, the use of image restoration theory was to analyse the cases of crisis. This theory has the ability to draw speculative conclusions on the advantage of using crisis response strategies through identifying them in the case. Using the word speculative was since they are not empirical hypotheses tests but they are case studies. Also, the strategies of IRT were integrated into SCCT to predict the reaction of the public to a crisis (Coombs 2007b).

From the discussion above, it can be seen that matching the crisis type with the response strategies is an integral part of the success of that used strategies. Also, choosing the suitable strategy to respond to a crisis situation comes after

understanding that crisis which shows an alternative of having a conceptual link to match the crisis type and response.

Image repair is considered as one of the rhetoric purposes. From a rhetorical perspective, image repair is using the language in an effort for managing the audience impression that might be emerged from a threatening of face act (Chimbarange et al. 2013). When a reputation is threatened, both organisations and individuals are motivated to present excuses for behaviour or an image defence such as rationalisations, justifications, apologies, and explanations (Holtzhausen & Roberts 2009). Using the strategies of crisis response is to stop negative behavioural intentions, to minimise negative influence, and to repair the threatened reputation. Crisis managers utilise understanding the use of crisis communication to protect reputational assets during a crisis (Coombs 2007b).

Several image restoration studies focused on the efforts of individuals or organisations for saving their reputations or face; no one is exempted from the crisis. Unfortunately, instead of preventing crises by several organisations, they find them responding to crises. Those who do not have clear-cut strategies of crisis communications will find themselves struggling for repairing the sharp damage that occurred to their reputations (Baker 2001). Image restoration is a process of winning the marketplace of ideas through clarifying what has happened and who is at fault. The image restoration strategies of attacking the accuser as well as transcendence and denial do not have observable and meaningful actions that essentially renew or correct the problems (Jung et al. 2011).

Current research in the image restoration discourse area emphasises that organisations may respond to verbal assaults in several ways that intended to reduce the influence of the attack and repair the damaged image of an organisation. The discourse of image restoration is a significant form of rhetoric tries to restore one's reputation, image or face after suspicions or accusations of wrongdoing (Brinson & Benoit 1996).

From the previous studies (Baker 2001; Brinson & Benoit 1996; Chimbarange et al. 2013; Coombs 2007b; Holtzhausen & Roberts 2009; Jung et al. 2011; Sheldon & Sallot 2009) it is important to notice that response to a crisis is so important issue. Keeping silent might cause more harm to an organisation or individual. Those organisations and individuals are encouraged to make excuses, justifications, and explanations for saving their reputation or image to influence the perception of their audience positively.

Mostly, politicians find themselves in a crisis situation. In the typology in politics, some tactics may not work. In a crisis, there is bad and good news for a politician. The good news is the tactics and strategies that able to improve the damaged image. Admitting fault and apologising may win the acceptance and supportive behaviour of the public, but may not restore the reputation of a politician (Sheldon & Sallot 2009).

Today, presidents must show themselves equally as decent and being good citizens as well as individuals with exceptional awareness and strong ideas of the challenges and qualities of being faithful leaders. Exploring image restoration strategies following a crisis situation is important for understanding the impact of media on political responses. It is important for understanding that although scandals are a new issue in politics, the merging of private and public lives of officials led to new scandals being exposed virtually every month (Moran 2012). The defence of the American president Barack Obama on HealthCare issue in his press conference and his interview with Chuck Todd has depended on six strategies, namely mortification, corrective action, minimisation, defeasibility, bolstering, and transcendence. The image of President Obama seems to be gradually recovering, and the strategies he has applied were considered as fairly well-designed (Benoit 2014b).

Within crisis, presidential speeches might be significant in affecting public opinion and setting the tone of media coverage. The theory of image repair was applied to a content analysis of nine major speeches of the American President George Bush on Hurricane Katrina between 31 August 2005 and 12 January 2006. President Bush has used the bolstering tactic for highlighting federal assistance to all Katrina

victims since the public expected his help regardless of having flood insurance. He has offered a partial apology in one of his speeches by stating that Americans had the right for expecting more influential federal responses to Katrina. This partial apology may not have the same positive influence on the public in comparison with a full apology (Liu 2007).

Also, President Bush appeared on 8 February 2004 in the press in to repair his reputation and reply attacks while he was in the midst of his re-election campaign. The response of President Bush was for two key accusations; concerns about the economy including deficit and jobs, and justification for the war in Iraq. His usage of defeasibility strategy has increased the uncertainty about whether he will be able to solve problems in a second presidential term. Consequently, the effort of his image repair was largely ineffectual. The situation that he has faced threatened his image, and he clearly wanted an opportunity to try to repair it (Benoit 2006).

The popularity that the American President Ronald Reagan gained during his two presidential terms was experienced by a few politicians. He has shown the ability to avoid the blame for what was considered as policy failures. Hence, several of his speeches were examined from the perspective of diverse rhetorical. There is a need for self-defensive discourse when a rhetor perceives that he or she was the subject of, or is threatened with, an attack on his or her face, image, or reputation. The significance of keeping a positive face, or image, makes discourse aimed at restoring the image of an individual as a routine and unavoidable part of the human condition (Benoit et al. 1991).

The nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas' to replace Justice Thurgood Marshall on the U.S. Supreme Court was an argumentative political event, in large measure because of the sexual harassment accusations for Professor Anita Hill. In his defensive discourse, Judge Thomas has employed three strategies of image restoration theory which were bolstering, denial, and attacking his accusers. His defence is considered to be well-designed. It was found that Thomas provided corroboration of his denial and for sure rhetors can support other image repair strategies as well. It

should be clear that including just some image repair strategies is not enough for a rhetor (Benoit & Nill 1998).

The British actor Hugh Grant used bolstering, mortification, attacking accuser, and denial strategies to restore his reputation after his scandal by being arrested for lewd behaviour with a prostitute. His efforts were generally influential through appearing on talk shows to defend his image. This analysis illustrates the utility of using the theory of image repair discourse in both political and corporate realms (Benoit 1997a). The South Korean company, Samsung has employed some image restoration strategies in responding to the claims of wrongdoing made by a whistleblower. Transcendence strategy was influential and successfully made the South Korean public to believe that a few misconducts done by Samsung should be justified to save the national economy from competitions of fierce global economic (Jung et al. 2011).

The recovery and reparation of reputation is a long-term process. Mostly, the chosen strategy of image restoration by organisation is based on the situation, or on the concept "It depends". A good strategy in case of being truly innocent is telling the facts and simple denial. The acknowledgment of a situation is the more common strategy, but it requires to clarify that was an accident or and the consequences unintentionally occurred as a result of a decision (Wilcox et al. 2006).

Although there is an increase in practising image cultivation by countries, the trial to repair their tarnished national image still rare. After the 11 September attacks, Saudi Arabia implemented image restoration strategies to restore its damaged reputation. The three major elements in its effort to repair its image were denial, bolstering, and attacking accusers. Other strategies including defeasibility, differentiation, and good intentions got less emphasis to repair the image. In general, the effort of Saudi Arabia for repairing its image was partly effective (Zhang & Benoit 2004).

The image repair campaign by Michael Phelps the Olympic swimmer and both of his organisation and sponsors seem to be succeeded after exposing his photo while

he was allegedly smoking marijuana. The campaign has enhanced Phelps image, and not only supported that image. Phelps has used both bolstering and mortification strategies are supported for repairing his image. Another two strategies used were defeasibility and corrective action, but Philips had to go forward some public steps for correcting that situation (Walsh & McAllister-Spooner 2011).

The typology of image repair theory is influential when using a combination of multiple categories to facilitate the most influential a repaired image. Mrs. Clinton's used reducing offensiveness and denial in response to the incident that challenged image since that has a direct connection with her husband's image. Mrs. Clinton's denied that her actions or words have caused damage for her husband or for her symbolic position as the United States first lady (Oles-Acevedo 2012). Duke University used the strategies of image repair theory to defend and repair its reputation after its lacrosse team men were involved in a scandal. For defending its team, Duke initially depended on simple denial and mortification, and for defending its reputation, it has depended on corrective action, attacking accuser, bolstering, and separation (Len-Ríos 2010).

In crises times, the theory of image restoration became a main paradigm that examines corporate communication. During a crisis situation of product-harm, all the main five image restoration strategies were applied. But the strategy of reducing event offensiveness led to higher perceptions regarding the reputation of the organisation than the other four strategies (Dardis & Haigh 2009). The crisis of JetBlue Airways revealed that its leaders have the opportunity for adopting one or more of five image restoration strategies by Benoit. Examining rebuild reputation effort after the crisis by the Airline showed that JetBlue settled on both corrective action and mortification strategies (Efthimiou 2011). The American multinational telecommunications corporation AT & T used corrective action, mortification, and bolstering strategies to repair its image (Benoit 2013).

Consistent use of traditional strategies such as corrective action, mortification, and denial of image restoration theory by William Benoit was found to be used by the athletes and associated parties (Selzer 2013). During the crisis of sex-scandal, the use

of image restoration theory was very significant and beneficial. However, determining the effectiveness of the image-restoration strategies required examining the media response to the scandals after their implementation and, finally, to survey sports fans (Meng & Pan 2013). The studies of (Benoit et al. 1991; Benoit 1997a; Benoit & Nill 1998; Benoit 2006; Benoit 2014b; Jung et al. 201; Len-Ríos 2010; Liu 2007; Oles-Acevedo 2012; Walsh & McAllister-Spooner 2011; Zhang & Benoit 2004) showed the use of image repair strategies by different individuals and organisations including presidents, politicians, public figures, governments, and international organisation.

Exploring the employed image repair strategies by these previous studies was important to understand the media influence on the responses as discussed earlier by Moran (2012). Stating the used strategies by different individuals and organisations was also important to explore how these strategies worked in different situations was in line with Wilcox et al. (2006) who discussed that the chosen strategy should depend on the crisis situation. Matching the crisis situation with the suitable response might support prospective measures towards future crisis.

2.13.2 Framing perspective

Framing research became very popular and its roots are traced back in diverse areas and a wide variety of disciplines including communication, political science, sociology, psychology, semiotics, and behavioural economics (Cacciatore et al. 2016; Garguilo, 2014; Pan & Kosicki 1993). The concept of framing was at the centre of a growing and large body of mass media research, and there is no and should not be a single framing paradigm. Framing knowledge was accumulated since the research programme encouraged researchers for refining and employing several theories about the process of framing (D'angelo 2002).

Framing theory emerged in mass media and communication research in the United States in the 1970s (Stefanik-Sidener 2013; Volkmer 2009). This emergence occurred when the research of media moved away from the model of unidimensional media-effects and started addressing perspectives of media effect on public (Volkmer 2009). Goffman (1974) attributed using the term of “frame” to Gregory Bateson

(1972) who has proposed the term roughly in the way of what Goffman wanted to employ it.

As an originator of framing theory, Bateson defined a psychological frame as “a spatial and temporal bounding of a set of interactive messages” (Bateson 1972: 197). However, Goffman was credited as the first scholar who has established the early socio-psychological perspective of the framing approach (Jordan McClain, 2011). Goffman (1974) used the word “frame” to refer to the basic elements that able to be identified. He used the “frame analysis” phrase as a slogan for referring to the examination in these terms of the experience organisation. Goffman defined a frame as “schemata of interpretation” which allows the frame users to perceive, identify, label, and locate the apparently unlimited number of particular incidents defined in its terms.

Framing concept was imported from both psychology and sociology fields by Tuchman and then introduced to mass media and journalism (Shi 2007). Tuchman (1978) is considered as the first researcher that interpreted the news as a frame (Amadeo 2007; Hallahan 1999). Tuchman has acknowledged the role that framing plays in gathering the news by media workers and processing news by publics (Hallahan 1999).

It can be understood that the origin of framing came from psychology through Bateson (1972) study and sociology through Goffman (1974) then introduced to communication by Tuchman (1978) and by Entman (1993) much later. Since then, framing research gained huge popularity in communication and was at the centre of mass media body of knowledge as discussed by (Cacciatore et al. 2016; D'angelo 2002; Garguilo, 2014; Pan & Kosicki 1993). Based on what was mentioned above, framing studies require more attention to be developed and improved to enrich the mass communication field.

Mass media set the frames of reference that the audience use for discussing and interpreting events based on available information. The news media create a context that influences the discussion on public issues by the audience and also have a

greater influence on politicians and policymakers. The news is interchangeable among news-workers and policymakers, politicians, organisational superiors, and the rest of society are following that ongoing conversation (Tuchman 1978).

In the process of American politics, the construction of news discourse is related to issues of public policy accuracy. This occurs partly since both interest groups and politicians take an increasingly proactive approach for extending their views about an issue. News media also play an effective role in framing public policy. Studying of framing might be as a discourse of processing news and constructing as a discourse of news or as a discourse characteristic itself (Pan & Kosicki 1993).

Entman was another leading theorist who tried to extend the understanding of framing in mass media. Frames are describing the news attributes and they reside in the particular attributes of the news narrative that encouraging thinking and perceiving events for developing specific understandings of them. The construction and embodiment of news frames come through concepts, keywords, visual images, metaphors, and symbols asserted in a news narrative (Entman 1991).

Mostly, the use of theory of framing on news stories and is related to the attributes chosen on specific issue that shape a narrative to make them more prominent than others (Mokhtar 2018). Frames are enhancing or introducing the apparent and availability significance of specific ideas to evaluate a political topic. Framing comes from cultural norms, journalistic decision rules, and interaction of developments of the real world with maladroit or proficient efforts of competing elites for managing the news (Entman 2010).

Framing includes salience and selection. Framing is selecting some perceived reality aspects and making them more salient in communicating text. It comes in such a way as for promoting a particular definition of a problem, treatment recommendation, moral evaluation, and/or causal interpretation for the item described. Highlighting certain information about an issue of communication or news story raises the salience of this subject or issue. Salience is making an information piece more meaningful, noticeable, or memorable to the public. Texts can transfer information

bits to be more salient by linking them with culturally familiar symbols, or repetition or placement. A frame has a common influence on a huge part of the receiving public; even it does not have a universal influence on all (Entman 1993).

There are two different uses for the frame term whether frames in thought or frames in communication. The term of frames in thought refers to the cognitive understanding of individual for a given situation. The term of frames in communication refers to the used presentation style, phrases, words, and images by a speaker for relaying the information to another. Frames in communication come before frames in thought and influence it. First, Frames in communication focus on the presented message by a speaker, then frames in thought focus on thinking of an individual. The way of framing the message is influencing defining it by individuals (Druckman 2001).

The argument of (Entman 1991; Entman 1993; Entman 2010; Pan & Kosicki 1993; Tuchman 1978) shows that framing the news by mass media through stressing on some aspects and specific ideas then making them salient and ignoring others. This process mostly aimed to influence the discussion of audience to public issues, and affect their thoughts, perceptions, and understanding for the discussed specific issues. This argument was in line with Druckman (2001) study which mentioned that frames in thought is influenced by and frames in communication and come after it.

The use of “frame” word can be as a verb “to frame” or as a noun “a frame”. As noun “frame” indicates the boundary of the displayed picture and distinguish that from the background and playing a filtering role in interpreting, understanding, and perceiving of specific situations. Its use as a verb is to create a frame during communication whether intentionally or not. Based on the context, frame may be used to persuade, interpret, manipulate, and conceptualise (Shmueli 2008).

Framing is selecting specific aspects of an issue and making them more salient they become more significant in evaluating that issue (Garguilo 2014). Media frames stress on some aspect of reality, and neglect other aspects, and keep out some aspects. The media frames by journalists are the decision of what should be included in the

news story and what should be excluded which happens instinctively or consciously totally (Eze & Elegbe 2018).

The function of a frame is stressing on the salience of some parts of reality over other parts has given the frame a rhetorical power. Although, the use of framing analysis can be for examining various news media it is more suitable for examining mainstream news media. There are several ways for looking how stressing on different parts of a story; framing is one of them that is a process make alternative interpretations of political actors, issues, and events may be muted in an effective way (Cooper et al. 2008).

A frame is an assertion on the salience of several aspects of an issue. There is an agreement in the empirical approach that frames are certain visual and textual elements or framing devices. These elements are mostly different from the remaining news story that might consider the core news facts (De Vreese 2005). The framing of content should ensure meets the concerns and interests of the audience, information answers questions, the actionable quality worth special attention, and allows the audience members to act on their concerns and interests (Cutlip et al. 1994). The media framing is highlighting certain information about a news item and ignoring other certain aspects regarding the agenda set by the news team or news outlet. The audiences' reaction might be different about framed news than other simple news (Raza et al. 2012).

One-sided framing is stressing on some elements in the story and suppressing others which encouraging audience for giving weigh and attention to the evaluative attributes which support the interpretation of favoured side. Emphasising on one preferred frame and derogating or ignoring the other side in the news report about political conflict is considered as the essence of slant. The slanted framing encourages the audience in giving weight and attention to the evaluative attributes that support the favoured interpretation. Slanted framing comes from the interaction of the cultural norms, rules or journalistic decision, and developments of real world with the competing elites efforts to manage the news (Entman 2010).

Slant characterise the individual news editorials and reports when framing prefer or favour one side on the other within the potential or current dispute. If the slant patterns continue across media outlets, message dimensions, and time, that means systematically the media is supporting specific entities to encourage their preferred behaviour in others. Slant gives insight about how power distribution is influenced by media (Entman 2007). Media slant is defined as systematic filtering that at the same time simplifying the political reality and assigning relative weights, and implicitly giving negative or positive correlation to several political issues (Duggan & Martinelli 2011).

The perceived news coverage was a strong predictor of the perceived public opinion, regardless of the absence or presence of assuring anecdotal cues, even when reporting articles differently base-rate information. It is commonly known that the slant of media coverage regarding a specific issue is influencing the perceived public opinion about it (Gunther & Christen 2002). Slant is giving more favourable coverage to one side of a specific issue than the other sides. Slant is characterising the imbalance in the portrayal of different groups within the news stories. The slant of a news story shows how different content of news influence perceptions of media bias (Peffley et al. 2001).

News slant focuses on favourable or unfavourable parts of an issue or selecting favourable information to specific groups. The news stories that slant towards the audience's ideologies are preferred by them. The political preferences of the audience are influenced by the political slant of the news stories and affect their attitude towards specific issue (Chiang & Shih 2017). Newspapers slant the news presentation to support the preferences of audiences. The preferred stories by the audience should have consistency with their beliefs and newspapers are expected to slant the stories to match those beliefs (Mullainathan & Shleifer 2005).

The exposure to the slant of media influences the persuasion of media and alters voting behaviour and beliefs of the audience (DellaVigna & Kaplan 2007). The media coverage and editorial slant have an influence on the decisions, and choice, and

evaluation of the audience regarding political issues and voting. The media might have a positive, negative, or neutral image coverage slant (Druckman & Parkin 2005).

Although the competition of media brings more slanted news reports, it has a positive influence on the welfare of audience since it allows them to access valuable information source and to select information source that yields a more expected utility (Sobbrio 2012). The base of media slant depends on the similarity of the language of the media source the policy of the other media policy (Ribeiro et al. 2018). Tones are a significant aspect of framing the news, they have different connotations and used in a varied way, thus implying positivity or negativity and influencing the way of perceiving the information. They focus on specific perspectives or angles and include deeper meanings (Zeng et al. 2014).

Frames represent judgments made by creators of the message, who use specific semantic phrases, set information in either negative or positive frames, and tell stories using specific rhetorical, syntactical, or thematic devices. Framed messages certainly include contextual cues that aimed to make associations with ideas kept in the memory of the public. The traces of this memory can be either negative or positive or can call up specific recalled images that simplify processing. Familiar frames give mental maps to the public to help them for making sense of daily events. The central idea behind framing is that framing puts information in a cultural or situational context that determines how people assess information, understand meanings, and take action (Hallahan 2005).

Framing the story and shaping the message by media is potentially changing the intent or aspect of it. If the framing about an issue is negative, the opinion of readers will also be negatively influenced, and if positive it will influence their opinion positively. Newspaper framing and portrayal of any issue can be influential in changing the perception of the readers about that issue. The fact of the case is not only the determinant of the reaction of readers to it but also the portrayal of that case. The portrayal of a newspaper should be accurate in describing an issue to avoid the wrong perception since these portrayals could cause bias perception for readers (Fountain 2008).

Scheufele (1999) developed framing research typology that classified the applications of framing in media impacts research into two dimensions, namely media frames and audience frames. The concept of framing is established in the larger context of media impacts research, and its theoretical buildings are outlined.

Frames are determining how the people pay attention to a problem and how their understanding and remembering to it, and how their estimation and decision to act upon the problem. The possibility of a particular text interpretation was increased through the frame. The frames do not have a universal influence on the audience, but they have an influence on a part of that audience. Frames are one of the significant means that give a specific meaning to a particular issue (Sandberg 2007). Understanding the framing of an issue by news media is an imperative matter to understand the considerations and perspectives in the forming of the public opinion about that issue and the wide-reaching influence on public acceptance (Chuan et al. 2019).

Often, framing is helpful for the audience to understand specific issue and it affects their perception, beliefs, attitudes, and interpretation of an event or issue (Berinsky & Kinder 2006; Boyle et al. 2006; Buturoiu & Corbu, 2015; Druckman, 2001; Fatmawati et al. 2018; Gál 2018; Khan 2018; Kim et al. 2002; Kuehn 2017; Shen & Edwards 2005; Tewksbury & Scheufele 2009).

Previous studies (Cooper et al. 2008; Entman 2010; Garguilo 201; Shmueli 2008) defined framing as selecting and stressing on specific aspects of a story and ignoring or suppressing other aspects. Also, the studies of (Duggan & Martinelli 2011; Entman 2007; Gunther & Christen 2002; Zeng et al. 2014) stated that slants are playing a significant role in framing process through giving a favour to one side than another which influence the public opinion and perception of the public. However, all these studies, have ignored very important point that framing content should meet the interests and concern of public which mentioned by Cutlip et al. (1994). If the media frame does not fit the public cancers and interests they might find other media platforms.

Over time, framing research found various trends in several mediums and in media coverage. The patterns of how presenting the story to the public show tendencies by journalists and media professionals for preferring specific frames to certain types of issues or stories (Zukas 2013). News framing is able for weaken arguments and eliminating voices; framing of issues by media can favour specific side without displaying the explicit bias. The media framing concept is significant since it is offering valuable suggestions for the practitioners of communication, and it is helpful for understanding the effects of mass communication (Tankard 2001).

Framing is addressing the way of presenting a certain news story which might influence the perception of the audience on content. There is an effect of framing consistent or inconsistent information on having subsequent evaluations of the audience. The consistency of frame between personality characteristics and character-focused story, especially the evaluated positively attributes by media audience led to more positive reactions toward the story. Alternatively, focusing on performance in adding personal attributes to the news story led to an inconsistency of frame since there was no relation between supplementary content, the dominant frame of the story. Utilising particular content in narrative frames affects reactions of the audience towards content and causing attitudes formed about people (Lewis & Weaver 2013).

Through news framing, the audience can learn about themselves and others, of their own organisations, leaders, lifestyles, and other nations and their societies. The news makes the mere happening events to be publicity discussable events and mostly they are a social institution (Tuchman 1978). The media is responsible for offering to people some kind of guidance for helping them to make choices in the related matters to their life, and informing them about opportunities and risks that exist in their environment. Currently, the media is considered as the most significant social institutions that influence the perceptions, knowledge, and actions of people (Sandberg 2007).

Frames not only improve the understanding about an issue but also influence the opinions of citizens about it. When framing a political issue by the media to adopt the narrative structure, the citizens should have a better understanding of that issue

(Berinsky & Kinder 2006). Media is playing an important role in informing the general public and in making public consensus on specific issues. Media is providing information and forming the perception and public opinion by providing the full information on any story. Media also has a role in highlighting or promoting some issues and putting some of these issues in the background which depends on, agenda, importance, and sensitivity. Media act based on the situations and circumstances and it like to support specific viewpoints on some issues because media is the vigilant pillar for providing instant and basic news coverage on all aspects (Sadaf 2011).

Unsurprisingly, framing theory eventually achieved its place in mass communication research since developing the frame concept aimed to explain how people interpret, perceive, and understand reality. When there is no direct contact between the individuals and the occurred event so the media present the event to the public. Through that, the media influence perception and understanding of the public regarding that event (Gamreklidze 2015).

Theories of media effects such as framing theory do not focus only on the effects of the audience but also examines how the content is presented. As a media effect theory, framing is mostly related to how presenting the message more than what is presented. There are several definitions for the term if framing, and there is a lack of agreement in communication and journalism literature about the conceptualisation of framing and what it means. The meaning and measurement of framing have various different understandings and approaches (Knudsen 2014).

Several scholars have defined and explained framing theory, but their points of view on the theory could not be more different. Every researcher refers to specific characteristics and functions to frames regarding the particular communication level. The first level of communication is the making of news and production of information by media and journalists. The second level of communication is the message in itself and the concrete of news contents. The third level is the influence of message frames on the audience (Amadeo 2007).

In communication studies, using specific images, phrases, words, sentences, sources of information has an influence on the way of presenting and receiving information by their audiences (Entman 1993; Gupta et al. 201; Raza et al. 2012). Their presence or absence also gives thematically reinforcing clusters of the judgments or facts (Entman 1993).

Mostly, the notion of framing focused on the content of news or framing effects. The media is considered as a cornerstone of the democracies; public opinion might be shaped by media through framing issues and events in specific ways. Framing contains a communication source, defining, and presenting an issue. The prospect of the framing concept is being in the concentrate on communicative processes. Communication is not static, but it is a dynamic process that includes frame-building and frame-setting (De Vreese 2005). Frames are considered as a part of the culture, they guide the way of constructing the information by the elite, they influence the selection of information by journalists, and they are obvious in the media texts. The frame building includes looking at how establishing the frames in the public discourse and then carried out for adoption by journalists and elites (Cheregi 2015).

In the process of frame building, the dynamic interaction between news media and government indicates the ability of powerful political actors' for affecting frame building follows the indexing predictable pattern by an unexpected event and that reduce the independency of the press (Falasca 2014). Frame building has a role in the mediated public diplomacy between countries. In case of having strong cultural ties between two countries, then their government can successfully push its own frames into the other country's media which enhance the image of the country among the other country's public (Sheafer & Shenhav 2009).

Since its emergence in the sociology field in the mid of 1960s, framing theory has evolved rapidly. Framing is a presentation of the journalist mind during the writing and building of the news story, to be received by the public through a decoding process that is important for understanding the reality beyond the news story. The frame facilitates the messages understanding that it includes by reminding

viewers that there are connection and relevance in the messages that placed inside and the outside messages must be ignored (Ardèvol-Abreu 2015).

From the argument above, it can be seen that De Vreese (2005) stated that framing includes both frame building and frame setting. Previous studies (De Vreese 2005; Knudsen 2014; Lewis & Weaver 2013) argued that framing is presenting a specific issue and focusing on the content of that issue, and how that issue was presented. The issue of frame building of news story was also discussed by (Amadeo 2007; Ardèvol-Abreu 2015; Tankard 2001; Zukas 2013) and discussed the issue of making and producing of news stories.

In contrast, the issue of frame setting was discussed by (Amadeo 2007; Berinsky & Kinder 2006; De Vreese 2005; Gamreklidze 2015; Knudsen 2014; Lewis & Weaver 2013). These studies focused on the effects of framing an issue on the audience and how they react towards that issue. The main focus of this research was the frame building rather than the issue of frame setting. The employed theoretical framework of this research was also associated with the issue of frame building and how Malaysian media reported the image repair effort of Palestinian Presidents on crises. This study did not examine the issue of frame setting and the influence of Malaysian media on the perception of Malaysian people.

Framing became much popular in communication scholarship. The employed frames and perspectives by journalists are drawing the attention to specific attributes of the news coverage objects and to the objects themselves. Applying a frame can be for several messages aspects and types (Weaver 2007). Framing the stories of journalists is particularly affected by the retrieved information from sources and the value of news that attributing to the issue. The situational factors such as the involved people, the events, and their location are determining the approach and shaping the stories (Vossen et al. 2017).

Sources are considered as essential elements of a news story. For seeking information, the journalists are often depending on credible sources, especially when they do not know that information personally (Zeng et al. 2014). The source of news

is playing a vital role in distinguishing the portrayal of movement. The news media, especially print media serve as a powerful form of communication and valuable sources of information (Cissel 2012).

In the recent scholarly, the concept of new framing has received a considerable amount of attention. The audience is receiving the means of understanding and organising new information through the supplied frames by journalists. Thus, the policy preferences and opinions of individuals may be shaped through stressing on specific features or elements of a broad controversy (Tewksbury et al. 2000). The importance of the news sources was discussed in (Cissel 2012; Vossen et al. 2017; Zeng et al. 2014) that showed the influence of sources on framing the news stories as a part of the frame building process. Thus, influence the perception of the audience as a part of frame setting process. Hence, news sources are totally significant for the whole process of framing.

In the news, framing may influence interpretation, evaluation, and learning of events and issues. The framing consequences can be seen on both societal and individual level. On the societal level, frames may have more influence on shaping the process of decision-making, political socialisation, and collective actions. The consequence of the individual level may be changing attitudes about an issue based on viewing the news coverage in specific frames (De Vreese 2005).

Framing became a focus of the researchers who are interested in reporting, and in how dominant social ideas or themes are used for shaping the way of presenting the news by the media. A frame of news is a main organising idea to explain events that use different framing devices and symbolic that supports the main idea. Framing devices show agreements for telling information and helping the workers of media to arrange disconnected events into an organised and meaningful interpretive package (Hallahan 2005).

Framing is a comprehensive theory that contains the process of news making, the official characteristics of the news pieces, and the audience reception for the news. It focuses on the shared social values by journalists and their community, and values

that are either clearly suggested or indicated in the news. The theory of framing explains the transfer, modification, and strengthening process of the social values set, norms and symbols from the media to society and vice versa. The research of framing shows that frames can influence a person in specific or society in general (Amadeo 2007).

The framing approach is working on showing underlying themes in the media coverage about a specific topic, which could lead to draw useful conclusions. Examining the messages, content, institutional conventions, and patterns of media coverage show an influential path for a better understanding of the social world. This is simplified by knowledge of previous mass communication studies which focus on the capability of media to structure meaning through the way of organising, repetition, and propagation of messages (McClain 2011). Scholarship of framing asserts on the constructed media messages nature and often examines the portrayals of media issues as clues to framing decisions of journalists. Decisions of framing are providing significant evidence about the power flow in society (Maher 2001).

Frames became a significant tool to present relatively complicated issues effectively and making them accessible to lay audiences. It describes how presenting the features and uses information by people regarding issues that form their impressions (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007). In several ways, framing of issues has a deep influence on how people judging them. Additionally, there is powerful and basic bias in the judgments of the people about the media influence, and these judgments are different based on the issue (Joslyn 2003).

Viewing the theory of framing can be from different perspectives and its construction has inclusion for diverse considerations or values. Framing is the process about a reorientation of people's thinking and developing a specific conceptualisation regarding an issue. Defining the frame in communication is only regarding a particular event, issue, or political actor (Chong & Druckman 2007). Framing in communication defines how mass opinion can be shaped by news media coverage through using these certain frameworks to help to guide the public to understanding frame in social theory

consists of stereotypes, schema of interpretation, and anecdotes collection that individuals depend on for understanding and responding to events (Cissel 2012).

Previous work (Amadeo 2007; Chong & Druckman 2007; Cissel 2012; De Vreese 2005; Joslyn 2003; Maher 2001; McClain 2011) showed the influences of framing on the society. It can be understood that framing is not a simple issue but it is also valued and sensitive issue that influences the society and the process of shaping a social level including political socialisation and decision-making. Framing also focus on strengthening and modification of social values symbols, norms, and sets of thought influencing the judging and thinking of people.

Considerable attention was received about framing as an approach to understand the influences and process of news. In some cases, framing includes defining a situation or scene where individuals interact. In other cases, framing requires messages that have a selective focus on key attributes characteristics of a candidate, cause, service, or product. Framing set information into a context and institutes reference frames so that allows people to evaluate information, understand meanings, and take action, if suitable. The use of framing was to understand and investigate communication and other disciplines such as political communication, speech communication, negotiation, and discourse analysis, media studies, economics, organisational decision making, health communication, and psychology (Hallahan 1999).

Media frames introduce particular story aspects whether in an explicit or implicit way, change, and deny particular associations to support its interpretation. Frames are promoting an idea about the cause of a specific issue, and they suggest the available solutions for it (Kuehn 2017). Therefore, media through indirect way have a “word” to say in both political and electoral contexts. Over time, both types of media exposure and credibility of news source can moderate framing influences. Influences of framing on the political attitudes of people vary in their direction and strength regarding the time passage and to moderator variables (Buturoiu & Corbu 2015).

Information influences news stories about political events and issues include both frames and information (Tewksbury & Scheufele 2009). Yet, the influence of framing might be different based on individual differences. News frames and individual values have important interaction that influences the responses of the audience (Shen & Edwards 2005). Confirming the narrative structure of an event requires from citizens for understanding the political event better when media framed that event. Elites are defining issues in a specific way, the spread of frames in communication, shaping how people are understanding politics and how they store and process relevant information, and creating the frames in cognition (Berinsky & Kinder 2006).

Framing theory became significant for a set of sectors within the recent society of transnational media. Knowledge about the theory of framing is a very important matter for media campaigns planning in political, public relations, and advertising sectors. Media research in political communication and journalism is one of the most significant areas of framing theory. Framing theory is found to be useful for analysing the imbalances and underlying structures of power that mediate political issues, especially since the media is still considered as the fourth estate in democratic societies (Volkmer 2009).

Framing has a vital role in the political power exertion, and it is really the power imprint in the news text since it registers the identity of interests or actors that competed to control the text. The text contains frames emerge the absence or presence of specific stock phrases, keywords, sentences, sources of information, and stereotyped images, which give thematically reinforcing clusters of judgments or facts (Entman 1993).

The recent research on framing issue has highlighted the vital role of mass media in shaping the political judgments of people. In several ways, framing issues can have a strong influence on the judgment of people on those issues. There is a very powerful and basic bias in the judgments of people regarding the influence of media, and those judgments differ by issue. Tying framing to perceptual judgments of media

effects would offer an empirical extension for the theory of framing itself and expand the understanding of media influence in general (Joslyn 2003).

The political judgments of citizens often depend on how a problem or issue is framed. Work on framing and frames can be found throughout several subfields within political science and in cognitive and social sciences. The concept of framing was used by scholars from various studies and areas such as public opinion and voting campaigns, media effects, political psychology, decision making of foreign policy, bargaining behaviour, jury decision making, social movements, and many others (Druckman 2001).

Usually, receiving the political news by audiences is from limited sources of the press, and it is seldom for them to read the originally reported statements. The covered material meaning is comparing the used frames by the press with the reported materials (Kuypers & Cooper 2005). Governments in many several countries have provided the necessary resources for media and expected from them an obedient coverage. Political parties in other countries own the media and request sympathetic coverage from them. Journalists were not independent observers and operators but they were members of parties who shared the aspirations and goals of their parties. Journalists have an influence on both public policy and public opinion (Kalb et al. 2006).

In some cases, before framing policies, governments will have public opinion soundings on an issue which allow them for tapping into pre-existing reference frames to facilitate the change process which might in another way face resistance. Governments have the ability to provide ready frames references as a political tool for delineating issues under discussion, yet that process of framing can be dishonest or highly selective (Abjorensen 2012).

Framing is considered as a significant means of the elite to affect the public opinion. The way of respond of citizens to frame is unknown, especially when sponsoring the frames by political parties (Slothuus & De Vreese 2010). Policies conflicting interpretations are the heart of political debate. Social movements are

trying to modify the public policy and they are in a competition similar to political actors. For mobilising substantial protest, they are engaging in consents of framing with the political authority. Framing includes identifying the problems, causes, and suggesting solutions (Cooper 2002).

Parties prefer framing of issues in a specific way since a frame requires a definition of the problem and suggest suitable solutions. Parties use a suitable frame with their programs, yet it is seldom for parties to have a monopoly on the way of defining the issues (Van der Pas 2014). The frame of an issue is a window on electoral politics that allow viewers and readers for seeing the candidates through involving in constructive dialogue regarding policy issues, demonstrating why specific problems of policy-related exist, and as proposing problems solutions and discussing the consequences of not solving them. If the frame of strategy is common in campaign news, the received individuals of that frame are unduly ready for understanding governance and campaigning regarding strategies and motivations of individual politicians instead of properly primed for seeing politics regarding problems, issues, and their solutions (D'Angelo et al. 2005).

Another important role for framing was discussed by (Berinsky & Kinder 2006; Buturoiu & Corbu 2015; D'Angelo et al. 2005; Druckman 2001; Entman 1993; Hallahan 1999; Joslyn 2003; Kalb et al. 2006; Kuehn 2017; Kuypers & Cooper 2005; Slothuus & De Vreese 2010; Tewksbury & Scheufele 2009; Volkmer 2009). Framing of political issues, contexts, and events can be used as a political tool for governments and political parties to influence the political attitude, judgment, and interactions of the people. Additionally, framing can create a better understanding of political events.

However, a frame has four main functions, namely define problems, suggest remedies, make moral judgments, and diagnose causes for the public. Consistently, the framing concept shows a way of describing communicating text power. Frames analysis clarify the accurate way in which impact over a human awareness is exerted by the transfer of information or communication from one location-such as an utterance, novel, news report, or speech to that awareness (Entman 1993).

The media framing concept has several definitions that focused on framing as either a persuasive media element or as a natural act of communication including a specific perspective. The news items such as placement in a publication, number of words, date, and statistics should be obtained for having content quantitative variables of news frames (Ostrowski 2009). However, the coverage of the news of political issues includes two main types of news framing which are: episodic and thematic. Episodic framing describes issues regarding specific events or individual instances. Episodic coverage usually forms dramatic visual footage. The thematic frame usually takes an in-depth form and puts the issue in a general context (Iyengar 2005).

The framing of attributes and responsibilities build the micro level of the construction, on top of that the framing of situations and issues set the prominent relationships and topics. On a more macro level, a framing of options shows a balance point through oppositional concepts such as failure and success. For message creation, frames are significant since they organise those messages and give them meanings. To some extent, applying the frames is in every message in a certain way (Shi 2007).

Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) stated that most definitions on framing or news frame have similar characteristics, although there is no single definition for them. Using the news framing depends on both types of topic and types of outlet. Five types of news framing from previous studies of framing were investigated: (1) Conflict frame: It reflects the conflict and disagreement between institutions, groups, or individuals as a mean to get the interest of audience; (2) Human interest: It brings an emotional angle or a human face to present an issue, event, or problem; (3) Economic consequences: It reports a problem, issue, or event regarding the economic consequences on region, country, economically, institution, group, or individual; (4) Morality frame: This frame puts the issue, problem, or event in the moral perceptions or religious tenets; and (5) Responsibility frame: It present a problem, or issue in a way of attributing responsibility for a solution or cause to either the government or to a group or individual.

The classification of framing devices in discourse of news includes four categories that represent four structural dimensions of discourse of news: (1)

Syntactical structures: It refers to the stable patterns of phrases or words arrangement into sentences; (2) Script structures: Reports of news are mostly conceived as stories; (3) Thematic structures: The orientation of news stories not always as an event or action; and (4) Rhetorical structures: Describe the stylistic options made by journalists related their intended influence (Pan & Kosicki 1993).

There are seven different types or models of framing are applicable to public relations. Those seven models or types include framing of attributes, actions, situations, issues, responsibility, choices, and news. News framing is the last framing model relevant to public relations that deals with the framing of news and how those news stories are framed or portrayed by the media for explaining abstract or complex ideas in familiar. News framing is an essential process used by the media to relate the events that have a meaningful and relevant way for the public (Hallahan 1999).

The message of practitioners of public relations must be framed to make them newsworthy by any standard, hence the requirement for knowing the media and its gatekeepers. Messages also must be uncomplicated, understandable, and simple to grasp and free of jargon. Those messages must be local or topical to achieve the interest of the audience, and immediately actionable. Both messages and action strategy must be mutually beneficial in the same way (Cutlip et al. 1994).

Decisions of framing are perhaps the most significant strategic choices made in the effort of public relations. The application of framing is possible in public relations; a brief discussion about applying it in public relations is helpful in illustrating the framing concept robustness. Framing is a possibly useful paradigm to examine the audience responses and strategic creation of messages of public relations (Hallahan 1999). Theory of framing deals with a rhetorical device that has achieved more attention in public relations as a way to understand the different arguments interpretations and arguments construction. Practitioners of public relations frame problems or situations in a favourable way to their clients (Hallahan 2005).

Official reactions to crisis events seem to have a deep-rooted drive toward a frame that portrays the event regarding a political, social, natural, or even personalised

framework. Transforming the event of crisis into an institutional crisis is not in the officials' interest since its influence would be awkward for both organisation and responsible officials too. The crisis framing is also a result of the crisis actual features. The crisis reaction can be determined by other factors such as crisis seriousness, the damage, fundamental values number, occurrence of crisis number, and the attention degree for the crisis (De Vries 2004). Framing or describing the event of crisis may affect the evaluation of the public regarding the responsibility of organisation for the crisis. Studies of framing should be beneficial to both crisis management and crisis communication (Cho & Gower 2006).

The essence of the theory of framing is concentrating on the rhetorical portrayal of events of life. The way of framing or explaining a situation has a direct influence on how perceiving it by the audience. Typically, there is an attempt to frame the response to the crisis by organisations in a favourable way, yet the news media has the choice to reframe or accept the response of organisations. From the perspective of organisation, framing is used as a publicity form (Sellnow & Seeger 2013). Finally, it can be seen that framing has different functions, definitions, characteristics, levels, and procedures, but they do not have a conflict with its importance and influence in communication field. Framing has received high attention from scholars with many calls from them to develop and increase framing studies.

2.14 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

The research framework of this study was established based on image repair theory and framing perspective. Figure 2.1 represents the research framework for this study. The research framework is about the coverage of Malaysian media specifically *New Straits Times* on image repair strategies used by Palestinian Presidents in their reaction towards different types of crisis in two different time period. The first time period was from 1996 to 2004 which was the Presidential term of Yasser Arafat until his death in 2004. The second time period was from 2005 to 2016 from electing Mahmoud Abbas until the decline of coverage in 2016.

The research framework also shows image repair strategies which were used to respond to several crises whether through denial, evasion of responsibility, reduce of offensiveness of event, corrective action, and or mortification. The framework also presents the news framing of the *News Straits Times* and its used slant towards the Palestinian Presidents whether it was positive, negative, balanced or neutral.




Figure 2.1 Research framework

2.15 SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed the related literature to the research questions and objectives. The literature review aimed to give more understanding about the issue of study. Related literatures on the media reports on image repair efforts during crisis were reviewed. Several empirical studies on the topics of Palestinian Presidents and Palestine, crisis, image repair, and framing from various perspectives were discussed. The reviewed sub-topics included life of Palestinian Presidents, PLO and Fatah, main Palestinian issues and crises, crisis definitions, types, crisis leadership, crisis communication and public relations, crisis management, image repair, and framing.

This chapter also demonstrated theoretical framework and discussed previous research related to the employed theoretical framework. The literature showed the link and the relationship between image repair theory and framing perspective. Showing this relationship was important since the theoretical framework combines theories from different fields of communication. Image repair theory belongs to public relations and framing belong to journalism. This chapter also included critical review of previous research and assessed their value.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This study analysed the portrayal of the *New Straits Times* on the image repair strategies used by the two Palestinian Presidents in their reaction to several types of crisis. The content analysis allowed assessment of the type and extent of media coverage whether it was, positive, negative, balanced, or neutral. This chapter on the methodologies used for gathering and analysing the data for this study. This chapter has topics on introduction, content analysis, Malaysian media scenario, newspaper under study, data collection, period of study, reliability of study, validity of study, research instrument, operationalisation of study, data analysis, and summary.

This chapter provided more details about collecting the data, selecting news stories, and the categorisation process of the data. This study also elaborated more about the *New Straits Times* which has a national circulation readership and is considered as a mainstream newspaper in Malaysia. This chapter presented the methods used in this study and elaborated more on the used multiple methods to interpret the results of the study. This study employed content analysis to answer the research questions and to achieve the research objectives.

3.2 CONTENT ANALYSIS

This study analysed the content of *New Straits Times* by presenting a detailed outline regarding its coverage on the two Palestinian Presidents during crises, and how image repair strategies were used in defending their image. Considering the research objectives, a content analysis was generated to achieve the results of study. The

decision to use the content analysis method was taken after formulating the aim of this study. The content analysis adopted the use of coding sheet as the instrument for this study. The coding sheet is considered as the device of content analysis to record the data collected. The coding book is considered as the operation manual of the coding sheet.

In the early 20th century, the emergence of journalism schools, the growth of the newspapers, and the increase of newsprint production created interest in public opinion and empirical inquiries into media coverage through “quantitative newspaper analysis”. The transition from the journalism driven quantitative newspaper analysis to content analysis was influenced by several factors: (1) Involvement of eminent social scientists in debates; (2) Interest in propaganda, symbols, stereotypes, values, and styles; (3) Employing new statistical tools by analysts; and (4) Involvement of content analysis data in larger research efforts (Krippendorff, 2004).

Introducing the content analysis was a quantitative technique (Franzosi 2008), and a systematic method for studying the mass media content (Macnamara 2005), by Harold Lasswell, who is considered as the father founder of content analysis through his study in (1927) entitled “Propaganda Technique in the World War” (Franzosi 2008 & Janowitz 1968). The use of content analysis was a social invention by Lasswell to quantify political communication (Janowitz 1968).

As a research methodology, the popularity of content analysis during the 1930s (Berelson 1952; Macnamara 2005), came through the increased interest in public opinion and propaganda, the work of Lasswell and his associates, and the emergence of radio (Berelson 1952). The attention to content analysis was directed by the radio emergence at about that time, especially from Paul F. Lazarsfeld (Berelson 1952). The use of content analysis during World War II was to analyse the main newspapers under the direction of Lasswell (Berelson 1952). Extracting the information from propaganda was the biggest challenge for content analysis during the war in the studies of Lasswell (Krippendorff, 2004).

After the war, Bernard Berelson (1952) limited the use of content analysis to manifest content and his focus was on the quantitative analysis in defining the content analysis. In the 1980s, although the main use of content analysis was in communication and journalism research yet its use was in the social and psychological sciences (Krippendorff 1980, 2004). The content analysis at that time took intensive human effort and consumed a lot of time (Krippendorff, 2004).

Content analysis was defined by several scholars. Content analysis was defined by Berelson (1952:18) as a “research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest of content of communication”. The inferences about the relationship between aim and content or between content and influence can validly be done. It is meaningful to study the manifest content, and it requires accepting the content as a common meeting-ground to the communicator, public, and analyst. Also, it is important to use the quantitative description of the content of the communication. The occurrence frequency of several characteristics of the content itself is a significant element in the communication process.

Content analysis is a systematic, objective, and quantitative method for researching messages. First, systematic means that the selection of content is according to consistent and explicit rules and the selection of sample must be through appropriate procedures whereas each item can get an equal chance of being analysed. Second, objective means that the personal biases and idiosyncrasies of the researcher should not be involved in the findings. Third, quantitative means that the accuracy of content analysis in the representation of a body of messages. Also, the succinct reporting and summarising of results by researchers comes through quantification (Wimmer & Dominick 2011).

There was wide agreement on requirements of content analysis which are objective, general and systematic. Objectivity, in the research process, carrying out each step must be based on explicitly formulated procedures and rules. Generality requires having a theoretical relevance to the findings. Systematic means applying the categories or content inclusion and exclusion should be according to consistent applied rules (Holsti 1969).

Content analysis is a systematic technique for message handling and analysing the content of the message. It is a tool to analyse and observe the explicit communication behaviour of chosen communicators (Budd et al. 1967). Content analysis is not only a research technique; it includes a theoretical perspective which aims to major role to communications in the analysis of political change and social organisation (Janowitz 1968). Another known definition of content analysis was given by Holsti (1969) as any technique to make inferences by identifying specified characteristics of messages systematically and objectively. As a multipurpose research method, the development of content analysis was specifically to investigate any problem in which the communication content serves as the inference basis.

Content analysis is a research technique to make valid and replicable inferences from meaningful subjects or texts to their use contexts. As a research technique, it is through involving specialised procedures, providing new insights, informing practical actions, and increasing the understanding of the researcher on specific phenomena. The methodological requirements of validity and reliability require specific demands on content analysis, and the research must lead to valid results. By applying the same research techniques, the work under different circumstances and time by the researcher should lead to the same results. In social science research, content analysis is probably one of the most significant techniques (Krippendorff 2004).

United States General Accounting Office (1989) mentioned that content analysis is a series of procedures to transform unstructured information to a format, which allows analysing them. Those procedures to organise and collect large quantities information in a standardised format, especially those include useful information that is not easy to analyse and combine because it is unstructured and diverse. Also, it allows analysts to make inferences about the meaning and characteristics of both written and recorded material. Content analysis is a way to structure written material to analyse them to list and summarise the main issues that the materials include. Content analysis also includes categorising and simplifying the written information.

Strictly speaking, content analysis is about what is said and not about motive or questioning why the content was like that, and not about the responses and appeals or how people react. Generally, content analysis is limited to manifest content and not normally related to latent or intentions of communication (Berelson 1966). Manifest content is more common in and is actually seen and can be counted. Manifest content is considered as a quantitative analysis. Manifest content reflects the answers that the questions of definition and fact seek. It is also easily quantified, counted, and defined. The reliability of manifest content analysis is more than the reliability of the latent content analysis. Manifest content examines the actual item, character, word phrase, or physical measures, space and time. Also, defining, quantifying, and counting of manifest content is easier (Stacks 2011).

Content analysis aimed to build a model for describing a phenomenon in a conceptual manner. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are representing preparation, organising, and reporting phases. Both approaches are similar in preparation phase. The use of qualitative content analysis is through deriving the concept from the data. The use of quantitative analysis is when the operationalisation of analysis structure came from previous knowledge. The use of qualitative content is when the phenomenon was fragmented or when there are no former studies has studied that phenomenon. The quantitative approach is helpful for comparing categories in a different period of time or testing a previous theory in a different situation (Elo & Kyngäs 2008).

In quantitative research, perhaps the fastest-growing technique is content analysis. The advancement of computer made the organised messages studies easier and quicker, but not always better. The content analysis summarises all details regarding a message set instead of reports. So far, the common approaches to content analysis can be as descriptive, predictive, inferential, and psychometric. Descriptive: by describing a particular message pool in an archival way. Predictive: its main goal is predicting some outcome or influence of the examined messages on the public responses by measuring their key characteristics. Inferential: through trying to infer to the source, or infer to effects of receivers or receiver or both. Psychometric: aimed to measure a psychological trait or give a clinical diagnosis for people (Neuendorf 2002).

Content analysis as a method, allows breaking up the obtained information into units that could be placed into categories then counted and quantified. Content analysis is able to reliably and objectively describe a message or several messages and apply that to advanced statistical analyses. Content analysis also gives both logical and statistical bases to understand how creating the messages. It focuses on the communications or messages actually produced in practice and it might be considered as a main methodological tool that bridges research methods. For years, content analysis was employed by public relations researchers to count the number of specific types of press releases or to examine the readability of public relations messages (Stacks 2011).

There are five main purposes of content analyses suggested by Berelson (1952): (1) Describing core properties of message content; (2) Describing form properties of message content; (3) Making inferences to content producers; (4) Making inferences to content audiences; and (5) Predicting the influences of content on public. The three main characteristics of content analysis are: (a) It is inferential or predictive in intent, exploratory in process, and empirically grounded method; (b) It exceeded traditional notions of contents, intents, and symbols; and (c) It was forced to develop its own methodology which enables researchers for communicating, planning, critically evaluating, reproducing, and executing their analyses whatever the results are (Krippendorff 2004).

The use of content analysis was for several purposes, the most common purposes are: (1) Testing hypotheses of message characteristics: by examining messages from sources and including elements of source characteristics; (2) Describing communication content: Content analysis is used for stating and exploring the characteristics of a given content body. (3) Comparing media content to the “real world”: A content analyst may check how the media portray specific issues and compare the portrayal of these issues by their nature in real life (Ojebode et al. 2010).

Advanced use of content analysis combines it with more information about the communication process, or other communication situation conditions, such as demographic characteristics, personality, or attitude. This allows making predictions

about the process of communication. In such cases, content analysis can be used with other methods to link the content of the message with other communication setting parts. It allows the investigator for dealing with larger questions of the effects and process of communication (Anyango 2012).

Clearly, content analysis is a research tool to investigate the nature of communication and mass communication. In political communication, texts, and their contents are placed at the forefront of research and theory. Content analysis is considered as both valid and reliable, and the research quality that employs content analysis has a steady improvement (Benoit 2010).

Content analysis focuses on the message, content, and handles the issues, especially in the media to study the prominence, direction, and pattern of coverage. Content analysis as its name shows is a research method for content, not a research method for the audience. It is the study of the contents or corpus or of all media products (Ojebode et al. 2010). Content analysis focuses on studying the message, not the audience or communicator (Fearing 1953). The use of content analysis as a research method was to analyse verbal, visual, and written communication messages (Cole 1988).

The communication messages included: books, newspapers, letters, texts, magazines, leaflets, diaries, symbols, signs, images, maps, comics, advertisings, gestures, movies, sounds, speeches, and music (Berelson 1952; Krippendorff 2004; Krippendorff 1969). Also, content analysis can be applied to media releases, documents, interviews, speeches, focus groups, and video content and scripts (Stacks 2011), reports, journal articles, news releases, case studies, congressional testimony, documents, regulations, legislation, work-papers, and answers to survey questions (United States General Accounting Office 1989).

However, the analysis of discussion or speech cannot be done unless it has been taped or transcribed (United States General Accounting Office 1989). The content analysis is an objective analysis, which gives the same result if the same rules are followed. Those “rules” are applied consistently over all messages. The messages

are transformed from qualitative statements to numbers, data that can be compared and quantified against other data. To do so, there is a need to create a system that is able to describe the message(s) of the study with reliability degree and from which validity also can be assessed. Conducting a content analysis requires several steps such as reviewing, conducting researches and situations that related to the current research, identifying the content, specifying the actual units of analysis, crating the system to categorise the units, selecting the messages, accomplishing the units counting and placement into categories, and ascertaining the reliability (Stacks 2011).

To some extent, conducting or incorporating of quantitative content analysis can be together with qualitative content analysis. Qualitative and quantitative content analyses are complimentary for each other and combining them is essential to understand and determine the meanings of media texts and their influence on the audience. Qualitative content analysis depends heavily on the interpretation and readings of the researcher to the texts of media. Qualitative analysis of texts is essential to understand their interpretations and deeper meanings by audiences (Macnamara 2005). Comparing qualitative content analysis with quantitative content analysis enhances the understanding of the method. Qualitative content analysis confirms an integrated view of texts or speeches and their particular contexts. This analysis goes beyond just extracting objective content or counting words from the texts to test the themes, meanings, and patterns (Zhang & Wildemuth 2009).

Qualitative research is giving us more in-depth understanding and description of a specific event or subject. Qualitative data can be from quotes, description paragraphs, sentences, and even diagrams or photos. Content analysis is a qualitative method in operating the data which basically derived from specific messages in specific media or from open-ended responses of questions. Transforming those messages is from qualitative statements to numbers and the data can be compared and quantified against other data (Stacks 2011)

The qualitative content analysis has deep structural meaning conveyed by the message comparing with quantitative content analysis which has a surface structure in presenting the message. In qualitative analysis, content analysis can be influential that

counts of textual elements solely provide tools to identify, organise, index, and retrieve data. After organising the data according to specific elements of content it should include consideration of the literal words in the analysed text (Berg 2001). Content analysis refers to a specific set of procedures that make reading the content of communication of qualitative and quantitative statements available. This requirement makes the content of communication capable of being reproduced in permanent form (Fearing 1953).

Mainly, qualitative content analysis is inductive which basically examines the themes, topics, and the inferences are drawn from them. It pays attention to unique themes that explain the extent of a phenomenon meaning more than testing the frequency of occurrence of specific themes or texts. Qualitative content analysis is a valuable alternative to the traditional quantitative content analysis, especially when working on an interpretive paradigm. In some cases, attempting to generate a theory is another goal for qualitative content analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth 2009).

Content analysis method can be used either qualitatively or quantitatively and in a deductive and inductive way. The use of content analysis is to build a model for describing a phenomenon in a conceptual manner. Both of quantitative and qualitative analyses are represented preparation, organising, and reporting phases. Both approaches have are similar in preparation phase. The use of qualitative content analysis is for deriving the concepts from the data, or when the phenomenon was fragmented or if there are no former studies has studied that phenomenon (Elo & Kyngäs 2008).

Qualitative content analysis is a research method for the subjective interpretation of the text content through identifying patterns or themes and coding systematic classification. Content analysis can be (a) Conventional: by deriving the coding categories from the text; (b) Directed: by starting the analysis with relevant research findings or theory to guide the initial codes; and (c) Summative by involving comparisons and counting of content or keywords followed by the underlying context interpretation (Hsieh & Shannon 2005).

Basically, all the texts reading are qualitative, even in the case of converting specific text characteristics to numbers. The proponents of using qualitative approaches to content analysis offer some alternative protocols to explore texts systematically. Those approaches are discourse analysis, social constructivist analyses, rhetorical analysis, ethnographic analysis, and conversation analysis. There are characteristics shared between the qualitative approaches to content analysis: (a) Require a careful reading of textual matter; (b) Involve the interpretation of texts into new narratives that are accepted within specific scholarly communities which different sometimes from inquiry positivist traditions; and (c) Acknowledge of working within hermeneutic circles by the analysts in which their own culturally or socially conditioned understandings substantially participate (Krippendorff 2004).

3.3 MALAYSIAN MEDIA SCENARIO

Malaysia is considered as a heterogeneous country with multiethnic and multicultural. The Malaysian society contains three main ethnic groups, namely Malay, Chinese, and Indians. But there are other ethnic groups in Sabah and Sarawak. Hence, the nature of multilingual newspapers in Malaysia has strongly influenced by the diversity and plural society in the country. Publishing of newspapers in several languages came to serve the interests and needs of the several ethnic groups in Malaysia. Also, it allows the ethnics to support their customs, religion, culture, and mother tongue (Ahmad et al. 2017; Chang et al. 2017).

The multi language newspapers serve their respective communities. It is not surprising that the Malay language newspapers are focusing on Malay like the case of Utusan Malaysia. The Chinese and Indian language newspapers are highlighting and focusing on their own community like the Chinese Sin Chew Daily and the Indian Tamil Nesan. The English language newspapers are usually read by English-educated people and elites, especially in urban areas (Ahmad et al. 2017).

The Malaysian newspapers can be categorised as: (1) Malay language newspapers: Harian Metro, Berita Harian, Utusan Malaysia, and Sinar Harian; (2) Chinese-language newspapers: (a) Sin Chew Daily: is a wide circulation newspaper,

(b) China Press: owned by the China Press Berhad, (c) Kwong Wah Yit Poh: headquartered in Penang, (d) Nanyang Siang Pau: owned by MCIL Multimedia Sdn Bhd, (e) Oriental Daily News: owned by KTS Group, and (f) Guang Ming Daily; (3) The leading English-language newspapers are: The Star and *New Straits Times*. In addition to the regional newspapers such as The Sun, New Sabah Times, Daily Express, and Borneo Post; (4) Other Ethnic/Multicultural newspapers: (a) Vanakkam Malaysia: this newspaper is serving the community of South Indian; (b) Tamil Nesan and Malaysia Nanban: both of them are also considered as Tamil newspapers (W3Newspapers 2018).

3.4 NEWSPAPER UNDER STUDY

New Straits Times (NST) was chosen for this study to represent Malaysian media. The selection of this newspaper was influenced by several factors. NST has covered the scope of study which was the news stories on Palestinian Presidents' image during crises due to the location of these stories in the Malaysian media.

First, NST is a mainstream English-language broadsheet newspaper in Malaysia (Anuar 2005; Chibundu 2013; Jones 2012; Lavric, 2008; Zaharom 2000). The English newspapers in Malaysia have a wide-ranging audience that comprises not only local but also international communities. They come in an international language which goes beyond the barriers of language and ethnic. Those newspapers serve all races in the country, and their readers mastering other languages besides their mother tongue and they are well-educated. English newspapers are still highly important since they seek to satisfy those who speak other languages rather than English by providing them with more news channels (Chang et al. 2017). In Addition, English-language newspapers can reach international audience and have readership and influence more than other newspapers. Also, English-language newspapers are increasingly taking a part in the international news environment (Nazhmidinova 2014).

Second, the Malaysian support to Palestine and the strong bilateral relations between the countries. Additionally, all Malaysian Prime Ministers and governments have championed the Palestinian issue (Harun 2009; Mohamed et al. 2017a, 2017b;

Nair 2003; Yegar 2006). Third, the large circulation of newspapers that supersede the regional boundaries has a great potential influence on the coverage of other media outlets (Scharrer & Bissell 2000). NST has wide coverage in Malaysia (Chibundu 2013), with a circulation of over 200,000 throughout the country. New Straits Times Press produces the *New Straits Times*, and also other newspapers such as the afternoon tabloid Malay Mail (Lavric 2008).

Frouth, NST is controlled by UMNO-based conglomerates and is considered as a government-controlled newspaper (Chibundu 2013; Jones 2015). *New Straits Times* is the oldest Malaysian newspaper still in print, although it is not the first one. It was established as Strait Times in 1845, and then was re-established in 1965 as *New Straits Times* (Jones 2012). After the call for local ownership of newspapers in 1969-70 in Malaysia and the stringent restrictions placed on Malaysian life, Strait Times was renamed *New Straits Times*, and the governmental body Pernas has owned 80 per cent of it. Since then UMNO has controlled this newspaper (Jones 2015).

NST is controlled by Fleet Group which is an investment arm of UMNO, the dominant partner in the Barisan National coalition. This exposes the strong affiliations with the people who are close to the power in Malaysia (Manan 2001). In late 1983, Fleet Holdings (an UMNO firm) which owned 5.5 percent of New Straits Times Press was placed under the chairmanship of Daim Zainuddin, the close ally to Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Later in early 1984, Singapore's Straits Times sold its 20 percent so the Fleet Group which increased its holdings in the New Straits Times Press (Jones 2015). NST is a part of New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd (NSTP) the largest media conglomerate in Malaysia that controls the English language broadsheet. NST is currently owned by Media Prima group which is close to and controlled by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) (Anuar 2005& Zaharom 2000).

The issue of ownership is significant since it has an influence on the contents of news, several aspects of media performance, and having the ability to influence publics as argued by the following scholars. Entman (1993) argued that the imprint of power is reflected in the news text and it registers the identity of the actors who control the text and also playing a significant role in the political power exertion.

Okwuchukwu (2014) argued that the ownership of media influence and control their agenda-setting. Different governmental levels, politicians, and some retired officials are considered the main newsmakers whose opinions and views are found in most of the disseminated information, opinions, and news in the media. Additionally, Baum & Zhukov (2018) discussed that ownership exerts an influence on the coverage and content of newspapers, especially about issues of foreign policy. Also, Cho, Kong, & Lin (2004) discussed the influence of ownership on the content of newspapers whether positively or negatively.

Choosing an UMNO controlled newspaper which was the Malaysian ruling party during the time frame of the study from 1996-2016 before losing the power by UMNO in 2018 is an important issue. This is since the study has examined the coverage of NST on Palestinian Presidents who were the heads of “Fatah” the ruling party in Palestine. This coverage might reflect the point of view of the Malaysian government and leadership towards Palestinian Presidents, and the bilateral relations between the two countries.

3.5 DATA COLLECTION AND PERIOD OF STUDY

This study was for a period of 21 years starting from 1996-2016 covering each single news story regarding the portrayal of *New Straits Times* on image repair strategies used by the two Palestinian Presidents Arafat and Abbas in different types of crisis. A content analysis of the news stories that covered the image repair effort of Palestinian Presidents during crises was implemented to answer the research questions. A total of 531 news stories of *New Straits Times* were selected from all the daily issues within the time frame of the study.

This time frame was divided into two main phases: (1) 20 January 1996 to 11 November 2004; from the first day Arafat was made Palestinian President until the day he passed away. (2) From 9 January 2005 to 31 December 2016 which covered the presidential term of President Mahmoud Abbas until the decline of coverage about him although he is still the Palestinian president.

The news stories from the period 1996-2006 were retrieved from the Google news website <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=x8G803Bi31IC>. The website included most of *New Straits Times* stories from the period 1972-2006 and included other newspapers from the entire world. However, there were missing news stories on the website from the period 1996-2006, and all the news stories from 2006-2016. The missing news stories were retrieved from both microfilm and microfiche in UKM Library/Perpustakaan UKM. The microfilm and microfiche in UKM library could cover the whole period from 1996-2016, but using Google news website have shortened the time and effort in exploring the newspapers' stories.

Identifying the news stories as a part of the coding process was adopted from Ibrahim et al. (2012). The researcher paid attention to (1) Both headlines and sub-headlines of news stories; (2) The first three paragraphs in the news stories; (3) Illustrations, captions, figures, tables, and photos. The researcher also needed to read the news stories thoroughly. Identifying the related news stories was also through focusing on specific potential keywords such as "Palestine, Israel, Arafat, Abbas."

For this study, each complete and single news story from the *New Straits Times* (NST) served as the unit of analysis. Previous research (An & Gower 2009; Len-Ríos 2010; Riffe et al. 2014; Strömbäck et al. 2013) considered the whole full-text news story as the unit of analysis. Additionally, Esser et al. (2014) argued that, in the news content research, especially quantitative content analysis, the use of full single news story as the unit of analysis is the most widely used approach and methodology. This means the main focus is on the verbal news story content and manifest, rather than the visual news story content or latent.

The written text of the news stories was coded, but figures and photos captions were not included in the analysis except for the number of photos. The whole content of news stories related to the research questions started from the headlines and the leads to the end of the stories was coded. The specification process showed the eligible unit of analysis to be included in this study.

The measurement of news stories of the newspaper was in accordance with the topic of study including Palestinian Presidents, slant of news, types of crises, and image repair strategies. Each unit of analysis was coded according to the attention or prominence of news stories based on Budd (1964) scores including: if the length of headline 2 columns or more in width; if the length of headline occupied more than half of page; the story is placed above the centre of page; if the story occupied $\frac{3}{4}$ of a column or more; and if the story appeared on the front page. Budd scores were used in several studies such as (Entwistle & Hancock-Beaulieu 1992; Ibrahim et al. 2012; Rung & Zanuddin 2018; Zhi et al. 2011).

The researcher was introduced to several types of microfilm and microfiche machines by the library staff and how to collect the data through these machines. The process of data collection for the period of 21 years took six months starting from March until September 2017 including the online from Google and microfilm and microfiche. Initially, 2715 news stories that related to Palestine issue were found. After reading all the news stories, a total of 531 relevant news stories that contribute to meet the research objectives and answering research questions were included in this study. The other 2184 irrelevant news stories which did not focus on the issue of the study were excluded.

Then, the researcher listed and recorded all of the 531 news stories on a sheet of paper to recall them for scanning later. A screenshot was applied to the news stories from Google news database, and the other stories from UKM library were scanned through canon scanner. Then, all the sampling was saved according to the publication date and page number in softcopy in the computer which allowed the researcher to refer back to these news stories over the time of research. Then, out of 531 news stories, 53 (10%) news stories were used in the intercoder reliability process before starting the actual coding process.

3.6 RELIABILITY OF STUDY

The procedure of research is reliable when its response to the same phenomena is in the same way regardless of its implementation circumstances. Demonstrating the

trustworthiness of data is needed to be done by researchers through reliability measurement. The data analysis may be preceded by the researchers if the results of their reliability test are convincing, but if there is a doubt about the results then it will be hard to justify the analysis (Krippendorff 2004).

Primarily, the concern of reliability is about the extent to which test, an experiment, or any measuring procedure achieve the same results on repeated tests (Carmines & Zeller 1979). Over time, all consistency, dependability, and stability are often equated with reliability. The use of intercoder reliability is for estimating the degree of achieving or reproducing the result by other observers, and mostly judging the same phenomenon required more observers. It is expected that to end up with the same result if the people use the same measuring instrument and the same operational measure (Ojebode et al. 2010).

For content analysis, the reliability concept is crucial, and the procedures and measures must be reliable for having an objective content analysis. Intercoder reliability is about the agreement levels among independent coders who use the same coding instrument and coding the same content. Achieving acceptable levels of reliability requires applying the following steps: (1) Defining the boundaries of category with maximum detail; Coders should have brief explanation and examples of each unit of analysis to understand the procedure; (2) Training the coders before collecting the data by using the coding instrument and the category system; and (3) Conducting pilot study by choosing a sub-sample of the content population (Wimmer & Dominick 2011).

Establishing the intercoder reliability within the content analysis is a compulsory process either by different independent coders or doing that twice by the same coder preferably after duration of time (Stacks 2011). The intercoder reliability is done by two coders or more to show the agreement level among those coders in content analysis. The reliability is essential in content analysis, or else the measures of content analysis will be meaningless without acceptable levels of reliability. Providing essential validation of coding scheme is by enabling more than one individual to use the coding scheme, and splitting up the coding task allows processing more messages

that are important to achieve an acceptable level of intercoder reliability (Neuendorf 2002).

For this study, intercoder reliability was implemented by three trained coders including the researcher who was the primary coder and the other two coders were students from mass communication. The coders were assigned to code the same news stories from *New Straits Times* and they were familiar with research methodology, and communication theories subjects.

The coders received training and were briefed about the constructs under investigation and the characteristics that needed to look at during the analysis of the news stories. Applying this process was to ensure that the coders understood the coded variables. The researcher received three sessions of training, two sessions by the main supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Chang Peng Kee, and another one session by the co-supervisor Prof. Dr. Syed Arabi Idid. The other coders also received training sessions from both Dr. Chang Peng Kee and the researcher.

The coders were provided by coding book, coding sheet, and few news stories during the training sessions. The coders also were provided by the operationalisation of study, research instrument, and some journal articles and information related to the theories and the research questions of the study.

The coders were asked to go through some news stories. After that, the coders started to code three news stories and during that, there were some differences between the coders regarding some sub-strategies of image repair theory. One of the coders had confusion regarding some sub-strategies, but the agreement between the coders was achieved and the differences were reconciled after clarifying that. The training sessions and trial exercises have given the coders the opportunity for experiencing the coding process and for asking questions to get more clarification.

The coders started the intercoder reliability process after their agreement on the instructions and guidelines, and when they became clear about the coding process. For the pre-test/pilot study, the coders participated independently in the trial round for

the process of analysing and coding the news stories. Choosing more than one coder was due to maintain validity, reliability, and objectivity of study and to avoiding the personal bias of any coder. The similarities of coding the items from the instrument have shown the reliability and consistency of the coders.

In communication studies, the intercoder reliability is mostly obtained by taking 10% of the entire sampled number (Johnston, 2007). Based on that, 10 per cent of the whole sampling 53 out of 531 news stories were randomly selected to test the intercoder reliability. The coders examined the phrases and sentences in each unit of analysis. The total sampling 531 (100%) of news stories were coded later by the main researcher. Determining of reliability yields to a reliability coefficient and based on the continuum 0.00 to 1.00. Having 0.00 coefficient shows that the coders were totally different while 1.00 means they have the same coding (Stacks 2011).

After completing the coding process for 10 per cent of the sampling, the coders keyed in the coding sheet in SPSS programme and merged their data in one file. The calculation of intercoder reliability was through Holsti (1969) measurement formula to ensure the simple agreement level on all variables. The reliability score must be higher than 0.7. Holsti intercoder reliability formula was as $\frac{2M}{N_1+N_2}$. M stands for the number of agreement between the coders, N1 and N2 refer to the total number of coding decisions for each coder. Based on the formula, the agreement level between the coders was $\frac{2(46)}{N(53)+N(53)} = 0.86$ out of 1.00.

The analysis of the intercoder reliability was checked by the trainer Dr. Chang Peng Kee to ensure the correct results of Holsti's formula. After coding reliability was established, the coding process for whole data 531 stories was started by the primary researcher and then was entered into SPSS for statistical analyses. It is not claimed by the researcher that the intercoder reliability was totally error-free due to the human factor of coders and their judgment, but if there were some errors occurred they do not affect the results.

Another important issue in this study was establishing and constructing the content categories. Wimmer & Dominick (2011) stated that the used category system for classifying the media content is at the heart of the content analysis. The valuable category system should be reliable, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive. The reliability of the categorisation system mostly quantified and comes through intercoder reliability the agreements between coders by agreement between coders on appropriate category for every unit of analysis. Being mutually exclusive requires the placement of unit of analysis to be in only one category. Being exhaustive is not difficult in the content analysis of mass media; it requires having an existing slot for every unit of analysis to be placed in. In case of not having an existed category for a unit of analysis then it can be placed under a category labelled “miscellaneous” or “other.” Determining an exhaustive proposed categorisation system comes through a pre-test on a sample of content. In the case of appearing unpredicted items, the original scheme should be changed before starting the primary analysis.

The process of establishing and developing the categories of the content was guided by Wimmer & Dominick (2011) study. First, establishing the categories depended on a priori coding before the collection of data, which depends on theoretical or conceptual rationale. The main categories that related the research questions such as type of crises, slants of news stories, and image repair strategies depended on this. Additionally, to ensure the exclusivity of all categories, the coders were asked to tick only one answer for each category. Ensuring an exhaustive categorisation comes through having an additional slot in some categories which were stated as “others”. Then the issue of reliability was tested through the intercoder reliability.

Each news story was content analysed in several categories: name of presidents, media attention scores, source, type, and section of news stories, slants of news stories, type of crisis, type of response, image repair strategies, and journalistic approach. All the categories were reliable through the intercoder reliability. Also, the categories were exhaustive through including “others” to the categories, or through including all the variables. For example, image repair strategies and attention scores included all the mentioned strategies and scores by their theorists. Also, the name of

presidents it has included two name of presidents since Palestine has only two presidents so far. The categorising of source, type, and section of news stories, slants of news stories, type of crisis, type of response, and journalistic approach included “others” in case of there is something not included in the category.

However, the case of categorising image repair strategies was different from other categories. As argued by Holtzhausen & Roberts (2009) and Roberts (2006) that although image repair strategies are not mutually exclusive they are exhaustive and reliable. These strategies were not considered as mutually exclusive since more than one strategy can be employed within one news story. These strategies are exhaustive since they contain all the defined categories in image repair theory by Benoit. Also, the classification of these strategies is reliable since it was supported by previous studies. Additionally, the studies of Benoit (1997b) and Benoit & Drew (1997) showed that this theory is considered an exhaustive more than other previous theories.

However, the main five image repair strategies in this study were made as mutually exclusive through selecting the predominant used strategy in the news stories. But the sub-image repair strategies were as other previous not mutually exclusive since some of the news stories included more than one sub-strategy. Yet all of the main and sub-strategies in this study were exhaustive, exclusive, and reliable.

3.7 VALIDITY OF STUDY

The common definition of validity is the degree to which an instrument actually measures what is supposed to measure (Neuendorf 2002; Kassirjian 1977; United States General Accounting Office 1989; Wimmer & Dominick 2011). Validity refers to whether the messages were coded as the way that should be done. In other words, validity asks whether the coding system has measured what is intended to be measured accurately. There are three things that have an influence on coding validity, and whether the content analysis measured accurately what it should be measured: (1) How the units of analysis defined and what are they?; (2) What is the system of category?; and (3) Validity is often can be reached through the process of gathering the actual messages for analysis (Stacks 2011).

Achieving the validity of content analysis is completely through careful selection of the media sample to be analysed, introductory reading of a subset of relevant content, and understanding the research objectives (Macnamara 2005). An inference is made any time from the results of scale, instrument, or other tool, and questions of validity and reliability should be essential. In content analysis, both content units and categories choice reduce or enhance the probability of valid inferences (Kassarjian 1977).

The validity and reliability of a study can be ensured through collecting pilot study which allows developing the coding sheet (Neuendorf 2002; Ojebode et al. 2010). The validation of the coding sheet can be through allowing more than one individual for using the coding sheet which also allows achieving an acceptable level of intercoder reliability (Neuendorf 2002). By other words, the pilot study for intercoder reliability was another way to ensure the validity of this study.

In the studies of content analysis, especially the descriptive, face validity is the most commonly used which is offered implicitly (Benoit 2014a; Holsti 1969; Riffe et al. 2014; Wimmer & Dominick 2011), that the categories seem logical upon simple reflection about the categories nature (Benoit 2014a). Face validity can be suitable in case of having high agreement among relevant researchers (Riffe et al. 2014). Achieving face or content validity is usually through an informed judgment of the researcher or researchers. The face validity is sufficient in case of having pure descriptive research (Holsti 1969). Face validity is a part of the internal validity test or assessments. It comes through asking if correct conclusions were reached by investigators on the face of things depending on the available data. The occurrence of face validity comes through obtaining assessments by investigators and researchers from a common sense perspective (Gaber 2010).

Face validity is acceptable in research findings since it is believable and reasonable on their face without the need for expecting or giving detailed reasons. Face validity is considered as the gatekeeper for all other types of validity (Krippendorff 2004). The concept of face validity to which a measure extent on the

things face. Actually, checking the face validity can be really informative (Neuendorf 2002).

Hence, this study has employed face validity which is based on judgment through consulting Prof Syed Arabi Idid as an expert in communication field to assess the research instrument. The researcher has consulted Prof Syed to ensure the validity of the study and asked the assessor to evaluate the instrument then give comments and suggestions. Measuring the instrument by Prof Syed relied on his experience and familiarity about the subject of study. The face validity assessment was through the reflection of Prof Syed as the assessor about the nature of instrument and categories. The assessor checked what the instrument was testing for, and if the coding sheet has accurately measured what it supposed to be measured. The assessor has checked also if the analyses procedure was conducted adequately, and if the operationalisation was well-constructed.

After checking the face validity by Prof. Syed, the instrument of study which is the coding sheet was successfully tested through a pilot study. Applying the pilot study was before collecting the actual data allowed the researcher to make sure that the coding sheet was valid for this study. The validation of the instrument was also by allowing the main researcher and another two mass communication students to use the coding sheet independently through using the same instrument to achieve high intercoder reliability. For the usability and validity, the coding sheet was successfully pilot tested.

An amendment and modification was suggested by the assessor to reconstruct some of the items, especially regarding the source of news stories, tone/ slant of news article, type of response by presidents, sub and main image repair strategies, and sub-types of crises. After implementing the required amendment by the assessor and testing the instrument through the pilot study and intercoder reliability, it was clear that the items of the instrument seem to be relevant, clear in language, consistent in format and style, reasonable, and feasible to be applied. Additionally, the careful selection of the news stories that tended to the answer of the research questions was

another way for achieving the validity. All the other news stories that did not focus on the subject of study were excluded.

3.8 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

The coding sheet was the instrument for gathering, categorising, and generating the data for content analysis of this study. This coding sheet was used to analyse the content of *New Straits Times* by placing each unit of analysis within a content category according to the presence of category items and spelled out clearly in the coding sheet. The analysis of the data collected was according to the categories that were established based on previous researches. After developing the instrument, it was pilot tested on samples of news stories to ensure the validity and reliability and showed an agreement between the coders.

The instrument “coding sheet” was divided into three main sections (refer to Appendix B). Section A was adopted from Ibrahim et al. (2012). This section included the basic recording of information such as the name of coder, unit number, name of president, headlines, date of news, and page number. The coders were asked to identify the basic information of each unit of analysis. Section B included media attention score, attachment of pictures, number of paragraphs, source type and section of news story, slant of news story, and type of crisis. Section C included types of response by presidents, main and sub-image repair strategies, other strategies, and journalistic approach.

The instrument consisted of conceptual variables such as image repair strategies, crises types, slants of news stories, type of response, and journalistic approach. The validity of these categories was proved before since they were used in several previous studies. Analysing and coding each unit of analysis was for the following categories: Name of president: this study examined the only two Palestinian Presidents so far, namely (a) Yasser Arafat, (b) Mahmoud Abbas.

Media attention scores: The five criteria were: (a) The length of story headline is two columns or more in width; (b) The length of story headline occupied more than

half of page; (c) The story is placed above the fold or centre of any page; (d) The story occupied $\frac{3}{4}$ of a column or more; and (e) The story on the front page. The study employed a device developed Budd (1964) which focused on assessing the saliency and prominence of news stories in NST positioning in its coverage on Palestinian Presidents.

Source of news story: This study categorised the sources of news stories as: (a) Local news sources; (b) International news sources; and (c) Others. The sources of news were adopted from Pearson et al. (2001) who mentioned three types of news sources, namely local, regional, and international. Also, the study of Okeke (2012) categorised the sources as: reporters, NAN, MENA and PANA, international news agencies, and unidentified.

Type of news story: The story type included (a) Straight news; (b) Opinion; (c) Editorials, (d) Letter to the editor; and (e) Others. Section of news story: The newspaper section included (a) Front page; (b) National; (c) Letters; (d) World news; (e) Business; (f) Sport; (g) Life & times; and (h) Others. Both type and section of news stories were retrieved from *New Straits Times*.

Slant of news story: To determine the slant/ tone of news stories, the used slants in this study were: (a) Positive; (b) Negative; (c) Balanced; and (d) Neutral. These slants were adopted from previous studies: Roberts (2006) categorise them as positive, negative, or balanced; Scharrer & Bissell (2000) used positive, negative, neutral, and mixed slants; other studies grouped them as positive, negative, neutral (Len-Ríos 2010; Rogers 2012; Sadaf 2011; Trussler & Soroka 2014).

Type of crisis: The used types of crisis in this instrument were (a) Political; (b) Social; (c) Economic; (d) Others; and (e) Non-crisis. These types were modified mainly from Shaluf et al. (2003) who categorised them as: community and non-community crises. The non-community crisis was transportation accidents. The community crisis contained: (a) industrial crisis (socio-technical disasters), (b) natural crisis (natural disasters), and (c) non-industrial crises which include conflict type (political crisis), and non-conflict type (social and economic crises). Additionally,

Mitroff (2005) mentioned seven types of crises: (a) Natural disasters; (b) Economic; (c) Informational; (d) Reputational; (e) Human resources; (f) Physical; and (g) Psychopathic acts. The definitions of crisis typologies were adopted from several previous studies such as: (Coombs 2007b; Oliver 2004; Ruff & Aziz 2003).

Type of response: the categorised type of response in this study was: (a) Proactive; (b) Reactive; and (c) Others. This study modified the type of response from the studies of (Bucurean 2015; Fearn-Banks 2001; Jugo 2013; Roberts 2006) who have proactive or reactive approaches to respond to a crisis or to cope with it.

Image repair strategies: The instrument employed the image repair strategies of image repair theory by (Benoit 1996, 1997b, 2006, 2013): (a) Denial: simple denial, and Shift the blame. (b) Evasion of responsibility: provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. (c) Reducing offensiveness of event: bolstering, minimisation; differentiation, transcendence, attack accuser, and compensation. (d) Corrective action: correct or solve problem, and prevent problem reoccurrence. (e) Mortification: confessing/admitting, and apology and beg for forgiveness.

Journalistic approach: The coding sheet contained (a) war; (b) peace; and (c) others. This study adopted the journalistic approach from previous studies on peace and war journalism (Ibrahim et al. 2013; Raza et al. 2012).

3.9 OPERATIONALISATION OF STUDY

The coding book was the operation manual to the coding sheet which included the guidelines and instruction for coders (refer to Appendix A). It has also included the interpretation of some used terms in the coding sheet. The coding book is considered as a reference to the coders for any technical clarification throughout the coding process. This study used several concepts to examine the phenomenon under investigation. These concepts included name of president, attention scores, source, type, and slant of news story, type of crisis, type of response, image repair strategies, and journalistic approach.

Name of president: through using the check marks beside the name of Palestinian President who was mentioned in each news story/unit of analysis whether (a) Yasser Arafat or (b) Mahmoud Abbas.

Media attention scores: It includes five criteria of Budd (1964) which show the prominence of one news story from another in varying degrees. The given attention score rates was a score of zero to five points based on how and where the news story was presented. Score 0 for the absence all criteria and score 5 for the presence of all criteria. A check mark supposed to be added in “Yes” slot if that criteria was used, and check mark “No” supposed to be added if that criteria was not used.

Source of news story: A check mark was added beside the source of news whether it was local, international, or other sources. Type of news story: Also check mark was added beside the type of story whether it was (a) straight, opinion, editorials, letter to the editor; or others. Section of news story: Another check mark was added beside the section of story whether it was in front page; national, letters, world news, business, sport, life & times, or others. Adopting the type and section of news stories was from *New Straits Times*.

Slant of news story: It was operationalised by whether positive, negative, balanced, and neutral. (a) Positive tone if the story used to connote sense of flattery, praise, approval, affirmative qualities, generally favourable toward affirmative outcomes or any angle that portrayed the Palestinian Presidents in a good manner; (b) Negative tone if the story used to connote sense of unflattering, disregard, disapproval, accusations deemed less favourable toward affirmative outcomes, or any angle that portrayed the Palestinian Presidents in negative manner (Scharrer 2002); (c) Balanced stories present both sides of an issue by reporting its pro and con, and including opposing perspectives on an issue (Fico et al. 2004); and (d) Neutral if the story does not emphasise on either positive or negative tone or traits (Len-Ríos 2010) or if the story does not include any interpretive phrases or evaluative statements that could be interpreted as positive or negative (Scharrer & Bissell 2000).

Type of crisis: It was operationalised by whether they were political, social, economic, and others which were modified from (Shaluf et al. 2003; Mitroff 2005). (a) Political: internal conflict, foreign pressure, Israeli attacks, Israeli blockade, Palestinian attacks, Israeli threats, clashes, demonstrations, Israeli spying, kidnapping, and relations breakdown; (b) Social: corruption, information leakage, Israeli slanders, cheating/ electoral fraud, false information, and Israeli rumours; (c) Economic: financial and non-financial crisis; and (d) others.

Type of response: The proactive approach is making an action in anticipating the environmental changes process. The reactive approach is a response to environmental changes that already occur (Bucurean 2015). The proactive response tends to avert the crisis, and reactive response tends for confronting with the crisis (Jugo 2013).

Image repair strategies: (1) Denial: including (a) Simple denial: by asserting on not performing the act or that offensive act did not happen, and (b) Shift the blame: by referring the wrongful act to another party; (2) Evasion of responsibility: (a) Provocation: by claiming that the offensive act was a reasonable reaction to another prior wrongful act, (b) Defeasibility: by referring that wrongful act to the lack of information or control, (c) Accident: by indicating that the wrongful act was a mishap or unintentional, (d) Good intentions: through asserting that the act has occurred with good intentions; (3) Reducing offensiveness of event: (a) Bolstering: by stressing on the good traits and positive actions of accused person, (b) Minimisation: through reducing the outcomes seriousness of the offensive act, (c) Differentiation: by comparing the act to other similar acts and showing that it is less offensive than them, (d) Transcendence: through mentioning that act has more important values or other important ends, (e) Attack accuser: may minimise the credibility of the accusations source, (f) Compensation: through offering reimburse for the victim by the accused; (4) Corrective action: (a) Through planning to prevent the repetition of the problem, (b) Planning to solve the problem; and (5) Mortification: (a) Apologising and begging for forgiveness, and (b) Confessing or admitting the wrong act (Benoit 1996, 1997b, 2006, 2013).

Journalistic approach: it includes war and peace journalism. Peace journalism stress on peace, democracy, respecting other opinions, pluralism, and human rights (Ibrahim et al. 2013). It also means promoting the initiatives of peace through journalism and focusing on reconciliation and conflict resolution, and undermining the differences between religions and ethnics (Raza et al. 2012). War journalism demonizes the enemies and stress on violence (Ibrahim et al. 2013). This journalism covers one side of the conflict by using military offensive language (Raza et al. 2012).

3.10 DATA ANALYSIS

The data collected were transferred to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) computer programme for generating the statistical findings of this study. The key in process was followed by cleaning, checking, and regulating the data to ensure the accuracy of the transferred data before starting the analysis. Regarding the quantitative method, the analysis of the data felt with nominal categories which contained descriptive analyses. The descriptive analysis of data contained running of simple frequencies, percentage of occurrence, and cross-tabulations for several variables and present them in tables. While string categories were used to the attached statements to the news stories.

Frequency tests were obtained in this study. Cross-tabulation and percentage analyses were applied to the following: name of president, attention score, picture attachment, source of news stories, type and section of news stories, slants, type of crisis, type of response, image repair strategies, and peace and war journalism. This study created specific cluster variables in order to facilitate statistical analyses. Clustering is necessary in order to examine image repair strategies and their sub-strategies, and to types of crises which included main and sub-categories.

Regarding the qualitative method, a qualitative interpretation was implemented to support the quantitative data. The qualitative interpretation was applied to distribution of news stories, media attention score, number of pictures, section or placement of news story, slant of news story, subtypes of crises, image repair strategies, and journalism approach.

Qualitative research gives more in-depth understanding and description of a specific event or subject. Qualitative data can be quotes, description paragraphs, sentences, and even diagrams or photos (Stacks 2011). Qualitative method also has its own advantages by deepening the understanding of researcher about phenomenon of study, especially when there was no previous investigation for the phenomenon. Finally, qualitative method has more flexibility and allows the researcher to pursue new interest areas (Wimmer & Dominick 2011).

While quantitative content analysis focused on frequency test and descriptive statistics, a qualitative content analysis aimed to give more details to the findings. Qualitative content analysis was implemented to determine the image repair strategies used by the Palestinian Presidents as portrayed by NST. Qualitative content analysis of the news stories was guided by Krippendorff (2004) study. The process of coding and organising the data has started by identifying the themes found during the content analysis. This study looked for the main and sub-image repair strategies of Benoit's theory as predetermined codes. Keywords were identified to code and place the categories of image repair strategies properly and fit them in each data piece correctly. Each statement was studied individually and coded by using these strategies.

3.11 SUMMARY

This study analysed the content of 531 news stories from *New Straits Times* on the two Palestinian Presidents. Then, the study analysed the relevant part of the data to answer the research questions on image repair, types of crisis, and news slant. Choosing *New Straits Times* was due to its wide circulation, being English language newspaper, and its ownership which might influence its content.

The time frame of this study included all the issues of NST in 21 year period from 1996 to 2016. It was divided into two main phases: (1) from January 1996 to 2004 which marked the presidential term of Yasser Arafat; (2) from 2005 to 2016 which marked the presidential term of Mahmoud Abbas until the decline of coverage. This study implemented intercoder reliability by three coders including the researcher and another two communication students. The reliability was counted through (Holsti

1969). This study used also face validity to test the research instrument which was the coding sheet. The data was analysed quantitatively through SPSS to answer the research questions. Qualitative interoperation was implemented to give more understanding and supporting the quantitative analysis.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS OF STUDY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the results obtained through content analysis of tabloid *New Straits Times* newspaper on Palestinian Presidents' image during crises. The time frame of this study was 21 years, from 1996 to 2016. The data collected were in the form of coding sheets analysed through SPSS. This study has relied on image repair theory and framing perspective. This study aimed to find out the answers of research questions, and to achieve its objectives. Both the research questions and objectives of this study were answered. The results of this chapter answered the three research questions. The results also showed several types of crisis faced by Palestinian Presidents Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas as portrayed by the *New Straits Times*. This chapter also revealed the slant of Malaysian media (NST) about the Palestinian Presidents.

In addition to the research questions which focused on crisis type, image repair strategies and slant of news, this chapter contained other relevant sections and topics to research questions. These topics included: distribution/volume of news stories, media attention scores, source of news stories, section of news stories, type of response by presidents, and journalistic approach. This chapter offered the frequencies, and then included cross-tabulations which demonstrated the relationships between the two Palestinian Presidents and other variables. A total of 2715 news stories on the Palestinian issue were found within the time frame of the study from 1996-2016. Then, a total of 531 relevant news stories on the two Palestinian Presidents were selected and analysed, and the other irrelevant news stories were excluded from the analysis.

4.2 DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS STORIES

A comparison of frequency distribution on the news items covered by NST on the two Palestinian Presidents was made. Table 4.1 shows the frequency and percentage of news stories on each president. A total of 531 news stories related to the topic of study were analysed, while other unrelated news stories were excluded from analysis. Out of 531 stories, 68.5% were related to President Yasser Arafat (nine year period from 1996-2004) and another 31.5% of news stories were related to President Mahmoud Abbas (12 year period from 2005-2016).

Table 4.1 News items on the Palestinian presidents

Name of President	Frequency	Percentage
Yasser Arafat (1996-2004)	364	68.5
Mahmoud Abbas (2005-2016)	167	31.5
Total (1996-2016)	531	100.0

The frequency distribution on the coverage of NST on President Yasser Arafat was also made. Table 4.2 presents the distribution or volume of coverage for 364 news stories within nine years on the first Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. The time frame of President Arafat began since he was elected on 20 January 1996 until his death in Percy Military Hospital in Paris on 11 November 2004.

The year 1996 gained the most coverage with 19.8% of news stories. This year marked the establishment of Palestinian Authority and the first Palestinian general elections. Many of news stories in this year discussed the topic of electoral process and the campaign of two candidates, Yasser Arafat and his rival Samiha Khalil. Most of the other news stories focused on the peace process and the faced obstacles during that process.

The next major news stories were 14.8% for the year 1997 which marked the Hebron Agreement or Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Most of news stories during this year discussed this agreement and the delay of implementing it from the Israeli side. The third highest coverage was in 2000 with 14% of news stories. The year 2000 was the year of both

second intifada and Camp David summit, and most of news stories discussed peace and negotiation process.

The years of 2001, 2003, and 2002 covered 10.7%, 10.4%, and 10.2% of news stories respectively. The lowest three years in coverage were 1998, 2004, and 1999 with 7.4%, 6.9%, and 5.8% of news stories respectively. The average of coverage volume of news stories within the nine years for President Yasser Arafat's term was 40.4.

Table 4.2 Annual distribution of news stories on President Arafat

Year	Frequency	Percentage
1996	72	19.8
1997	54	14.8
1998	27	7.4
1999	21	5.8
2000	51	14
2001	39	10.7
2002	37	10.2
2003	38	10.4
2004	25	6.9
Total	364	100.0

An analysis was also made of the coverage of NST on the second President Mahmoud Abbas. Table 4.3 describes the total of 167 produced news stories within a period of 12 years about President Mahmoud Abbas. The time frame was from the elections day on 9 January 2005 until the decline of coverage on 31 December 2016.

It can be seen that the year 2006 produced the highest per cent of news stories with 16.2%. The year 2006 marked the victory of Hamas party in the Parliament elections. Most of news stories within this year focused on the internal conflict between Hamas militias from one side, and Palestinian Authority troops which headed by President Abbas from the other side.

The second year in producing news stories was in 2007 with 14.4% of news stories. The year 2007 marked the coup of Hamas militias and its hostile takeover on Gaza strip after launching aggressive attacks against Palestinian Authority troops and defeating them. The third year with the most number of news items was 2010 with

11.4%; the news stories within this year mostly focused on the peace and negotiation process between Palestinian Authority and Israel.

The analysis was followed by 2005 and 2011 which represented 10.2% and 9.6% of news stories respectively. The years 2008 and 2009 represented 8.4% of news stories for each year. Then, the years of 2013 and 2014 have represented 6.6% and 5.4% of news stories respectively. After that, 2012 and 2015 has achieved 4.2% of news stories for each year. Finally, the year 2016 has covered only 1.2% of news stories.

It is understood that that the number of news item on Abbas was less than that given to Yasser Arafat. This issue raises the question about why President Abbas received less coverage by Malaysian media than President Arafat?, and why there was a clear drop in news coverage about President Abbas?

Although, the time frame of President Arafat was $\frac{3}{4}$ of time frame of President Abbas, yet the average of news stories about President Arafat figured almost triple the coverage volume of President Abbas. The average of news stories coverage volume within the 12 years for President Mahmoud Abbas's term was 13.9 comparing to 40.4 for President Arafat.

Table 4.3 Annual distribution of news stories on President Abbas

Year	Frequency	Percentage
2005	17	10.2
2006	27	16.2
2007	24	14.4
2008	14	8.4
2009	14	8.4
2010	19	11.4
2011	16	9.6
2012	7	4.2
2013	11	6.6
2014	9	5.4
2015	7	4.2
2016	2	1.2
Total	167	100.0

4.3 PROMINENCE OF NEWS STORIES

The study analysed the news coverage in terms of the prominence given to them by the NST. Table 4.4 shows the attention scores that were developed by communication scholar Richard Budd (1964). The table presents the number of each used attention score within the total of 531 news stories. The attention scores are considered useful for understanding and assessing the power and prominence of coverage of one news story over another. The scores reflect the common layout in covering the issue of study. Those scores reflected the positioning of news stories and how they appeared in the (NST) newspaper. It can be understood that increasing the scores in one news story can show the power, efficacy, and the high attention paid to that story.

Mostly, the attachment of many readers for newspapers stories is related to the placement of those stories or for the content of headline. For instance, giving more attention to the news stories in the first page than the news stories located inside the pages (Kahn & Kenney 2002).

Of the 531 analysed stories on the coverage given to the two presidents, the score about “length of the headline of the news story is two columns or more in width” constituted the highest number with 465 news stories. The “replacement of the news story above the measured centre of the page” gained the second highest number with 419 news stories. The third highest attention score was “the story has occupied three quarters of the column or more” represented in 387 news stories. Followed by 354 news stories for the score that shown if “the length of the headline is more than half of the page”.

Finally, the “appearance of the news story in the front page” presented in only nine news stories. The first news story appeared in the front page was on 22 January 1996 talked about the victory of President Arafat in the first Palestinian Presidential Elections. The second news story on 26 February 1996 discussed the issue of explosions in Israel that killed 25 and injured 80 Israelis. The third news story on 3 June 1996 discussed the issue of fears regarding halting the peace process by the Israeli regime.

The fourth news story appeared in the front page was on 1 October 1996 discussed the issue of the call for a summit in Washington by Clinton for both Israeli and Arab. The issue of the fifth news story on 16 January 1997 was the signing of the Hebron Accord between both Palestinian and Israeli authorities. The sixth news story on 6 September 1999 was about signing a peace deal between Barak and Arafat. The seventh news story on 24 September 2002 discussed the issue of arrangement of rallies that joint by European Union which condemned by Israeli. The eight news story on 25 April 2004 was about threatening for Arafat by Israeli. The ninth news story on 6 November 2004 discussed the critical health situation of President Arafat.

Table 4.4 Prominence of each media attention score

Attention score	Frequency
Headline length 2 columns/ more in width	465
Story placement above the fold	419
Story occupied $\frac{3}{4}$ of a column/ more	387
Headline length more than half page	354
Story in front page	9

The study analysed the attention scores that carry important implications and value-laden connotations in covering news stories and reflect their newsworthiness. Table 4.5 describes the five Budd's attention scores. The way of representing those news stories might affect the way of interpreting them. A score of zero was given in the absence of all the five criteria, and a score of five was given in the presence of all criteria to show the prominence level of the chosen news stories. The scores of zero to one were categorised as low attention, the scores of two to three as moderate attention, and the scores of four to five as high attention.

In total, the results shows that more than half of news stories 52.2% achieved four (high) attention scores, followed by 19.0% of news stories that gained three (moderate) attention scores. The third and fourth highest percentage was for two (moderate) and one (low) attention scores with 13.4% and 10.5% of news stories respectively. The stories that gained zero (low) attention score shaped 4.0% of news stories. Finally, the stories that got five (high) attention scores shaped the lowest percentage with only 0.9% of news stories.

The mean for President Arafat was 3.0852, and the standard deviation was 1.21556, while the mean for President Abbas was 3.0599 and the standard deviation was 1.2059 which reflects the interest in covering those news stories. The overall mean for both Presidents was 3.0772 and the standard deviation was 1.21145.

Table 4.5 Zero to five attention scores

Attention score	Frequency	Percentage	Mean	SD
.00	21	4.0		
1.00	56	10.5		
2.00	71	13.4		
3.00	101	19.0		
4.00	277	52.2		
5.00	5	0.9		
Total	531	100.0	3.0772	1.21145

Analysing Budd's attention scores is helpful to understand if the news stories have achieved better prominence in the news coverage. Table 4.6 presents a comparison of zero to five attention scores between Presidents Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. Generally, the highest percentage for both presidents has started with four (high) attention scores, followed by three and two (moderate), one and zero (low), and five (high) attention scores respectively. Generally, the paper gave high prominence (score of four) to both presidents.

For President Arafat, the four (high) attention scores shaped over than half of news stories with 51.9%. The three (moderate) attention scores for President Arafat figured 19.2% of news stories. Followed by two (moderate) and one (low attention) scores with 12.4% and 11.5% of news stories respectively. Then, the zero (low) attention scores gained 3.6% of news stories. Finally, the five (high) attention scores have represented only 1.4% of news stories.

In contrast, the four (high) attention scores for President Abbas also shaped over than half of news stories with 52.7%. But it was slightly higher than the percentage of Arafat. The three (moderate) attention scores for President Abbas represented 18.6% of news stories. After that, the two (moderate) and one (low) attention scores figured 15.6% and 8.4% of news stories respectively. The zero (low)

attention scores constituted 4.8% of news stories, whereas the five (high) attention scores were absent in the coverage about President Abbas.

However, it would be interesting to explore the five news stories that achieved five (high) attention scores which only covered the news stories on President Arafat. The first news story on 22 January 1996 discussed the victory of Yasser Arafat during the First Palestinian General Elections. The second news story on 1 October 1996 discussed the call from Clinton for a Summit in Washington between Arab and Israeli leaders.

The third news story on 9 September 1999 discussed the issue of signing peace deal between Arafat and Barak. The fourth news story on 25 April 2004 discussed the Israeli threats to Arafat. Finally, the fifth news story on 6 November 2004 discussed the ailment and the critical healthy status of President Arafat.

Table 4.6 Comparison of attention scores between two presidents

Attention Score	Frequency of Arafat	Percentage of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas	Percentage of Abbas
.00	13	3.6	8	4.8
1.00	42	11.5	14	8.4
2.00	45	12.4	26	15.6
3.00	70	19.2	31	18.6
4.00	189	51.9	88	52.7
5.00	5	1.4	0	0.0
Total	364	100.0	167	100.0

4.4 PICTURES ATTACHMENT TO NEWS STORIES

The measurement of the pictures accompanying the news stories was a part of the overall of their length to assess the attention scores as discussed by Budd. Table 4.7 describes the number of attached pictures within news stories. The result shows that 48.6% of news stories did not include any picture. Followed by 47.3% of news stories that contained one picture. The news stories that included two and three pictures figured 3.0% and 0.6% of news stories of respectively. Finally, the stories that included four, five, and 10 pictures figured only 0.2% for each.

However, it is quite interesting to find out which news stories that came out with the highest number of pictures. The news story that was accompanied by 10 pictures was on 24 September 2002 related to the siege of Israeli troops surrounding the headquarters of Yasser Arafat in Ramallah city in West Bank. Those pictures were on Yasser Arafat and his besieged compound. The other news story that was attached with five pictures was on 2 October 2002 showed the execution of a Palestinian kid by the Israeli Army. Then the attached news story with four pictures was on 27 January 2006 about Hamas victory in the parliament elections. The total mean for the number of attached pictures to news stories was 0.59, and the total standard deviation was 0.753.

Table 4.7 Number of pictures within a news story

Pictures Number	Frequency	Percentage	Mean	SD
0	258	48.6		
1	251	47.3		
2	16	3.0		
3	3	.6		
4	1	.2		
5	1	.2		
10	1	.2		
Total	531	100.0	.59	.753

A comparison in the accompanied pictures to the news stories on both Palestinian Presidents was also made. Table 4.8 reveals that over than half of the 531 news stories included pictures 52.4%, while another 47.6% of news stories have no pictures. For President Arafat, from the 364 news stories, the accompanied news stories with pictures figured 49.7%, and the stories that did not include pictures were 50.3%. In contrast, for president Abbas, from the total coverage given to him of 167 news stories, over than half of news stories were accompanied with pictures 55.1%. The rest of the 44.9% did not include pictures. The news stories on President Abbas were attached with more pictures than the stories on President Arafat.

Table 4.8 Pictures attachment to news stories for each president

Picture Attachment	Frequency of Arafat	Percentage of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas	Percentage of Abbas	Total
Yes	181	49.7	92	55.1	273
No	183	50.3	75	44.9	258
Total	364	100.0	167	100.0	531

4.5 SOURCE OF NEWS STORIES

The sources of news are influencing the framing process of news stories which in turn influence the perception of public (Cissel 2012; Vossen et al. 2017; Zeng et al. 2014). Sources are considered as essential elements of a news story (Zeng et al. 2014). The credibility of those several sources could moderate the influences of framing (Buturoiu & Corbu 2015). Therefore, framing the news stories by the *New Straits Times* journalists is mostly influenced by the retrieved information from the original sources. In this case, the news stories might focus on specific aspects of opinions and points of view while ignoring others. Table 4.9 shows the sources of news stories about both Palestinian Presidents.

From the table below, it is clear that the majority of sources were from international news agencies 82.9%. Then, the “others” which are a combination of sources that were stated as “agencies” shaped 13.2%. Finally, the local sources only figured 4.0% of news stories. It can be seen that, total per cent of international news agencies including specified agencies and combination of agencies was 96.1%.

Table 4.9 Source of news stories

Source of News	Frequency	Percentage
Local news agencies	21	4.0
International news agencies	440	82.9
Others	70	13.2
Total	531	100.0

The study analysed sources of news stories on the two Palestinian Presidents. Table 4.10 compares between the sources in these news stories. The coverage for President Arafat was mainly from the international news sources with 82.7%. Then the other sources shaped 12.6% of news stories. The local news sources figured the smallest number with 4.7% of news stories.

For President Abbas, the highest sources were international news sources with 83.2% of the news items which were slightly different from Arafat. Followed by 14.4% of news stories that contained other sources “agencies”. Finally, the local news sources just figured 2.4% of news stories.

Table 4.10 Source of news stories for each president

Source of News Stories	Frequency of Arafat	Percentage of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas	Percentage of Abbas
International news	301	82.7	139	83.2
Others	46	12.6	24	14.4
Local news	17	4.7	4	2.4
Total	364	100.0	167	100.0

The study then specified the news sources to be better understand the original sources. Table 4.11 presents the specified sources of news stories and the originated number of news stories from each source that appeared in the *New Straits Times*. Over than one-third of the sources 36.2% of news stories were retrieved from Reuters news agency. Then the sources from AFP and AP news agencies figured 23.7% and 21.5% of news stories respectively.

The fourth largest number of sources was from Agencies with 13.2% of news stories. While the sources from the *New Straits Times* newspaper itself was only 3.4% of news stories. However, each of Bernama, AFP/Reuters, and AP/AFP figured 0.6% of news stories. Finally, the sources from The New York Times figured the smallest number with 0.4% of news stories.

Table 4.11 Specified sources of news stories

Source of News	Frequency	Percentage
Reuters	192	36.2
AFP	126	23.7
AP	114	21.5
Agencies	70	13.2
NST	18	3.4
Bernama	3	0.6
AFP/Reuters	3	0.6
AP/AFP	3	0.6
NYT	2	0.4
Total	531	100.0

4.6 SECTION OF NEWS STORIES

The placement of news stories is important to deliver the message and is related to the prominence of that news stories. Table 4.12 describes the placement of news stories sections. The vast majority of news stories were placed in the world news section with 96.8% of news stories. Following a slow second were the stories placed in the front

pages with 1.7%. Each of national section and others figured 0.6% of news stories. Finally, the life and time and letters section shaped 0.2% of news stories for each.

The news stories placed in the front page of *New Straits Times* were nine stories. The first news story on 22 January 1996 talked about the victory of President Arafat in the first Palestinian Presidential Elections. The second news story on 26 February 1996 discussed the issue of explosions in Israel that killed 25, and injured 80 Israeli. The third news story on 3 June 1996 discussed the issue of Palestinian fears about halting the peace process by the Israeli regime.

The fourth news story on 1 October 1996 mentioned the issue of the call for a summit in Washington by Clinton to both Israeli and Arab. The issue of the fifth news story on 16 January 1997 was about signing Hebron Accord between both Palestinian and Israeli. The sixth news story on 6 September 1999 was about signing a peace deal between Barak and Arafat. The seventh news story on 24 September 2002 discussed the issue of Palestinian demonstrations against the Israeli siege to headquarters of President Arafat. The eight news story on 25 April 2004 was about threatening to Arafat by Israeli. The last news story which was on 6 November 2004 discussed the critical health situation of President Arafat.

On the other hand, the three stories in the national section were all about President Arafat. Two news stories discussed the visit of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to Malaysia and his meeting with the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. The first news story was on 18 October 1999 during a brief stopover visit for Arafat to Malaysia and his meeting at Golden Horses Hotel. The trip of Arafat came after visiting Japan and Vietnam, and then he continued his trip to Jeddah. The second visit for President Arafat to Malaysia was on 8 August 2001 and he met the Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad at Seri Perdana. The third news story on 15 April 2000 discussed the bilateral meeting between President Arafat and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in Havana.

The included news story in letters section was on 7 March 1996 about the obstacles in the peace process and losing the faith by Israeli in Peres and Arafat. The

only news story in life and times section about Arafat on 8 February 1996 mostly focused on his rival candidate Samiha Khalil in the first Palestinian general elections.

Finally, two stories appeared in “others” section were from prime news section during the same day on 12 November 2004 which was one day after the death of the first Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. The first news story discussed the establishment of new Palestinian leadership after Arafat’s death, and the second story quoted Prime Minister of Malaysia Abdullah Ahmad Badawi about the death of Yasser Arafat. The thirds news story in the others section was from opinion section on 31 March 1996 and discussed the issue of peace process and working hard to achieve a durable peace.

Table 4.12 Placement of news stories

News story section	Frequency	Percentage
World News	514	96.8
Front Page	9	1.7
National	3	.6
Others	3	.6
Letters	1	.2
Life & Times	1	.2
Total	531	100.0

An analysis was made on the placement of news stories. Table 4.13 shows the placement of news stories for both the Presidents. It can be seen that the vast majority of news stories on President Yasser Arafat were from the world news section with 95.3%. Followed by 2.5% of news stories in the front page. Then, each national and “others” sections shaped 0.8% of news stories. Finally, each letters and life and time sections contained 0.3% of news stories. In comparison, all the news stories on President Mahmoud Abbas were from world news section with 100%.

Table 4.13 Placement of news stories for each president

Sections of News Stories	Arafat Frequency	Arafat Percentage	Abbas Frequency	Abbas Percentage
World News	347	95.3	167	100
Front Page	9	2.5	0	0.0
National	3	0.8	0	0.0
Others	3	0.8	0	0.0
Letters	1	0.3	0	0.0
Life & Times	1	0.3	0	0.0
Total	364	100.0	167	100.0

4.7 SLANT OF NEWS STORIES

Slants or tones are an important aspect of framing the news and they are systematic filtering that influences the perceived information and public opinion about one issue whether positively or negatively (Gunther & Christen 2002; Zeng et al. 2014). Table 4.14 presents the slant of news stories of the *New Straits Times* which were scored as positive, negative, balanced, and neutral news stories in tone. The frequency test shows that the neutral slant had 60.1% of news stories. Then the positive news stories were more than the negative news stories with 20.7% and 11.5% of news stories respectively. Finally, the balanced stories shaped the least number with 7.7% of news stories.

Table 4.14 Slant of news stories on presidents

News Slant	Frequency	Percentage
Neutral	319	60.1
Positive	110	20.7
Negative	61	11.5
Balanced	41	7.7
Total	531	100.0

A comparison between the slants used by NST on the two Palestinian Presidents was also made. Table 4.15 represents cross-tabulation analysis between the slant of news stories and the two Palestinians Presidents. For President Arafat, of 364 news stories, 59.6% of news stories were neutral, followed by positive news stories 21.4%. Then the negative news stories shaped 11.3%. Finally, the balanced news stories figured only 7.7% of the total number of stories.

For president Abbas, there were 61.6% neutral news stories. Also, there were more positive news stories about president Abbas 19.2% than negative news stories 12.2%. Finally, there were only 7.8% balanced news stories. In general, it can be seen that President Arafat received a slightly more positive coverage than President Abbas, and at the same time President Abbas has received a slightly more negative coverage than President Arafat.

However, President Arafat was accorded several positive words that connoted approval, praise, or flattery. The most considered prominent positive words about

Arafat were through considering him as veteran, defiant, great, beaming, and optimistic leader, legendary figure, hero of struggle, and symbol and icon of Palestinian nationalism. In comparison, the most prominent positive words that described President Abbas were moderate leader, and man of peace. The news stories which contained negative words that connoted a sense of criticism, disapproval, accusations, and unflattering about President Arafat were through considering him as very gloomy, pessimistic, head of terror, terrorist, embattled, irrelevant, ailing elder statesman, and puppet of Israel. In comparison, the most prominent negative words that described President Abbas were through considering him as: frustrated and failed to achieve any progress.

The results of Arandas et al. (2019) study revealed that the balanced coverage of the *New Straits Times* about President Arafat was 50%, followed by 37.5% and 12.5% for positive and negative coverage respectively. Arandas et al. (2018) showed that President Mahmoud Abbas did not receive any negative coverage from two news agencies.

Table 4.15 Slant of news stories on each president

News slant	Frequency of Arafat	Percentage of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas	Percentage of Abbas
Neutral	217	59.6	102	61.6
Positive	78	21.4	32	19.2
Negative	41	11.3	20	12.2
Balanced	28	7.7	13	7.8
Total	364	100.0	167	100.0

Media slant implicitly gives a negative or positive correlation to the discussed issues (Duggan & Martinelli 2011). This study specified the used slants and the news sources to be better understand the differences and similarities between them. Table 4.16 is cross tabulation between the specified sources of news stories and the news slant. Reuters figured most of the coverage of NST with 192 news stories. Reuters included 57.8% neutral news stories, followed by 20.3% positive news stories. Then the negative news stories were 12.5% and the balanced news stories were 9.4%. A total of 126 news stories covered by AFP, neutral news stories constituted 60.3%, followed by positive stories with 27.8%. Then, both negative and balanced slants constituted 7.1% and 4.8% of news stories respectively. AP covered 114 news stories,

a total of 56.1% were neutral, followed by 18.4% positive stories. The negative news stories recorded 14.0%, and the balanced stories were 11.4%.

The news stories from a combination of sources that were stated as “agencies” were 70 stories. Neutral stories shaped 70.0%, followed by negative stories with 15.7%. The positive news stories shaped 12.9%, and balanced stories shaped 1.4%. The covered news stories by NST were 18, among them the neutral stories figured 55.6%, followed by positive stories with 27.8%. Then the balanced news stories were 11.1%, and the negative stories were only 5.6%. All the news stories from Bernama news agency 100% were neutral. In addition, all the news stories from AFP/Reuters and AP/AFP 100% were neutral. Finally, NYT newspaper has only two news stories, one positive, and one balanced.

It can be seen that the most prevalent slant by Reuters, AFP, and AP was neutral followed by positive, negative, and balanced respectively. Among the international sources, it can be seen that the French AFP was the most international news agency that supported the Palestinian Presidents which has the most positive coverage and less negative coverage at the same time with 27.8% and 7.1% respectively. The second news agency that supported the Palestinian Presidents was the British Reuters with 20.3% positive coverage and 12.5% negative coverage. The American AP news agency was the least international agency that supported the Palestinian Presidents which has 18.4% positive coverage and 14.6% negative coverage.

Table 4.16 Slant of news stories and source of news

Specified Sources	Positive	Negative	Balanced	Neutral	Total
Reuters	39 (20.3%)	24 (12.5%)	18 (9.4%)	111 (57.8%)	192 (100%)
AFP	35 (27.8%)	9 (7.1%)	6 (4.8%)	76 (60.3%)	126 (100%)
AP	21 (18.4%)	16 (14.0%)	13 (11.4%)	64 (56.1%)	114 (100%)
Agencies	9 (12.9%)	11 (15.7%)	1 (1.4%)	49 (70.0%)	70 (100%)
NST	5 (27.8%)	1 (5.6%)	2 (11.1%)	10 (55.6%)	18 (100%)
Bernama	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (100%)	3 (100%)
AFP/Reuters	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (100%)	3 (100%)
AP/AFP	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (100%)	3 (100%)
NYT	1 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (100%)
Total	110 (20.7%)	61 (11.5%)	41 (7.7%)	319 (60.1%)	531 (100%)

The study analysed the sources of news stories on President Arafat and the used slants in each source. Table 4.17 is a cross tabulation between specified sources of news stories and news slant for President Arafat. The majority of news sources came from Reuters, the British news agency with 151 news stories. The neutral news stories were 55.6%, followed by positive news stories with 23.8%. The the negative news stories recorded 11.9%, and balanced news stories shaped 8.6%.

The second highest number of sources came from AP, the American news agency with 72 news stories. The neutral slant shaped 62.5% of news stories, followed by 13.9% of news stories for each positive and negative, and 9.7% news stories were balanced. The third highest coverage came from AFP, the French news agency with 70 news stories. The neutral news stories shaped 60.0%, followed by positive stories with 25.7%. Each negative and balanced shaped 7.1% of news stories.

The news that included a combination of sources which was stated as “agencies” figured the fourth highest number of coverage with 46 news stories. Neutral news stories figured 67.4%, followed by positive stories with 17.4%. Then negative news stories figured 15.2%, and there were no balanced news stories. Then 14 news stories about President Arafat were from NST itself. Neutral news stories figured 42.9%, followed by positive stories with 35.7%. Then the balanced news stories were 14.3%, and the negative stories were only 7.1%. All the news stories 100% from each Bernama AFP/Reuters and AP/AFP were neutral. Finally, NYT newspaper has only two news stories one positive, and one balanced. It can be seen that, among the international sources, the French AFP most supported President Yasser Arafat, followed by the British Reuters, and the American AP respectively.

Table 4.17 Slant of news stories and source of news on Arafat

Specified source of news	Positive	Negative	Balanced	Neutral	Total
Reuters	36 (23.8%)	18 (11.9%)	13 (8.6%)	84 (55.6%)	151(100.0%)
AP	10 (13.9%)	10 (13.9%)	7 (9.7%)	45 (62.5%)	72 (100.0%)
AFP	18 (25.7%)	5 (7.1%)	5 (7.1%)	42 (60.0%)	70 (100.0%)
Agencies	8 (17.4%)	7 (15.2%)	0 (0.0%)	31 (67.4%)	46 (100.0%)
NST	5 (35.7%)	1 (7.1%)	2 (14.3%)	6 (42.9%)	14 (100.0%)
Bernama	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (100.0%)	3 (100.0%)

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AFP & Reuters	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (100.0%)	3 (100.0%)
AP & AFP	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (100.0%)	3 (100.0%)
NYT	1 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (100.0%)
Total	78 (21.4%)	41 (11.3%)	28 (7.7%)	217 (59.6%)	364 (100%)

An analysis was made on the used slants in each news source on President Abbas. Table 4.18 is a cross tabulation between specified sources of news stories and news slant on President Abbas. The source of most news stories was from the French agency, AFP with 56 news stories. The highest number of news stories was neutral with 60.7%, followed by positive news stories with 30.4%. Then the negative news stories figured 7.1%, and balanced news stories figured 1.8%.

The American news agency, AP shaped the second highest number of sources with 42 news stories. The neutral slant figured 45.2% of news stories, followed by positive news stories with 26.2%. Then each of negative and balanced news stories shaped 14.3%. The British news agency, Reuters shaped the third highest source with 41 news stories. Then neutral news stories were 65.9%, followed by negative stories with 14.6%. Then balanced news stories were 12.2%, and positive news stories shaped were 7.3%.

The combination of news agencies was the fourth highest number of sources with 24 news stories. Neutral news stories were 75.0%, followed by negative news stories with 16.7%. Then each of positive and balanced news stories figured 4.2%. Finally, the least number of sources was from NST with four neutral news stories.

Table 4.18 Slant of news stories and source of news on Abbas

Specified source of news	Positive	Negative	Balanced	Neutral	Total
AFP	17 (30.4%)	4 (7.1%)	1 (1.8%)	34 (60.7%)	56 (100.0%)
AP	11 (26.2%)	6 (14.3%)	6 (14.3%)	19 (45.2%)	42 (100.0%)
Reuters	3 (7.3%)	6 (14.6%)	5 (12.2%)	27 (65.9%)	41 (100.0%)
Agencies	1 (4.2%)	4 (16.7%)	1 (4.2%)	18 (75.0%)	24 (100.0%)
NST	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (100.0%)	4 (100.0%)
Total	32 (19.2%)	20 (12.0%)	13 (7.8%)	102 (61.1%)	167(100.0%)

4.8 DIFFERENT TYPES OF CRISIS

Crisis is a sudden, inevitable, unexpected, and negative incident or situation that threatens individuals and organisations (Coombs 2007b; Coombs 2010; Oliver 2004; Ruff & Aziz 2003). Improper management or control for a crisis can cause a chain of crises (Fener & Cevik 2015). Crisis influences negatively the reputation of political figures and politicians which is highly valuable for them (Chimbarange et al. 2013; Sheldon 2006). Hence, politicians need to repair their embattled reputation (Sheldon 2006).

Understanding the crisis is so important to choose the most suitable response to it (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997; Coombs 2007b; Coombs & Holladay 2002). Using the strategies of image repair theory comes after understanding the charges and must match them. The effectiveness of these strategies comes through choosing suitable response strategies (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997). Table 4.19 presents several types of crises faced by Palestinian Presidents as portrayed by NST. The total number of crises was 456; the majority crises were political with 97.1% of news stories. Followed by social and economic crises with 2.2% and 0.7% of news stories respectively. This study adopted the political crisis from the study of Shaluf et al. (2003) who have stated different political crisis such as war, threats, blockades, embargos, and relation breakdown, dictatorships, terrorist attacks, demonstrations, riots, sabotage, internal conflicts, kidnappings, strikes, and hostile takeovers.

The three economic crises were during President Abbas term and contained only financial crises. The three news stories on 2 May 2011, 12 November 2014, and 7 April 2015 discussed the stop of collecting tax revenues on behalf of the Palestinian Authority by Israel and stop transferring the cash to Palestinians. However, there will be more elaboration in other next tables about political and social crises.

Table 4.19 Different types of crisis faced

Crisis Type	Frequency	Percentage
Political	443	97.1
Social	10	2.2
Economic	3	0.7
Total	456	100.0

This study analysed the frequency of the types of crises covered by NST on the Palestinian Presidents. Table 4.20 describes the types of crises faced by both Presidents during their terms. President Arafat faced a total of 312 crises. The political crises figured 98.1% of news stories. Then the social crises were 1.9% of news stories. But, President Arafat did not face any economic crises. President Abbas faced a total of 144 crises. The political crises shaped 95.1% of news stories. Followed by social and economic crises with 2.8% and 0.7% of news stories respectively.

Table 4.20 Types of crises faced by both presidents

Crisis Type	Frequency of Arafat	Percentage of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas	Percentage of Abbas
Political	306	98.1	137	95.1
Social	6	1.9	4	2.8
Economic	0	0.0	3	0.7
Total	312	100.0	144	100.0

This study analysed the sub-types of political crises covered by NST. Table 4.21 shows the specific types of political crises that faced by Presidents Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. The peace process crisis figured the highest number of political crises with 40.3% of news stories. The second highest type of crisis was the internal conflict with 19.2% of news stories. Then each of foreign pressure and Israeli attacks crises shaped 9.9% of news stories. After that, Israeli blockade crisis shaped 7.7% of news stories, then 7.0% of news stories contained Palestinian attacks crisis. Followed by Israeli threats, and clashes with 2.9% and 1.8% of news stories respectively. Then demonstration crisis was included in 0.7% of news stories. Finally, each of Israeli spying, kidnapping, and relations breakdown crisis figured 0.2% of news stories.

The peace process crisis included several sensitive issues in negotiation and peace-making such as future of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, expanding of Jewish settlements, negotiation halting, not implementing or postpone the signed accords by Israeli, and the Israeli attempts to modify the accords.

Of the 85 news stories on internal conflict, 59 stories discussed the internal conflict between the Palestinian Presidents and Hamas. The other 26 internal conflict issues were between Palestinian Presidents and their own colleagues and followers whether in PLO, Fatah, or the government.

However, other internal conflict crises occurred between Arafat and Abbas themselves. The feud between Arafat and Abbas came after appointing Abbas as Prime Minister by President Arafat. The reason for this appointment was the international pressure for power-sharing after four decades of sole control by Arafat. The main crises between them happened over a power struggle, and the wrangling also was over the names of ministers, especially the suggestion of Abbas to appoint Mohammed Dahlan as a chief of security. This issue was discussed in the news stories on 23, 24 April 2003 and on 5, 7 September 2003.

Ironically, after becoming the president, Abbas wanted to keep the power for himself and not to share it with others. The news story on 25 April 2005 discussed appointing three heads for security forces and forcing hundreds of their men for retirement which aimed to eject top commanders from Arafat's old guard. Additionally, the news story on 4 April 2013 discussed the spat and tension between President Abbas and his newly appointed Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. This tension came over a raft of issues including the resignation of finance minister over the refusal of Abbas to accept him even he was agreed by Fayyad.

Moreover, the news story on 23 June 2013 discussed another conflict between Abbas and his second Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah after only two weeks from his appointment. The power struggle conflict with Hamdallah was also over the decision of Abbas for appointing two deputy premiers, after the resignation of Fayyad.

Foreign pressure stories were during both Arafat and Abbas time; 32 news stories were during Arafat's Presidential term and 12 news stories were during Abbas's Presidential term. For President Arafat, some of the pressure was from the international community, especially the United States to stop him from declaring the independence of Palestine state, and to keep the negotiation with Israel. Other pressure was to appoint Prime Minister and to reveal his financial secrets. Also, the American veto which was against the decision of having international monitors in the Palestinian land.

President Abbas faced heavy pressure from the United States for revamping his security forces and cleaning up his government. Another pressure was from the United States and Israel for keeping the ban of financial aid to the new Palestinian government that led by Hamas. The United States has informed President Abbas that it will shun a future Hamas- Fatah coalition government because it will not explicitly recognise Israel. The other pressure was from the United State to drop the Bid from Abbas for the membership of Palestine state in the United Nations.

The crisis of Israeli attacks on Palestinian people came through airstrikes, assassinations, and committing several massacres against Palestinian civilians. Israeli blockade crisis included the siege of West Bank and Gaza Strip several times, and the blockades against Arafat by making him a virtual prisoner in his headquarter in Ramallah until his death. Additionally, creating buffer zones and isolating the West Bank cities by creating many roadblocks and checkpoints.

Palestinian attacks included the attacks on Israeli Army and settlers by the Palestinian resistance members, and some of those attacks were through explosions. Israeli threats crisis was mostly against Arafat through threatening to move, expel, or kill him, especially when he was besieged.

Clashes were mostly between the Israeli Army and civil Palestinian demonstrators. Usually, the Israeli army was attacking the Palestinian demonstrations through using the excessive force and firing discriminately by both live and rubber bullets and tear gas.

The three demonstrations were during Arafat's presidential term. Two of the demonstrations were at An-Najah National University in West Bank on 4, 5 April 1996 which were organised by Hamas students after the Palestinian police tried to break up their meeting. The third demonstration was in Gaza Strip on 10 October 2001 which was also organised by Hamas members to support Osama bin Laden.

The Israeli spying crisis was mentioned in the news story on 9 March 1996 after discovering planted electronic listening devices by Israel in the Palestinian

security headquarters which allowed the Israeli to eavesdrop on all the calls and conversations. The kidnapping crisis stated in the news story on 1 March 2007 was during Abbas time after abducting a photographer for foreign news. Finally, the news story on 26 September 2001 discussed the relations breakdown crisis between Palestinians and Syrians governments which become much worst after deteriorating of their relations for over 20 years.

Table 4.21 Types of political crises

Types of Political Crises	Frequency	Percentage
Peace process	178	40.3
Internal conflict	85	19.2
Foreign pressure	44	9.9
Israeli attacks	44	9.9
Israeli blockade	34	7.7
Palestinian attacks	31	7.0
Israeli threats	13	2.9
Clashes	8	1.8
Demonstrations	3	0.7
Israeli spying	1	0.2
Kidnapping	1	0.2
Relations breakdown	1	0.2
Total	443	100.0

Frequency analysis for the sub-types of social crises was also made. Table 4.22 presents the types of social crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents Arafat and Abbas as covered by NST. The corruption crisis included was in 30% of news stories. Then, leaking of information and Israeli slanders crises were included 20% of news stories for each. Then false information, electoral fraud, and Israeli rumours were included in one news story for each.

The corruption crisis occurred during the term of Arafat. The first crisis was on 3 August 1997 after the collective resignation by 16 ministers out of 22 over corruption charges by legislative council for several ministers. The accused ministers included Jamil Tarifi, Nabil Shaat, and Ali Qawasmeh. The second crisis on 13 September 2002 came after forcing the Cabinet of Arafat to resign by Parliament due to corruption allegations. The third crisis on 12 February 2004 came after reducing the foreign donor money after allegations that this money was siphoned off by corrupt officials or diverted to militants.

The first story on information leakage crisis was on 22 December 2010 after leaking of information from the United States cable. This leakage indicated that the Palestinian and Israeli forces work closely against Hamas after it has taken over Gaza in 2007. The second information leakage news story was on 27 January 2011 after leaking of documents to Al-Jazeera news channel regarding the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation.

The news story on 10 January 2002 discussed the Israeli slanders crisis and the allegations that Arafat and his administration have a link to a seized ship of weapons by Israel. The second story about Israeli slanders was on 16 December 2002 after the Israeli claims about al-Qaeda existence in Palestine.

The news story about electoral cheating or fraud crisis was on 17 January 2005 which was the first news story covered by NST about President Abbas. The story accused the campaign of Abbas and the intelligence officials of pressuring the Palestinian elections officials to change the procedures during the election.

The news story about using false information was on 26 June 2016 after accusation to Israel by Abbas without giving any source to support his accusation. Finally, the news story on 18 November 1997 discussed the issue of Israeli rumours through cooking up stories that stating the poor health of Arafat and Israeli claims that he was suffering from Parkinson.

Table 4.22 Types of social crises

Types of Social Crises	Frequency	Percentage
Corruption	3	30
Information leakage	2	20
Israeli slanders	2	20
Cheating/ electoral fraud	1	10
False information	1	10
Israeli rumours	1	10
Total	10	100.0

4.9 PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE RESPONSE

The type of response includes both proactive and reactive. The proactive approach is taking actions in anticipating the process of environmental changes. The reactive

approach is a response to the occurred environmental changes (Bucurean 2015). The proactive response aims to avoid the crisis, and reactive response aims to confront with that crisis (Jugo 2013). The categorised news stories as “others” mostly did not include any comments or statements by any Palestinian Presidents which did not allow categorising them as proactive or reactive. These news stories were descriptive. These stories discussed the Palestinian polls, the advancement in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, international presidential trips, and forming Palestinian governments.

The above types of response as portrayed by NST were also analysed. Table 4.23 shows whether the type of response by the Palestinian Presidents was proactive, reactive, or others. The highest type of response was a proactive response with 40.9% of news stories, followed by “others” with 36.0% of news stories. The reactive response figured 23.2% of news stories.

Table 4.23 Proactive and reactive response

Type of response	Frequency	Percentage
Proactive	217	40.9
Others	191	36.0
Reactive	123	23.2
Total	531	100.0

This study analysed coverage of NST on the type of response used by both Palestinian Presidents. Table 4.24 compares between the response used by Presidents Arafat and Abbas. For President Arafat, proactive response shaped 38.5% of news stories, followed by “others” with 36.5%. Finally, reactive response figured 25.0% of news stories.

For President Abbas, proactive response shaped 46.1% of news stories. Followed by, others with 43.7% of news stories. Finally, reactive response shaped 19.2% of news stories. It can be seen that President Abbas has more proactive and less reactive responses than President Arafat.

Table 4.24 Type of response by both presidents

Type of Response	Frequency of Arafat	Percentage of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas	Percentage of Abbas
Proactive	140	38.5	77	46.1

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Others	133	36.5	58	43.7
Reactive	91	25.0	32	19.2
Total	364	100.0	167	100.0

4.10 MAIN IMAGE REPAIR STRATEGIES

Image repair theory includes five main strategies: (1) Denial: With two variants/ sub-strategies: (a) Simple denial: By simply deny the wrongful act and accusation. (b) Shifting the blame: By referring the wrongful acts to others or another party. (2) Evasion of responsibility: Includes four variants/ sub-strategies: (a) Provocation: By claiming that the offensive action was a reaction to someone else's offensive act; (b) Defeasibility: By referring that offensive act to the lack of information or control. (c) Accident: By stating that the wrongful act occurred accidentally. (d) Good intentions: By asserting that performing the mistake was with good intentions.

(3) Reducing offensiveness of event: It has six variants/sub-strategies: (a) Bolstering: By strengthening the qualities of individual or organisation; (b) Minimisation: By reducing the severity of the offensive act outcomes. (c) Differentiation: By comparing the act to other similar acts; (d) Transcendence: By justifying the act by appeals to important ends and values to reduce the wrongful act unpleasantness. (e) Attack the accuser: By minimising the credibility of accuser and showing if the victims worth their fate; and (f) Compensation: By offering to compensate the harmed party or victim. (4) Corrective action: By promising to solve or correct the problem or promising to prevent its recurrence. (5) Mortification: By admitting the wrongdoing, or apologising and begging for forgiveness (Benoit, 1997b, 2005, 2013, 2014b).

This study analysed the strategies found in the news items of NST. Table 4.25 describes the main five image repair strategies by Benoit used by Palestinian Presidents. From the table below, it can be seen that the total of number of main image repair strategies found in news stories was 50 out of 531. Corrective action was the most used strategy among the five main image repair strategies with 42% of news stories. Followed by denial strategy that included in 38% of news stories. Then each

of evasion of responsibility and reducing offensiveness achieved 8.0%. Finally, mortification was the least used strategy that included in only 4.0% of news stories.

The types of crises and the image repair strategies used by Presidents to respond to these crisis determined by the media. The crises faced and strategies used by Presidents were identified and actively promoted by the reports of the *New Straits Times*. Other strategies might be used by the Palestinian Presidents but not reported by the *New Straits Times*. This small number of main image repair strategies 50 out of 531 might be due to lack of quotations and comments by the Palestinian Presidents. Out of 50 strategies, only seven strategies used by President Arafat and three strategies by President Abbas came through statements or press releases. Other studies that got a higher number of strategies mostly depended on press releases, press conferences, interviews, and comments from the individuals or organisations.

The other news stories which did not include image repair strategies mostly discussed the Palestinian elections issue, the efforts of the Palestinian Presidents to make progress in peace process, some obstacles in peace process, international presidential trips, and Arab Summits.

Table 4.25 Main image repair strategies

Image Repair Strategies	Frequency	Percentage
Corrective action	21	42
Denial	19	38
Evasion of responsibility	4	8.0
Reducing offensiveness	4	8.0
Mortification	2	4.0
Total	50	100

A comparison in the distribution of main image repair strategies employed by Presidents Arafat and Abbas was made as portrayed by NST. Table 4.26 shows that, out of 50 main image repair strategies, 40 strategies were used by President Arafat. The most prevalent strategy used by President Arafat was corrective action with 45% of news stories. Followed by, denial strategy with 40% of news stories. Finally, each of evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, and mortification strategies included in 5.0% of news stories. Out of the 40 strategies used by President Arafat, a

total of 14 corrective action and 10 denial strategies came after Palestinian attacks crisis.

In contrast, 10 main image repair strategies were used by President Abbas. Each denial and corrective action strategies figured 30% of news stories. Followed by each of evasion of responsibility and reducing offensiveness strategies which included in 20%. Finally, President Abbas did not used mortification strategy to repair his image.

Table 4.26 Main image repair strategies for both presidents

Image repair strategies	Frequency of Arafat	Percentage of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas	Percentage of Abbas
Corrective action	18	45.0	3	30.0
Denial	16	40.0	3	30.0
Evasion of responsibility	2	5.0	2	20.0
Reducing offensiveness	2	5.0	2	20.0
Mortification	2	5.0	0	0.0
Total	40	100.0	10	100.0

The use of image repair strategies should match the charges. Selecting the suitable strategies and persuasive response are important elements to the effectiveness of these strategies (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997). Matching the type of crisis and the type of response leads to crisis recovery and influence the perception of public positively (Fussell Sisco et al. 2010). Table 4.27 is a cross tabulation between main image repair strategies and sub-types of crises as portrayed by NST. Out of 50 main image repair strategies, 46 were used in political crises, namely Palestinian attacks, foreign pressure, peace process, demonstrations, Israel threats, Israeli attacks, kidnapping, and internal conflict. Followed by four main image repair strategies were used in social crises, namely slanders, information leakage, and false information.

From the table below, it can be seen that the highest number of main image repair strategies was 30 out of 50 strategies which used in Palestinian attacks crisis. Out of the 30 news stories, 56.7% of news stories included corrective action strategy, 40% of news stories included denial strategy, and 3.3% news story included evasion of responsibility. The second highest number of main image repair strategies was five strategies which used in foreign pressure crisis. A total of 60% of them contained

denial strategy, and then each of reducing offensiveness and corrective action was used in 20%.

The third highest number of main image repair strategies was three strategies which employed in peace process crisis. Reducing offensiveness strategy was employed in 66.7% of news stories and evasion of responsibility strategy employed in 33.3%. Then image repair strategies were used twice in demonstrations crisis one story included corrective action and another one included mortification. Additionally, corrective action strategy was included in two stories on clashes crisis. Moreover, denial strategy was used twice in a slanders crisis. After that, evasion of responsibility strategy was used once in each of Israeli attacks and false information crises. Then each of Israeli threats and kidnapping crises included denial strategy in one news story. The information leakage was covered in one news story by employing reducing offensiveness strategy. Finally, internal conflict crisis included mortification strategy in one news story.

The use of these strategies by both Palestinian Presidents was in line with Benoit's image repair strategies. The use of this theory was applicable to the findings of this study by explaining the crisis reported by media. The next paragraphs will give an example of each sub-type of crisis with the used image repair strategies as reported by *New Straits Times*.

First, during the Palestinian attacks crisis, the Palestinian Presidents used three types of image repair strategies to defend their image, namely corrective action, denial, and evasion of responsibility. For instance, the news story on 26 February 1996 mentioned the use of correct/solve problem the sub-strategy of corrective action strategy after Palestinian attacks. President Arafat promised to take immediate measures and ordered to arrest some people with who are linked with attacks. While the news story on 10 January 2002 mentioned the use of simple denial the sub-strategy of denial strategy after Palestinian attacks. President Arafat denied the Israeli charges that his administration was linked to attacks. The third used strategy within Palestinian attacks was evasion of responsibility by President Arafat on 23 March

1997. The use of this strategy came through denouncement by Arafat to a Palestinian attack on a cafe in Tel Aviv.

Both corrective action and denial figured highest number of image repair strategies used by the Palestinian Presidents. Most of these strategies were used after Palestinian attacks crisis. The Palestinian Presidents paid a lot of attention toward this issue to show to the international community and the whole world their eagerness to peace making process. That might also reduce the foreign pressure on both Presidents and help them to avoid the blame.

Second, during foreign pressure crisis, three types of image repair strategies were used, namely denial, reducing offensiveness, and corrective action. The news story on 19 March 2003 mentioned the use of simple denial the sub-strategy of denial strategy after having foreign pressure and blaming Arafat for being responsible about Palestinian uprising which was denied by him. Then the news story on 24 June 2002 mentioned the use of attack accuser the sub-strategy of reducing offensiveness strategy. President Arafat has brushed aside the accusation that he did not make enough effort to stop Palestinian attacks and accusing Israel by saying that its siege and procedures against Palestinians are the cause behind that. Then Arafat used correct/solve the problem the sub-strategy of corrective action strategy on 16 May 2002. Arafat has committed to implement major reforms in his government after he received foreign pressure from the international community.

Third, during peace process crisis, two types of image repair strategies were used, namely evasion of responsibility and reduce offensiveness. The news story on 23 September 2010 included the use of provocation the sub-strategy of evasion of responsibility strategy. Arafat said that stopping peace process occurred when the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Israeli will continue their activities in West Bank and Jerusalem. The other strategy indicted in the news story on 21 February 2007 by using attack accuser the sub strategy of reducing offensiveness. When Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert accused President Abbas by saying that Abbas cheated him by reaching deal with Hamas, then President Abbas responded by saying that Olmert did not keep his promise and gave him nothing.

Fourth, during demonstrations crisis, corrective action and mortification strategies were used. The news story on 5 April 1996 included correct/solve problem the sub-strategy of corrective action strategy when President Arafat bowed to the demands of Palestinian protesters and fired a senior police commander who ordered a raid on a university in West Bank. The other news story on 6 April 1996 included confess/admit making a mistake the sub-strategy of mortification strategy when President Arafat said that we all make a mistake and ask the university student to forgive what happened then they agreed to forgive and forget the police raid crisis.

Fifth, within the crisis of Palestinian-Israeli clashes only corrective action strategy was used. The news story on 9 October 1996 included correct/solve problem the sub-strategy of corrective action when President Arafat said that he gave a permanent order to Palestinian police not to fire at Israeli troops. Sixth, during the Israeli slanders crisis, only denial strategy was used. President Arafat on 10 January 2002 used simple denial the sub-strategy of denial when he denied the Israeli charges that his administration was linked to a shipload of weapons seized by Israel and called the Israeli allegations by lies.

Seventh, within the Israeli attacks crisis, only 1 type of image repair strategies was used. In the news story on 3 October 2000 President Arafat used provocation the sub-strategy of evasion of responsibility strategy when he exchanged recriminations blaming with Israel for the violence. Eighth, also one type of image repair strategy was used within the false information crisis which has no evidence-based information. President Abbas in the news story on 26 June 2016 used defeasibility as the sub-strategy of evasion of responsibility when his office had acknowledged that his comments about poisoning water issue were based on unproved foundation.

Ninth, during the Israeli threats crisis, only simple denial was used. President Arafat in the news story on 13 October 2003 denied the Israeli accusation that he was fomenting the violence. Tenth, within the kidnapping crisis, also one denial strategy was used by President Abbas through shift the blame sub-strategy. Abbas condemned the kidnapping of photographer for foreign news that was mentioned in the news story on 3 January 2007.

Eleventh, within the information leakage crisis one image repair strategy was used. The news story on 27 January 2011 included attack accuser the sub-strategy of reducing offensiveness strategy when President Abbas and his team focused on accusing Al-Jazeera channel of smear and distortion tactics instead of giving the substance of leaked documents. Finally, during the internal conflict crisis one type of image repair strategies was used. On 19 August 2004 President Arafat used confession or admitting sub-strategy of mortification strategy when he said that he made mistakes but without stating them or how he would correct them.

Table 4.27 Main image repair strategies and sub-types of crises

Sub-crisis types	Denial	Evasion Of Responsibility	Reducing Offensiveness	Corrective Action	Mortification	Total
Palestinian attacks	12(40)	1 (3.3%)	–	17 (56.7%)	–	30(100)
Foreign pressure	3(60)	–	1 (20%)	1(20%)	–	5(100%)
Peace process	–	1 (33.3%)	2 (66.7%)	–	–	3(100%)
Demonstrations	–	–	–	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	2(100%)
Clashes	–	–	–	2 (100%)	–	2(100%)
Israeli slanders	2(100)	–	–	–	–	2(100%)
Israeli attacks	–	1 (100%)	–	–	–	1(100%)
False information	–	1 (100%)	–	–	–	1(100%)
Israeli threats	1(100)	–	–	–	–	1(100%)
Kidnapping	1(100)	–	–	–	–	1(100%)
Information leakage	–	–	1 (100%)	–	–	1(100%)
Internal conflict	–	–	–	–	1 (100%)	1(100%)
Total	19(38)	4(8%)	4(8%)	21 (42%)	2 (4%)	50(100)

This study also analysed the types of crisis and the image repair strategies used by President Arafat as covered by NST. Table 4.28 shows the used main image repair strategies by President Arafat and the sub-types of crises. The highest number of strategies was 25, which were used in Palestinian attack crisis. Corrective action strategy used in 56%, followed by denial evasion of responsibility and strategies with 40% and 4.0% news stories respectively. The second highest number was five strategies which were used in foreign pressure crisis, especially from the United States. Denial strategy was in 60% of news stories, followed by 20% of news story for each reducing offensiveness and corrective action.

Then each of clashes, demonstrations, and Israeli slander crises contained two image repair strategies. Both news stories in clashes crisis included corrective action strategies. In demonstrations crisis, one story included corrective action strategy and the other story included mortification strategy. Within Israeli slanders crisis, two news stories contained denial strategy. Then Israeli threats crisis included one denial strategy. The Israeli attacks crisis included one evasion of responsibility strategy. Then stories on peace process and internal conflict crises contained one reducing offensiveness strategy and one mortification strategy respectively.

Table 4.28 Main image repair strategies of Arafat & sub-types of crises

Sub-type of crisis	Denial	Evasion Of Responsibility	Reducing Offensiveness	Corrective Action	Mortification	Total
Palestinian attacks	10(40)	1(4.0%)	–	14 (56.0%)	–	25(100)
Foreign pressure	3(60)	–	1(20.0%)	1(20.0%)	–	5(100%)
Clashes	–	–	–	2(100%)	–	2(100%)
Demonstrations	–	–	–	1(50.0%)	1(50.0%)	2(100%)
Israeli slanders	2(100)	–	–	–	–	2(100%)
Israeli threats	1(100)	–	–	–	–	1(100%)
Israeli attacks	–	1(100%)	–	–	–	1(100%)
Peace process	–	–	1(100%)	–	–	1(100%)
Internal conflict	–	–	–	–	1(100%)	1(100%)
Total	16(40)	2 (5%)	2(5%)	18(45%)	2(5%)	40(100)

The covered types of crisis by NST and the image repair strategies used by President Abbas were also analysed. Table 4.29 presents the used main image repair strategies by President Abbas in different types of crises. The highest number of strategies was five strategies which were used in Palestinian attacks crisis. Corrective action strategy included in 60% stories and denial strategy included 40% stories.

The second highest number was two strategies which were used in peace process crisis. Evasion of responsibility used in one news story while reducing offensiveness strategy used in another one. Each of false information, information leakage, and kidnapping crises included one news story which contained evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, and denial strategies respectively.

Table 4.29 Main image repair strategies of Abbas & sub-types of crises

Sub-type of crisis	Denial	Evasion Of Responsibility	Reducing Offensiveness	Corrective Action	Mortification	Total
Palestinian attacks	2(40%)	–	–	3(60%)	–	5(100%)
Peace process	–	1(50%)	1(50%)	–	–	2(100%)
False information	–	1(100%)	–	–	–	1(100%)
Information leakage	–	–	1(100%)	–	–	1(100%)
Kidnapping	1(100%)	–	–	–	–	1(100%)
Total	3(30%)	2(20%)	2(20%)	3(30%)	–	10(100%)

4.11 SUB-IMAGE REPAIR STRATEGIES

The frequency analysis on sub-strategies of image repair theory used by Palestinian Presidents as portrayed by NST was also made. Table 4.30 shows these sub-strategies. A total of 8 sub-strategies were used in 61 news stories by the Palestinian Presidents to repair their image. The main image repair strategies were used in 50 news stories. The number of sub-strategies does not add up to 100% since some of the news stories included more than one sub-strategy.

Presenting the image repair strategies used by the Palestinian Presidents to support their image by *New Straits Times* might be referring to several reasons. The international relations between countries are influencing the shape of their images by other countries (Giffard & Rivenburgh 2000). Also, when there is an interaction between two countries then the media portrayal of one country supports the image of the other country (Idid 2018). It can be seen that correct/solve problem which is a sub-strategy for corrective action strategy included in 22 news stories. Then shifting the blame and simple denial sub-strategies of denial strategy were included in 15 and 11 news stories respectively. Then, each of confess/admit the sub-strategy of mortification, and attack accuser sub-strategy of reducing offensiveness included in four news stories.

After that, provocation the sub-strategy of evasion of responsibility was included in three news stories. Finally, defeasibility the sub-strategy of evasion of responsibility strategy, and apology the sub-strategy of mortification strategy were

included in one news story for each. However, the other eight sub-strategies, namely accident, good intention, bolstering, minimisation, differentiation, transcendence, compensation, and prevent problem were not included in the news stories by both Palestinian Presidents.

Table 4.30 Sub-image repair strategies

Image Repair Sub-Strategies	Frequency
Correct/solve problem	22
Shift the blame	15
Simple denial	11
Confess/admit	4
Attack accuser	4
Provocation	3
Defeasibility	1
Apology	1
Total	61

*Does not add up to 100%

A comparison in the sub-image repair strategies covered by NST on the two Palestinian Presidents was also made. Table 4.31 elaborates on these sub-strategies. However, this number does not add up to 100% since some of news stories included more than one sub-strategy. For President Arafat, the total number of employed sub-image repair strategies was 50. The sub-strategy correct/ solve problem was used in 19 news stories. Then, each of simple denial and shift the blame sub-strategies was employed in 11 news stories. After that, confess/ admit sub-strategy was used in four news stories. Then each of provocation and attack accuser sub-strategies was used in two news stories. Finally, apology sub-strategy was employed in one news story, while defeasibility was not used by President Arafat.

In contrast, President Abbas employed a total of 11 sub-image repair strategies. Shifting the blame sub-strategy was used in four news stories followed by using correct/solve problem in two news stories. After that, attack accuser sub-strategy was used in two news stories. Finally, each of provocation and defeasibility sub-strategies was used in one news story, while each of confess/admit and apology the sub-strategies of mortification strategy was not used by President Abbas.

Table 4.31 Sub-image repair strategies for each president

Image Repair Sub-Strategies	Frequency of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas
Correct/solve problem	19	3
Simple denial	11	–
Shift the blame	11	4
Provocation	2	1
Defeasibility	–	1
Attack accuser	2	2
Confess/admit	4	–
Apology	1	–
Total	50	11

*Does not add up to 100%

4.12 ANALYSIS OF IMAGE REPAIR STRATEGIES

This section elaborated on the on image repair strategies used by both Palestinian Presidents as portrayed by NST in responding to several types of crises. The section also identified the context of crises in which these strategies took place. Additionally, this section analysed qualitatively the content of 61 news stories that contained sub-strategies of image repair theory from. Using qualitative content analyses aimed to give more depth and understanding to scrutinise the sub-strategies of image repair.

However, it would be beneficial to present image repair strategies by Benoit which discussed earlier in literature review chapter. Table 4.32 explains image repair strategies for further understanding before exploring the qualitative interpretation of the sub-strategies of image repair used by the Palestinian Presidents as portrayed by NST.

Table 4.32 Benoit image repair strategies

Image repair strategies	Key characteristic	Example
• Denial		
Simple denial	Did not perform act	Tylenol: Did not poison capsule
Shift the blame	Another performed act	Tylenol: A “madman” poisoned capsules
• Evasion of responsibility		
Provocation	Responded to act of another	Firm moved because of new taxes
Defeasibility	Lack of information or ability	Executive not told meeting changed
Accident	Mishap	Tree fell on tracks, causing train wreck
Good intentions	Meant well	Sears wants to provide good auto repair service

... to be continued

... continuation		
• Reduce offensiveness of event		
Bolstering	Stress good traits	Exxon's "swift and competent" clean-up of oil spill
Minimisation	Act not serious	Exxon: Few animals killed in oil spill
Differentiation	Act less offensive than similar acts	Sears: Unneeded repairs were preventive maintenance, not fraud
Transcendence	More important values	Helping humans justifies testing animals
Attack accuser	Reduce credibility of accuser	Coke: Pepsi owns restaurants, competes directly with you for customer
Compensation	Reimburse victim	Disabled moviegoers given free passes after being denied admission to movie
• Corrective action	Plan to solve/prevent recurrence of problem	AT&T long-distance upgrades; promised to spend billions more to improve service
• Mortification	Admit wrongdoing/ apologise	AT&T apologised for service interruption

Several statements from different news stories of NST showed how the Palestinian Presidents attempted to repair their image through using image repair strategies as portrayed by NST. The analysis of these statements was for determining which sub-strategies of image repair were used. The majority of these crises which affected the image of the Palestinian Presidents were caused by their officials, government, or people not by Presidents themselves.

The analysis of news stories revealed that only eight sub-strategies out of the 16 were used. The portrayal of NST revealed that eight sub-strategies were used, namely simple denial, shift the blame, provocation, defeasibility, attack accuser, correct/solve problem, confess/admit, and apology. While the non-used sub-strategies were accident, good intention, bolstering, minimisation, differentiation, transcendence, compensation, and prevent problem.

4.12.1 Strategies of Yasser Arafat

The portrayal of NST showed that President Yasser Arafat used 51 sub-image repair strategies from 1996- 2004. These sub-strategies were: simple denial, shift the blame, provocation, attack accuser, correct/solve problem, confess/ admit, and apology. The following paragraphs elaborate on the various image repair sub-strategies used by President Arafat in responding to several types of crises. Denial: was demonstrated as the most prevalent used strategy by President Arafat with 22 times as portrayed by NST. Out of 22 sub-strategies, 11 were simple denial sub-strategy and the other and 11 were shift the blame sub-strategy.

Simple denial: the following summarised the emerged themes in analysing the sub-strategies of image repair theory which was employed by President Arafat. The first time of using simple denial by Arafat came after a crisis of blast at Tel Aviv cafe that killed three people including the Palestinian attacker. The Israeli accusation for Arafat was through saying that he has indirect responsibility for the attack. The denial came through Arafat's spokesman who has dismissed the Israeli allegations through the statement "his spokesman angrily rejected Israeli charges that Arafat bore indirect responsibility for the attack" (NST, 1997, 22 March: 20).

The second simple denial was related to the same issue and came three days after using denial for first time. Arafat has denied the Israeli allegations for facilitating the launch of Palestinian attacks against Israel. The provided denial strategy by Arafat in the second part of the following statement "Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, elected last May promising more security for Israelis, has blamed Arafat for giving militants a "green light" to launch attacks against the Jewish state. Arafat denies the charge" (NST, 1997, 25 March: 24).

The third story that contained denial strategy came after Israeli slanders about Arafat. Arafat slammed the fake Israeli charges for him about his link to smuggling weapons. The use of denial by Arafat demonstrated through the statement "Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat today denied Israeli charges that his administration was linked to

a shipload of weapons seized by Israel last week calling the allegations “lies” (NST, 2002, 10 January: W6).

The fourth story came within Israeli slanders about the existence of al-Qaeda in. To support his position, Arafat has not only denied the Israeli claims, but also he called Osama Bin Laden for not involving the Palestinian Issue in his conflict. “Arafat tells Osama to stop claiming he is fighting for the Palestinians and dismissed Israeli charges that al-Qaeda is active in the Palestinian territories” (NST, 2002, 16 December: B23).

The fifth story of simple denial came with a huge foreign pressure, especially from the United States on Arafat for creating the post of Prime Minister who’s expected to be Mahmoud Abbas that criticise the militant violence. Arafat was blamed by Israel and the United States for the Palestinian uprising, the charges that he denied. “Israel blames Arafat for a 2 ½ year old uprising by Palestinian militants against Israeli occupation, an accusation which he denies” (NST, 2003, 19 March: B20).

The use of sixth simple denial came during the continuous foreign pressure on President Arafat from the United States which tried to sideline him. Arafat continued the use of simple denial for the accusation of supporting Palestinian militants through the statement “the United States has followed Israel’s lead and shunned Arafat, accusing him of not doing enough to rein in Palestinian militants, an allegation he denies” (NST, 2003, 29 April: B19).

The use of seventh simple denial by Arafat was after Palestinian attack which held by a woman from Islamic Jihad group. Arafat denied the accusation by Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz for preventing the progress in peace process. “The Palestinian President condemned the violence and denied trying to wreck the peace plan embraced by his reformist Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas with a view to ending a 31 months old uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (NST, 2003, 21 May: B21).

The use of eighth simple denial was related to the sixth story about foreign pressure on Arafat and trying to sideline him. The pressure mostly came with charges from the United States and Israel for Arafat about fomenting violence. The pressure came after the fracas between Arafat and Abbas which led to threaten Arafat by Israel if he undermines Abbas. The denial of Arafat was illustrated in the statement “Abbas, a moderate and reformer, became Prime Minister earlier this year following pressure from the United States, which has sidelined Arafat, accusing him of fomenting violence in a 33 month old Palestinian uprising. He denies it” (NST, 2003, 13 July: 17).

Arafat also continued to deny other accusations by Israel after its threats to expel him beyond two Palestinian attacks. The ninth simple denial by Arafat demonstrated in the sentence “Arafat, 74, has denied US and Israeli allegations he has encouraged bloodshed” (NST, 2003, 12 September: B24).

The tenth simple denial was after the crisis of Israeli threats to remove Arafat and accusing him of supporting violence. As usual in case of Israeli allegations against Arafat, he repeated his denial and dismissed the Israeli allegations. “Israel, saying Arafat foments violence, refuses contact with him and has threatened to “remove” him after a renewed spate of suicide bombings. He denies inciting militants” (NST, 2003, 3 October: B21).

The last used simple denial was regarding Palestinian attacks crisis. Arafat defended himself from the Israeli accusation which has no evidence-based. “Israel has repeatedly accused Arafat of being behind attacks on its civilians in a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation that erupted in September 2000 after peace talks failed. Arafat has denied these allegations” (NST, 2004, 1 June: B20).

Shift the blame: this sub-strategy was another tool for Arafat to defend himself and to protect his image, especially after the Palestinian attacks crisis. Implementing shifting the blame by Arafat mostly relied on condemnation and denouncement of wrongdoing, or accusing others for acting the wrongdoing. The first and second use of shift the blame strategy came in 2 different news pages in NST after Palestinian blast

attack in Jerusalem which caused several deaths and injuries among Israelis. To shift the blame on others, Arafat has reacted quickly and expressed his full opposition to that attack through denouncing it. The statement by Arafat in the first page was “Arafat himself was quick and harsh in condemning the bombings; which came at critical stage in the peace process” (NST, 1996, 26 February: 1). The second news story quoted Arafat saying “I condemn them completely and I condemn any power behind this- it is not only against civilians it is against the whole peace process” (NST, 1996, 26 February: 14).

The third use of shifting the blame by Arafat came after the Palestinian attacks which were discussed in the previous two news stories. Arafat tried to shift the blame by criticising the violence and calling for a summit to save the Middle East peace process with help from the United States. Arafat faced a criticism from Western countries and Israel through accusing him of failing to stop militant elements. Arafat stated that ““terror and violence are against Islam and God” (NST, 1996, 9 March: 22).

The fourth use of shifting the blame by Arafat was after Palestinian attack. This strategy was accompanied with simple denial strategy which discussed within simple denial strategies above. For shifting the blame, Arafat criticised that attack harshly. The use of this strategy is presented in the statement “Arafat condemned a blast that killed three people at a Tel Aviv cafe today” (NST, 1997, 22 March: 20).

The fifth news story discussed the continuous effort of Arafat to protect and improve his image through using shift the blame which came a day after using the fourth strategy. Arafat used a combination of shift the blame and provocation within this news story, the provocation will be explained later. Using shift the blame strategy was through the sentence “Palestinian President Yasser Arafat denounced the bombing” (NST, 1997, 23 March: 20).

The sixth news story was related to the peace process crisis. This news story also contained both shifting the blame and correct/solve problem sub-strategies. Using shifting the blame strategy was by Arafat's led Cabinet which accused Hamas

leadership of breaking its promise of stopping all violence “The Palestinian Authority accused the Islamic militant group Hamas of breaking promises” (NST, 1997, 28 September: 21).

The seventh strategy was after two back-to-back Palestinian attacks on Israeli. Arafat needed to use shift the blame strategy again to strengthen his position “Arafat condemned attacks on Israeli civilians and said shootings and bombings must be completely halted” (NST, 2002, 21 June: B28).

The eight news story was related to Palestinian attacks also. Arafat tried to shift the blame to others through slamming the terror act during a rambling speech in the Palestinian Parliament. “Yasser Arafat told Parliament today he condemned terror attacks on Israeli civilians” (NST, 2002, 10 September: B20).

The ninth news story illustrated on how Arafat continued shifting the blame effort after a wave of Palestinian attacks on Israel which battered a tenuous United States-led peace process. This story combined also simple denial strategy which was discussed earlier. Shifting the blame by Arafat came after Israeli threats for expelling him and blaming him for fomenting militant violence. The Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz also accused Arafat for preventing the peace process from taking off. The news story stated “The Palestinian President condemned the violence” (NST, 2003, 21 May: B21).

The use of the tenth shifting the blame was after an attack on Israeli restaurant in Haifa by a Palestinian woman which triggered the fresh Israeli call for exiling Arafat. This Israeli calls faced opposition by the United States for banishing Arafat which justified that by saying it would give him more sympathy. “Arafat condemned the Haifa attack and said it would give Israel a pretext to obstruct international peace efforts” (NST, 2003, 6 October: B23).

The eleventh news story was after Palestinian attack in Tel Aviv. This attack was just a few days before the death of Arafat on 11 November 2004 when he was in Percy Military Hospital in France. It can be understood that, although Arafat was in a

very critical health condition, yet he defended his image until his dying days. “From his hospital bed, Yasser Arafat has swiftly condemned a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv- a sign the ailing Palestinian leader wants to convey the impression he is still in charge despite deteriorating health” (NST, 2004, 3 November:18).

Evasion of Responsibility: although this strategy contained four sub-strategies, Arafat has used only provocation sub-strategy two times to defend his image. The first use of provocation by Arafat came after a blast in Tel Aviv Cafe by a member of Hamas from a village near Hebron. In this news story, Arafat used a combination of shift the blame and provocation strategies. Although, Arafat shifted the blame by denouncing the blast but also he used the provocation through showing that this blast is considered as a response to the Israeli policies towards Palestinians. “Palestinian President Yasser Arafat denounced the bombing but point a finger at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying his hard-line policies had prepared the ground for violence” (NST, 1997, 23 March: 20).

The second news story was on 3 October 2000, a week after the beginning of second Palestinian Intifada which erupted after Ariel Sharon broke into the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. That caused more than 1000 Palestinian injury with over 30 killed Palestinian. The Israeli tried to blame Arafat through the statement: “Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak called on Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to order his forces to rein in the violence”. Arafat has replied to that through his statements: “Stop shooting our soldiers, our old people, our youth, our women”. “Get Israeli soldiers out of Palestinian cities and refugee camps”. Then another sentence showed that both of Israeli and Palestinian leaders have used this strategy: “The Palestinian and Israeli leaders exchanged recriminations blaming each other for the violence” (NST, 2000, 3 October: 22).

Reducing Offensiveness: out of the six sub-strategies of reducing offensiveness, Arafat has used only attack accuser sub-strategy two times. Using attack accuser in both news stories was only during foreign pressure crisis. The first news story that included attack accuser by Arafat was after a foreign pressure crisis and deteriorating his relationship with the United States and Israel. Arafat also

rejected the criticism from the adviser of the United States national security Condoleezza Rice. The second part of the following statement reflects the use of attack accuser by Arafat who replied the accusation of Rice. She told the San Jose Mercury News that “the Palestinian Authority, which is corrupt and cavorts with terror...is not the basis for a Palestinian state moving forward”. “Arafat hits back, saying we are implementing only what our people want us to do and we do not take orders from anyone” (NST, 2002, 18 June: B23).

The second news story about attack accuser was also related to foreign pressure crisis and came a few days after the first story. This pressure came after the fail of Camp David Summit and blaming Arafat by both Bill Clinton and Ehud Barak for rejecting the Israeli offer. “However, Arafat stressed the offer was not acceptable to the Palestinians”. Additionally, after being accused by Israeli that he is not doing real efforts to prevent Palestinian attacks, Arafat attacked the Israeli accuser through the statement: “He brushed aside the accusation that he was not doing enough to stop young Palestinians from committing suicide bombings and said economic situation of Palestinians under siege was a main cause behind them” (NST, 2002, 24 June: B24).

Corrective action: this strategy has two sub-strategies, but Arafat only used correct/solve problem sub-strategy in 19 news stories. Out of the 19 news stories, 12 news stories were only in 1996 which was the year of the first Palestinian General Elections. The use of correct/solve problem sub-strategy was twice in two different pages within the same day and came after a blast Palestinian attack. These two sub-strategies were used together with shift the blame sub-strategy which discussed earlier above. Using this number of strategies at the same day shows the real attention paid by Arafat to this crisis and his eagerness to protect his image. Shimon Peres was quoted “Yasser Arafat promised me he would take immediate measures, and we learned that they have already made arrests this morning in the Gaza strip” (NST, 1996, 26 February: 1). It seems that Arafat has fulfilled his promise for taking immediate measures “Palestinian sources said police in Gaza arrested a member of Ezzeldin Al- Qassam shortly after the bombings” (NST, 1996, 26 February: 14).

The third news story was a few days after the Palestinian attack which discussed in the previous paragraph. Arafat tried to prove to the international community that he is the man of peace and he is not supporting the attacks “Arafat has arrested more than 200 Islamists since the Jerusalem and Ashkelon attacks” (NST, 1996, 2 March: 16).

Arafat continued using correct/solve problem on the next day. That occurs after foiling Palestinian attacks on a Jewish settlement in Gaza Strip by Israeli army and arresting five people while two others have escaped. To solve the issue of Palestinian attacks Arafat ordered to thwart them. “Palestinian Authority set a deadline of midnight Friday for Palestinians to turn in unlicensed weapons as part of a crackdown demanded by Israel after bomb attacks”. Several arrests were implemented by Palestinian forces against the attackers also “More than 250 Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists were arrested since the explosions” (NST, 1996, 3 March: 18).

The fifth news story contained both shift the blame and corrective action sub-strategies. Arafat needed to take corrective measures after Palestinian attack on commuter bus in Jerusalem which carried out on nearly the same location and time of the last attack. The frequency of attacks within a short time required from Arafat to do more measures Arafat “for the first time outlawed the six military wings of Islamic movements in the areas of the Gaza strip and West Bank he controls” (NST, 1996, 4 March: 20).

The use of sixth and seventh of correct/solve problem sub-strategy by Arafat was in two different pages within the same day. Arafat tried to solve the problem to reduce the Israeli revenge, especially after having four attacks within nine days. The Israeli troops also spread out across West Bank which welded shut several houses and barricaded the Palestinians in their villages and towns. Peres stated that Arafat told him “He would do anything to help his friend and peace partner Peres”. Arafat also “he vowed to continue cracking down on Hamas” (NST, 1996, 7 March: 13).

The seventh news story also indicated correct/solve problem through the following statement: “Palestinian President Yasser Arafat sent his police into the

Islamic University of Gaza, a stronghold of the Muslim militant group Hamas, in six hours search for weapons and wanted activists today”. “Palestinian police also raided homes and mosques in the search for Muslim militants in Gaza” (NST, 1996, 7 March: 20).

The eighth news story about correcting/solving the problem effort by Arafat stated “Arafat ordered raids on mosques and Islamic institutions in Gaza” (NST, 1996, 8 March: 18). The ninth news story also has discussed the matter of several arrests carried out by Palestinian police against Hamas, and arresting two of Hamas leaders. “Arafat met today with senior CIA officials trying to increase security measures against Muslim militants” (NST, 1996, 10 March: 19).

The tenth news story also indicated how Arafat continued his effort to correct/solve the crisis of Palestinian attacks on Israel, and the received praises from Peres. “Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority has launched an unprecedented crackdown on militants after four suicide bombings” (NST, 1996, 23 March: 22).

The eleventh news story was related to demonstrations crisis which was different from the previous stories above. These demonstrations broken out after the Palestinian police raided An-Najah National University in Nablus and firing tear gas and beating students. To correct that mistake by Palestinian police, Arafat sacked the police commander, and set a special guard unit for universities. “Bowling to the demands of Palestinian protesters, Yasser Arafat today fired a senior police commander who had ordered a raid on a West Bank university”. “The Nablus police chief Col Ala Hosni, was to be removed from his job and transferred to Gaza”. “Arafat also said he would set up special guard units for Palestinians universities” (NST, 1996, 5 April: 24).

The twelfth news story was related to the crisis of Israelis-Palestinians clashes. In a trial to solve the problem, Arafat paid a confidence-building visit to Israel, weeks after the bloody clashes and met Israeli President Ezer Weizman at his home. Arafat told a news conference that he is “pledging to pursue peace without restoring to violence”. Arafat also was asked during the conference “whether Palestinian police

would no longer fire at Israeli troops”, he replied “This is my permanent order to our policemen” (NST, 1996, 9 October: 22).

The thirteenth news story was related to Palestinian attacks crisis. After Palestinian attacks that held by Hamas, the Arafat’s led Cabinet pledged to stop Hamas violence. Palestinian forces shut down 16 welfare organisations run by Hamas in Gaza that were supporting Hamas armed activities, which was considered as the biggest ever offensive act against Hamas public activities. “The Palestinian Authority accused the Islamic militant group Hamas if breaking promises to stop terrorism and vowed to prevent it from any future acts of violence, its official news agency said” (NST, 1997, 28 September: 21).

The fourteenth news story showed the eagerness of Arafat to protect his image. Arafat’s effort followed the clashes and skirmishes between Israelis and Palestinians. Finally both sides agreed on a tentative truce at prodding of the United States a day after pulling back the Israeli forces and tanks from Palestinian cities and promising to halt its strikes against Palestinians. “Today’s calm came after Arafat announced he had ordered his forces to prevent attacks on Israelis”. It shows that correct/solve problem effort has totally succeed and led to that truce (NST, 2001, 20 September: W10).

The fifteenth story came after Palestinian attack crisis and Israeli threats to Arafat. This incident came after assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Zeevi at Jerusalem hotel. Arafat became under a huge pressure from Israel and was given an ultimatum either to hand over the assassins or face Israeli retribution. “In response, Arafat outlawed the military wing of the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine, Palestinian security officials said” (NST, 2001, 19 October: W1).

The sixteenth news story was also related to Palestinian attack crisis. The Palestinian attacks in Jerusalem and Haifa caused a mounting pressure on Arafat from the United States and other nations, with many Israelis calls to ouster him. Based on that “Yasser Arafat insisted yesterday that he will not shy away from confrontation with the militant Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups to revive what hope remains for

peace in the region”. “Arafat said the Palestinian police have already arrested 17 key militants out of a list of 33 presented to him by American officials, and said he will continue pursuing the rest despite continuing Israeli air strikes” (NST, 2001, 10 December: W2).

The seventeenth story discussed the issue of foreign pressure crisis on Yasser Arafat and how he tried to solve that matter. Arafat used both correct/solve problem, and confess/admit the mistake which will be discussed later under mortification strategy. After being under pressure and growing the demands from the international community and Washington for implementing major reforms, Arafat displayed a self criticism through saying he “accepted blame for any mistakes and pledged to rectify them” (NST, 2002, 16 May: W1).

The eighteenth news story was related to Palestinian attack. Arafat has to take corrective measures after he faced Israeli threats for removing him after several Palestinian attacks against Israel. Arafat “declared a state of emergency yesterday and approved a scaled-down Cabinet to deal with it”. “Arafat’s decree aimed to reinstate security in Palestinian areas, where militant factions opposed to peacemaking with Israel have grown powerful three years into a revolt for statehood” (NST, 2003, 7 October: B23).

The nineteenth and last correct/solve problem also came after Palestinian attack crisis. This news story contained both simple denial and correct/solve problem sub-strategies. After being repeatedly accused by Israeli for being behind the Palestinian attacks on Israeli, Arafat wanted to prove the opposite. “Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat said yesterday his government had helped thwart revenge attacks on Israel for the killing of two Hamas leaders” (NST, 2004, 1 June: B20).

Mortification: Arafat used this strategy five times; four times in confess/admit sub-strategy, and one time in apology sub-strategy. This strategy was only used by President Arafat, but President Abbas never use it. The news story on 6 April 1996 contained two sub-strategies of mortification. Arafat was in need to use this strategy

after Palestinian demonstrations crisis which occurred beyond a raid by Palestinian police to An Najah University in West Bank. At the beginning Arafat has admitted the mistake by his police and then he asked for forgiveness through the statement: “We all make mistakes, brothers and sisters and I hope you will forget what happened. It was a mistake and I ask you to forget it” (NST, 1996, 6 April: 22).

The third sub-strategy was used after foreign pressure crisis. This news story combined both correct/solve problem and confess/admit sub-strategies. Using confess/admit sub-strategy came after the received pressure by Arafat from the international community, especially from the United States to implement major reforms in the Palestinian Government. President Arafat has “accepted blame for any mistakes and pledged to rectify them” (NST, 2002, 16 May: W1).

The fourth news story was related to foreign pressure crisis which required from Arafat to defend his image. This news story included attack accuser and confess/admit sub-strategies of image repair theory. Arafat defended his image through his admission of making mistakes after the fail of Camp David Summit which was sponsored by the United States. “Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat said everyone, including the Palestinians, “made mistakes at the Camp David summit in July 2000” (NST, 2002, 24 June: B2).

The fifth and last confess/admit mistakes sub-strategy was related to the internal conflict and dispute inside Arafat’s government. Arafat was under intense pressure for sharing power and reforming his corrupted government. The Palestinian lawmakers criticised the corrupted government and called Arafat to sweep the government. In response to Palestinian legislators Arafat “said today that he has made mistakes -a rare admission- but did not say what they were or how he would correct them” (NST, 2004, 19 August: 19).

4.12.2 Strategies of Mahmoud Abbas

The sub-image repair strategies used by President Mahmoud Abbas as portrayed by NST were in 11 news stories from 2005-2016. The sub-strategies included: shift the

blame, provocation, defeasibility, attack accuser, correct/solve problem, confess/admit, and apology. President Abbas did not use mortification strategy at all to respond to any crisis. Denial: same as Arafat, denial was demonstrated as the most prevalent used sub-strategy by President Abbas which was used four times. However, unlike Arafat who used the two sub-strategies of denial, Abbas only used shift the blame sub-strategy.

The first time of using shifting the blame by Abbas was related to the Palestinian attack. This attack was carried out by Palestinian from West Bank on fast food restaurant in a commercial area in Tel Aviv. Abbas followed the same way of Arafat by shifting the blame through denouncing that attack. "The moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas of the rival Fatah party condemned the bombing, calling it a terrorist attack" (NST, 2006, 18 April: 4).

The second news story was related to the kidnapping crisis. It came after a photographer from the French news agency AFP was abducted when he was returning from an assignment from downtown Gaza City. The kidnapping occurred at gunpoint after the photographer got out of his car with one driver. "Abbas condemned the kidnapping, according to a statement on the Palestinian Wafa news agency" (NST, 2007, 3 January: 30).

The third news story was also related to the Palestinian attack crisis. This Palestinian attack came in the time of President's Obama visit to both Palestine and Israel which seemed to embarrass the Palestinian President with his guest. The attack was through launching two rockets from the Hamas-run Gaza Strip towards town on Sderot in southern Israel. "The attack was condemned by Abbas, in a statement issued by his political adviser Nimr Hammad" (NST, 2013, 22 March: 40).

Additionally, the fourth use of shift the blame was after Palestinian attack crisis. This attack came after a fire was set in a Jewish shrine near Nablus city in West Bank. In this news story, President Abbas used both correct/solve problem which will be discussed later, and shift the blame. "Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, in a

call to end the violence, condemned the attack. He ordered the damage to be repaired and opened an investigation into the arson” (NST, 2016, 17 October: 24).

Evasion of Responsibility: the portrayal of NST showed that President Abbas used two sub-strategies of this strategy, namely provocation and defeasibility. The first news story included provocation sub-strategy which came in the peace process crisis. Abbas tried to show that leaving the negotiation might be a response to the of Israeli settlements construction on the Palestinian land, especially in Jerusalem. “It’s very difficult for me to resume talks if Prime Minister Netanyahu declares that he will continue his activity in the West Bank and Jerusalem” (NST, 2010, 23 September: 27).

The second story used defeasibility and came after false information crisis. The crisis occurred after the accusation by Abbas to a number of Israel rabbis for making a clear declaration and asking their government for poisoning water to kill the Palestinians. After creating a lot of argument on this issue, Abbas used defeasibility sub-strategy “Abbas’s office acknowledged on Saturday that the reports on which his comments had been based had proved without foundation” (NST, 2016, 26 June: 22).

Reducing Offensiveness: out of the six sub-strategies of reducing offensiveness, Abbas only used attack accuser sub-strategy twice as portrayed by NST. The first news story was related to peace process crisis. The United States hosted the Israeli-Palestinian talks in a trial to revive the stalled negotiations between the two sides which ended without any agreement or promise on future meeting. After being accused by Israeli Prime Minister, Abbas fired back and attacked him. “Olmert told Abbas during the meeting, you have cheated me by reaching deal with Hamas, President Abbas responded (by saying) you gave me nothing and didn’t keep your promises” (NST, 2005, 21 February: 20).

The second news story discussed information leakage crisis. Al-Jazeera channel released several transcripts and notes from what it called them secrets from a decade of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The released information stated the willing of Abbas and his aides to scale back long-standing demands for returning of millions

of Palestinian refugees to their lands. “Abbas and members of his inner circle have drawn criticism for their response, which has focused on accusing Al-Jazeera of distortion and smear tactics” (NST, 2005, 27 January: 31).

Corrective Action: Same as used by Arafat, Abbas used only correct/solve problem sub-strategy, and did not use plan to solve/prevent sub-strategy as portrayed by NST. The use strategy was three times by Abbas in Palestinian attacks crisis. The first news story discussed the issue of stamping out the violence after sustained rockets and mortar barrage on Israel. Abbas implemented several measures to enforce the truce. “After firing his top security commanders, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas was to confront militant leaders in the Gaza Strip today with a demand they stop attacking Israeli”. “The central committee of Abbas Fatah movement also announced a state of emergency in the Palestinian security forces aimed at preventing new attacks” (NST, 2005, 12 February: 14).

The second news story showed the eagerness of President Abbas to save the peace process and prevent the attacks. It came after the appeal of Abbas to the militants for halting their attacks on Israeli and for committing themselves to the truce after a week-long wave of violence between Israelis and Palestinians. The efforts of Abbas came through insisting to “prevent attacks against Israeli forces by militants” (NST, 2005, 18 July: 37).

The third and last news story came after Palestinian attack against Jewish shrine in Nablus city which was discussed above in shift the blame sub-strategy. As a part of his corrective action effort to protect his image President Abbas “ordered the damage to be repaired and opened an investigation into the arson” (NST, 2016, 17 October: 24).

4.13 JOURNALISTIC APPROACH

The peace and war journalism covered by NST was also analysed. Table 4.33 presents the journalistic approach employed in the news stories. The highest per cent of news stories was in peace approach with 61.8%. The second highest per cent was 36.9% of

news stories for “others”. Finally, the war approach was included in 1.3% of the news stories.

However, “others” news stories referred to the stories that did not indicate any aspect of peace or war by the Palestinian Presidents, and they did not stress on any peace or war related issues. These news stories were descriptive which mentioned some events such as bilateral meetings between the Palestinian Presidents and other presidents, dispute between Arafat and Abbas, foreign pressure, financial crises, and forming several Palestinian governments.

Table 4.33 Journalistic approach of news stories

Journalistic Approach	Frequency	Percentage
Peace	328	61.8
Others	196	36.9
War	7	1.3
Total	531	100.0

This study compared between the peace and war journalism used by the two Palestinian Presidents as covered by NST. Table 4.34 shows the used journalistic approach by both Palestinian Presidents. For President Arafat, the peace approach was included in 67.9% of news stories, followed by “others” with 30.2% of news stories. Finally, the war journalistic approach was included in 1.9% of news stories. In comparison, the highest used approach by President Abbas was “others” with 51.5% of news stories, followed by peace approach with 28.5% of news stories. Finally, Abbas did not use war journalistic approach during his term.

However, the seven news stories that included the war approach by President Arafat occurred during the second intifada (uprising) time. The first news story was on 24 October 2000 when Arafat told Barak to “go to hell” and expressed his vow to march to Jerusalem. The second news story was on 30 October 2000 when Arafat also vowed to continue the Intifada. The third news story on 6 December 2000 came after the Israeli settlers closed the way of Arafat’s escort and irritated him so he left his car and brandished machine pistol.

The fourth news story on 14 December 2000 discussed the stressing of Arafat to continue the uprising, and his stress on the preparation of scarifying everything with pride. The fifth news story on 30 March 2001 also discussed continuing the uprising, and considering every place in Israel as a legitimate target for Fatah. The sixth news story on 4 April 2002 mentioned that Arafat has violently rejected to be surrounded to Israeli troops outside his Headquarter in West Bank, and he has preferred to be “martyr”. The seventh news story on 25 April 2004 discussed the response of Arafat to the Israeli threats by saying that “martyrdom” is his destiny and saying “oh mountain, the wind will never move you”.

Table 4.34 Journalistic approach of both presidents

Journalistic Approach	Frequency of Arafat	Percentage of Arafat	Frequency of Abbas	Percentage of Abbas
Peace	247	67.9	81	48.5
Others	110	30.2	86	51.5
War	7	1.9	–	0.0
Total	364	100.0	167	100.0

4.14 SUMMARY

A total of 531 news stories were found in *New Straits Times* (NST) on the Palestinian Presidents in 21 year period from 1996-2016. A total of 456 news stories were on crises; these crises included political, social, and economic crises. The portrayal of NST revealed that all the five main image repair strategies were used by the Palestinian Presidents.

The main image repair strategies contain denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. The employed sub-strategies were simple denial, shifting the blame, provocation, defeasibility, attack accuser, correct/solve problem, confess/admit, and apology. The other non-used sub-strategies were accident, good intention, bolstering, minimisation, differentiation, transcendence, compensation, and prevent problem were not included in the news stories by both Palestinian Presidents.

The number of main image strategies in news stories was 50, while the number of sub-image repair strategies was 61 since some news stories contained more than

one strategy. The coverage of NST showed that corrective action and denial strategies were used by the Palestinian Presidents more than other strategies, especially in their reaction to Palestinian attacks crisis. Additionally, the slant used in coverage of NST was mostly neutral, followed by positive, negative, and balanced slants respectively.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a conclusion on the research undertaken to examine how the Malaysian media had covered the Palestinian presidents, specifically on the issues related to the crisis faced by them. This study had also used the image repair theory to examine how the media portrayed the crises when both the Palestinian presidents were confronted with them.

The specific research objectives of this study were as following:

- i. To determine the types of crises that affected Palestinian Presidents' image during their Presidential term as portrayed by the *New Straits Times*.
- ii. To determine the used image repair strategies by Palestinian Presidents during crises as portrayed by the *New Straits Times*.
- iii. To investigate the slant of the *New Straits Times* about Palestinian Presidents.

5.2 DISCUSSION OF STUDY

This section presents the discussion on research objectives and contains several findings with other previous studies. In the beginning, several points can be found by comparing the crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents with other presidents, politicians, and public figures. The results of this study had revealed three main types

of crises faced by both Palestinian Presidents, namely political, social, and economic crises.

Under the political crisis, peace process figured the highest number which mostly contained peacemaking and negotiation obstacles, Israeli settlements, future of Palestinian refugee, and Jerusalem. In the social crisis, corruption was predominant. The corruption figured the highest number in social crisis and they were during the presidency of President Arafat, but they were related to the corruption of his Cabinet and other officials not to Arafat himself. All economic crises were financial and occurred during President Abbas term. These financial crises happened after stopping the collection of taxes by Israeli on behalf of the Palestinian Authority on the borders and not transferring the collected money to the Palestinian Authority (PA) account. The portrayal of the financial crisis by the Malaysian media raised the question why only President Abbas only faced it? And why the Israeli authorities could not take these measures against Arafat?

There were similarities and differences between the crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents and the crises faced by other presidents, politicians, public figures, and organisations. For economic crisis, especially financial, President Abbas only faced it after the Israeli sanction for the Palestinian Authority as discussed in the previous paragraph. This case was similar to Chimbarange et al. (2013) study regarding the sanctions, especially economic restrictions against Robert Gabriel the President of Zimbabwe. These sanctions were from the United States, European Union, and Australia against Zimbabwe after the report of misgovernance.

The *New Straits Times* did not report any natural disasters faced by the Palestinian Presidents during their term. In comparison, the American President George Bush faced a terrible natural disaster in 2005 which was Hurricane Katrina (Liu 2007). Additionally, none of the Palestinian Presidents have faced any scandal during their term. Other presidents and politicians had faced such type of crisis such as American President Bill Clinton and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

Comparing the crisis faced by the Palestinian Presidents with the crisis faced by other presidents or politicians was important since the response strategies to any crisis depend on the type of crisis itself. Previous studies (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997; Coombs 2007; Fussell Sisco et al. 2010) discussed the issue of matching between the response strategies and crises types.

Additionally, the vast majority of the crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents as reported by NST were political crises which mostly characterised Palestine from the other countries due to the Israeli occupation and its consequences. The most common political crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents were the peace process, Israeli attacks, Israeli blockade, Palestinian attacks, and Israeli threats.

Most notably, the majority of crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents were long-term crises, unlike most of the crises faced by other presidents which were short-term crises. For instance, the Middle East peace process is one of the longest unsolved crises that occurred along the presidential term of Arafat and Abbas. It includes two key players Palestinian and Israeli, and other secondary players like the United States and some Arab countries.

Moreover, other studies focused on only one type of crisis faced by presidents, politicians, and public figures. There were several crises portrayed by the media in several contexts and situations in different times and places. Benoit (2014) discussed facing the HealthCare crisis by President Barack Obama; Liu (2007) discussed facing Hurricane Katrina by President George Bush; Benoit & Nill (1998) discussed facing sexual scandal and harassment accusations by Judge Clarence Thomas; Benoit (1997a) discussed the scandal of the British actor Hugh Grant after being arrested for lewd behaviour with a prostitute; and Walsh & McAllister-Spooner (2011) discussed the crisis faced by the Olympic swimmer Michael Phelps after smoking marijuana.

On the other hand, previous studies (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997; Coombs 2007; Coombs & Holladay 2002) have discussed the issue of selecting the best-fitted crisis response after understanding the crisis situation. Determining the crisis type by

practitioners is important since the crisis response depends partially on the crisis type and its duration (Cutlip et al. 2009).

The crisis response by using image repair strategies should match the charges. Selecting the suitable strategies for charges, using the strategies effectively, and having a persuasive response are important elements for the effectiveness of these strategies (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997). Also, situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) suggested that protecting the reputation requires matching crisis response strategies with crisis situation through identifying the type of crisis and assessing the crisis situation by crisis managers (Coombs & Holladay 2002). Determining the crisis response strategy by crisis managers by understanding the crisis situation increases the reputational protection. Shaping reputational threat in a crisis situation is influenced by initial responsibility of crisis, history of crisis, and prior reputation of the organisation (Coombs 2007).

Employing the most effective strategies in crisis time is helpful for restoring the positive reputation of organisations and individuals, and ensuring their success after the crisis. Matching the type of response with the type of crisis by organisations or individuals leads for recovering from crisis and has a positive effect on the perceptions of their public (Fussell Sisco et al. 2010). Also, the response to the crisis shapes and affects the perceptions and evaluation of public to the crisis and the reputation of organisation (Coombs 2007).

Other scholars have discussed how framing influences the perception of the public and the image of politicians. The coverage of media could influence the image of politician and it is considered as the core of public figures (Chimbarange et al. 2013; Freyenberger, 2013). Media coverage and framing of specific issue influence the way of perceiving the information by the public. It also implies a positive or negative influence on the perception of the public and develops public opinion among them (Fountain 2008; Gunther & Christen 2002; Freyenberger 2013; Lewis & Weaver 2013; Sadaf 2011; Zeng et al. 2014).

The media is playing a role in promoting some issues and putting other issues in the background which mostly depends on the media agenda, sensitivity, and importance of issues (Sadaf 2011). The essence of slant is emphasising or stressing on one favoured or preferred side of the news story and ignoring or derogating the other side (Entman 2007, 2010). The slants used in media coverage could have a negative or positive impact on the image of politicians and leaders and is it considered as the core of any public figure (Chimbarange et al. 2013; Freyenberger, 2013).

Mass media framing of one country can influence the perception of its citizens on the images of the other countries' governments and people. Disseminating the greater part of information about other countries comes through mass media. Images of nations are significant in the international relations between countries. Buying or forcing the positive image is unachievable, and the effort of image building must include continues image cultivation. Mass media including TV, radio, newspapers, and magazines are the strongest shapers of the image. Images of certain countries come through series communication processes including several information sources (Kunczik1997).

The measurement of an image of a foreign country leadership can be by looking at the perception of other country citizens' on that leadership. In the case of interaction between two countries, the media portrayal of one country supports the image of the other country and hence influences the perception of their people. Creating these images also influenced by the leadership of other countries (Idid 2018). The international relations between countries are playing an important role in shaping their images by other countries (Giffard & Rivenburgh 2000).

At long-term influence, political public relations aims to build credibility and trust or image cultivation. In addition, as a part of public diplomacy, media diplomacy aims to build mutual trust climate in the long run which is part of the cultivation of national image (Zipfel 2007). Moreover, Zhang & Swartz (2009) stated that public diplomacy concept encompasses three dimensions, namely image cultivation, promotion of mutual understanding, and advocacy of national interests.

When there are strong ties between two countries, their governments can push their own frames into the media of the second country which can improve its image in the eyes of public of the second country (Shenhav 2009). In many countries, the necessary resources for media are provided by the government, and the media are expected to have obedient coverage. In several countries, the media are owned by political parties, and the media is requested to have a sympathetic coverage which would affect both public opinion and public policy (Kalb et al. 2006).

As discussed earlier, media framing influenced the image of politicians which influence the public whether positively or negatively. The coverage of the *New Straits Times* asserted on specific parts of the stories on the Palestinian Presidents, especially the positive one and ignored the other parts based on its own agenda. Hence, the big size of positive coverage/slant of NST on the Palestinian Presidents might improve their image in the eyes of Malaysian citizens.

Based on the discussion of (Kalb et al. 2006), since the government is the main provider of necessary resources for media, and since NST is owned by UMNO, the ruling party in the Malaysian government during the time frame of study, it shows that they had supported the Palestinian Presidents. In addition, based on the discussion of Idid (2018) it can be said that the coverage of NST shows the eagerness to support the Palestinian Presidents and their image building and repair efforts. This support influences the perception of the Malaysian public and reflects the strong bilateral and warm relations between both Malaysians and Palestinians governments. Also, the good bilateral relations allowed the Palestinian Presidents to push their own frames into the Malaysian media. The support of NST to the Palestinian Presidents shows it has made public relations job on behalf of them.

The Malaysian media showed sincere support to the Palestinian Presidents. The *New Straits Times* helped those Presidents to repair their image by its framing of image repair strategies used by Palestinian Presidents. The majority of these strategies did not come by Presidents, but these strategies were covered by NST itself. If NST did not cover that effort it would be useless and unknown. For instance, most of the corrective action by President was not mentioned in any press release or press

conference by those Presidents or their office, but NST sought to cover that effort. Moreover, applying this study in Malaysia across the geographic borders of Palestine which has a different cultural context expands the scope of the public beyond domestic borders of the Palestinian Presidents which might create a positive global image about them.

Another important point for discussion is the issue of the source of news and its role in portraying the news stories. The responsibility of shaping the image or images of another country comes through several communication sources (Kunczik, 1997). Framing and portraying the stories by media and journalists is influenced by the sources of information by ignoring some elements of the story and making others salient. This process might influence the perception of the public on the discussed issues (Ardèvol-Abreu 2015; Baresch et al. 2010; Cissel 2012; Hallahan 1999; Strömbäck et al. 2013; Vossen et al. 2017).

Choosing the source also might be influenced by the availability of the source, especially if the journalists personally have no access to the information about the covered story (Baresch et al. 2010; Zeng et al. 2014). Framing is really the imprint of power in the news text since it registers the identity of competing interests or actors to control the text and also playing a vital role in the political power exertion (Entman 1993).

From the argument above it can be understood that the framing of the news stories, especially by the international news sources reflects the imprint of power and political actors in their own countries. Hence, the positive coverage of the international news agencies on the Palestinian Presidents reflects the opinion of their governments on the Palestinian Presidents and the strength of bilateral relations between their countries and Palestine.

It can be understood that the French news agency AFP was the most international news agency that supported the Palestinian Presidents by having more positive and less negative slants. The second supportive news agency was the British Reuters and lastly the American AP respectively. President Arafat received the same

sequence of support. Same as President Arafat, Abbas received the most support from the French AFP. But different from Arafat, Abbas has more support by the American agency AP followed by the British Reuters.

The news story on 23 April 2003 was in line with the mentioned above about the support of Americans for Abbas than Arafat. The story discussed the power struggle between the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and his first Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas. The story indicated the piled pressure from the United States on Arafat and at the same time the American support for Abbas which was not recent and started a long time ago. The story has indicated “US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher who has indicated that Washington firmly backed Abbas and his cabinet selection.”

5.3 IMAGE REPAIR EFFORT OF CRISES

The difficulty identified by this study was that the crises and the response of the presidents to them were determined by the media. It was the *New Straits Times* that reported the crises and identified the strategies used. The study was only able to provide a theoretical framework on to how the media had framed the response to the crises. We were alerted to the use of the Image Repair Theory (IRT) to understand whether it would be able to help understand the steps in meeting the crises as postulated by Benoit (1995).

Although image repair theory had no conceptual link for matching crisis response strategies with a crisis situation yet it had the ability to draw speculative conclusions regarding the utility of using the response strategies. In addition, as discussed by An & Gower (2009) choosing the most suitable response can be done through understanding how the crisis was framed by media. In crisis communication, crisis managers can benefit from the framing analysis by providing them useful insight into the suitable crisis response strategies to reduce the damaged image.

Another advantage of image repair theory was through integrating its strategies into Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). Integrating the

Image repair strategies into SCCT is making IRT as the base of SCCT. Cross-tabulating the crises types with image repair strategies in this study provide valuable information about how these strategies are functioning which allows practitioners to choose a suitable response for each crisis situation.

Today, crises are threatening organisations and individuals, and they have the ability to tarnish, ruin, disrupt their image and reputation, cause reputational damage, and generate anger (Strömbäck & Kioussis 2011; Tench & Yeomans 2006; Wright 2009). In the political sphere, the reputations of politicians and public figures are so valuable. Thus, image repair strategies become essential for those politicians when their reputation is threatened because of crises (Chimbarange et al. 2013; Sheldon 2006).

Using image repair strategies to respond to a crisis should match the charges. The effectiveness of these strategies depends on having a persuasive response, choosing appropriate strategies which match the charges, and embed the strategies effectively (Benoit & Czerwinski 1997). There were discernible strategies reported on the Palestinian Presidents and other presidents, politicians, public figures, countries, and organisations. The main image repair strategies of Benoit are denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of event, corrective action, and mortification.

The first strategy of Benoit's theory is denial which includes simple denial and shifting the blame sub-strategies. The portrayal of *New Straits Times* showed that denial strategy was used by the Palestinian Presidents mainly after Palestinian attacks. The Israeli government has accused the Palestinian Presidents of being responsible for the attacks. Moreover, denial strategy was used by the Palestinian Presidents in Israeli slanders and foreign pressure crises.

This case was similar to Zhang & Benoit (2004) study about using denial strategy by the Saudi government after the 11 September attacks to defend their image of being responsible on the attacks since most of the attackers were Saudis. Additionally, Benoit (2006) mentioned that using denial strategy by President George W. Bush. He used denial strategy after being attacked by democratic presidential

candidates about the failure of finding the Iraqi mass destruction weapons and job losses issue. President Bush has denied that accusation since the evidence of the democratic candidates was mostly weak.

The effectiveness and success of denial strategy depend on several factors. The effective denial should be sustained, and when there is evidence about the charges, the denial cannot be maintained, and it is better to employ corrective action or admit the charges (Benoit 1996). Both lack of more publicity about the dispute issues and not receiving more counter messages after using denial show the success of this strategy (Brinson & Benoit 1996). Denial is vital but that requires being humble and remorseful, and not confrontational or aggressive. Thus, the audience will have sympathy and understanding (Chimbarange et al. 2013). Also, simple denial strategy is considered as a good strategy if the accused was truly innocent (Wilcox et al. 2006).

The denial strategy was therefore well portrayed as used by the presidents when they are confronted with crises. Using denial strategy by both President Arafat and Ababs was sustained since there was no evidence about the accusations and charges against them. After the Palestinian attacks, the Israeli accused both Palestinian Presidents for ordering and facilitating the attacks and being indirectly responsible for the attacks, but the Israeli never gave any single evidence. The other point that showing the success of denial was having no publicity or more counter messages after using this strategy by Presidents. Then the humble response by Presidents without being aggressive or confrontational which lead to sympathy was another sign for success of denial. Thus, used the denial strategy by the Palestinian Presidents was plausible and success.

The second strategy of Benoit's theory is the evasion of responsibility. The portrayal of the *New Straits Times* revealed that the Palestinian Presidents used only provocation and defeasibility sub-strategies. Provocation or scapegoating comes by claiming that provoking the misdeed is the reason behind creating the initial wrongdoing (Meng & Pan 2013). This strategy also claims that the wrongful act came as an understandable response to another previous act. Also, using provocation in this

case is considered as a reasonable reaction to that prior wrongful act (Benoit & Drew 1997; Benoit 2006; Brinson & Benoit 1996; Len-Rios & Benoit 2004).

The use of provocation by both Palestinian Presidents seems as fairly well-designed since it came in line with the previous argument. Arafat showed that Palestinian attacks were a result of the Israeli policies and aggression against Palestinian people which caused a lot of injuries and death among Palestinians. Abbas also showed that leaving the negotiations is a Palestinian option to respond to the construction of Israeli settlements on the Palestinian lands. The response of the Palestinian Presidents to the Israeli accusations showed that they or their people did not initiate any wrongdoing, but that was just a reasonable response to the Israeli violations. This portrayed response by NST seems to be acceptable and well-designed since it matches the function of provocation sub-strategy and its application as postulated by Benoit.

The use of defeasibility sub-strategy was only once by President Abbas after admitting the wrongdoing by him, unlike other wrongdoing acts committed by his officials or Palestinian people. Benoit (2006) argued that proclaiming by Presidents about lack of information or ability to control events may help them to avoid the blame for past problems but it undermines the faith about their ability in dealing with future problems. Also, identifying the causes of a problem might be through defeasibility to be solved by corrective action (Benoit 1997b). Not using corrective action with defeasibility by President Abbas might reduce the effectiveness of defeasibility.

The third strategy of Benoit's theory is reducing offensiveness. The Palestinian Presidents used only attack accuser sub-strategy. Using attack accuser-sub strategy came after facing a foreign pressure crisis from the United States. President Arafat stressed that he is not taking orders from anyone, especially the American administration which was his accuser. Arafat stressed that he is implementing the wishes and hopes of Palestinian people and what is acceptable for Palestinians not for others. It shows that Arafat has mostly cared about the Palestinians as his internal audience, not the Americans or Israeli.

Likewise, Presidents Abbas used attack accuser sub-strategy of image repair. Abbas was quick in his response to the accusation of Israeli Prime Minister, and he did not receive any negative feedback from the Israeli Prime Minister. In the other story on information leakage, Abbas and his team have attacked the credibility of his accuser by using smear and distortion tactics.

As discussed by Brinson & Benoit (1996) that the success of crisis response depends on not receiving more messages from the accuser and the lack of publicity about that issue. Also, attacking accusers' sub-strategy is helpful to gain the sympathy of the audience (Benoit 1997a). In accordance with that, this study shows how the Palestinian Presidents were reported to have employed this sub-strategy in a good manner. Palestinian Presidents attempted to reduce offensiveness by attacking the credibility and questioning the sincerity of their accusers. There were no more reactions or responses from the accusers after using this strategy by the Palestinian Presidents who tried to gain the sympathy of the Palestinian audience.

The fourth strategy of Benoit's theory is corrective action. The Palestinian Presidents used only correct/solve problem sub-strategy as reported by the *New Straits Times*. The vast majority of corrective action strategy was used by the Palestinian Presidents mainly after Palestinian attacks crisis, and a tiny minority was used in clashes, demonstrations, and foreign pressure crises.

Using corrective action strategy by the Palestinian Presidents Arafat and Abbas after the attacks was very fast. Presidents ordered corrective measures to arrest the attackers or those who ordered the attacks. The corrective action strategy showed that both presidents did not agree with the attacks and show their eagerness and commitment to the peace-making process. Although there was no Israeli evidence that the Palestinian Presidents have ordered the attacks or facilitate them, Presidents were very serious in using corrective actions.

Additionally, in the crisis of Palestinian-Israeli clashes, the Palestinian Presidents had ordered the Palestinian forces to stop shooting. Also, after the Palestinian demonstrations crisis as a result of the aggressive behaviour from

Palestinian Police towards university students, President Arafat has fired the chief of police immediately. Moreover, previous work (Benoit 1997a, 1997b, 2005) argued that the effort of corrective action started with promises to correct the wrong-doing. Yet, the promise to correct the wrong-doing means more delay, but the effort of Palestinian Presidents was mostly direct without any delay which makes it more powerful.

Corrective action is a crucial strategy to settle dust on several issues (Chimbarange et al. 2013). Also, the slow reaction is undermining the image repair efforts (Benoit 1997b). Coombs (2007a) discussed that both quickly and quick words are used as synonyms of crisis response. During crisis time, communication is a real challenge because of the necessity of immediate response, the uncertainty about these situations, and the looming threat. The main focus of image repair is the immediate aftermath of an event through its several strategic messages (Ulmer, et al. 2007). Implementing corrective action strategy by both Palestinian Presidents was in line with the discussion above. It has proved their eagerness to solve the crises and prevent their occurrence. This strategy was well portrayed by the *New Straits Times*.

The fifth and last strategy of Benoit's theory is mortification. This strategy used by President Arafat only and it was the least used strategy as reported by *New Straits Times*. President Arafat used both confess/admit and apology sub-strategies. President Arafat used both sub-strategies of mortification with corrective action strategy after Palestinian demonstrations crisis due to Palestinian police raid to An Najah University in West Bank. Arafat has admitted the mistake of his police, apologised to the demonstrators, and fired chief of police. Also, President Arafat used this strategy after an internal conflict crisis with the parliament due to the corruption of government by admitting the mistake.

In case of being guilty, the person has no choice to remain silent but to use the mortification. Using mortification is not easy for anyone, but it is more difficult for politicians to make apologies than other people. The people that have the courage of accepting the blame are admired by others. Also, combining both remorse and admission is helpful to achieve the good will of the audience (Benoit1997a).

Admitting the wrong-doing and apologising might gain the support of the public and win their acceptance (Sheldon & Sallot 2009). Moreover, the appropriateness and effectiveness of corrective action and mortification are more than other strategies (Benoit & Drew 1997). Both mortification and corrective action work well with each other, and the defence that contains both of them is a well-designed one (Benoit 2014; Brinson & Benoit 1996).

The findings of this study were in line with previous studies about using mortification strategy. Although Arafat did not commit the mistakes by himself he has apologies on behalf of his government and police. Arafat preferred to use this strategy and not to remain silent even he was not guilty which strengthen his position. Arafat also in other stories has combined both of mortification and corrective action which shows the portrayal of his defence by *New Straits Times* as a well-designed.

5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY

This section discusses the theoretical, practical, and methodological implications of this study. Despite its limitations, this study has succeeded in pairing both theory and practice. The study has broad implications since its results are significant for future research in this subject. This study provides a deeper understanding of the dozens of conducted studies about image repair, crisis, and framing theories. The study has direct valuable implications for the practitioners and researchers in public relations, crisis communication, and political communication.

5.4.1 Theoretical implications

This study examines the coverage of *New Straits Times* (NST) about the used image repair strategies by both Palestinian Presidents to respond to different types of crises. This study used the *New Straits Times* since it is an English language newspaper and due to its ownership. English language newspapers can reach the international audience, have more readerships, and take part in the international environment (Nazhmidinova 2014). Additionally, the *New Straits Times* is controlled by UMNO-based conglomerates and it is considered as a government-controlled newspaper

(Chibundu 2013; Jones 2015). The media ownership influence and control its agenda-setting (Okwuchukwu 2014). This coverage of NST might reflect the point of view of the Malaysian government and leadership towards Palestinian Presidents, and the bilateral relations between the two countries.

Reassessing image repair strategies gives more insight into the use of these strategies and the best way of using them effectively. The forethought about using image repair strategies supports them of being less reactive and more proactive. This study shares using image repair strategies as reported by the media. The response to the crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents as reported by the media was in correspondence to the image repair strategies postulated by Benoit. Using these strategies was applicable to explain different types of crises. Image repair theory proved its applicability in different types of crises, especially the political crisis due to the circumstances faced in Palestine.

The study revealed that the majority of image repair strategies were used to respond to the Palestinian attacks crisis. Mostly, corrective action and denial strategies were elaborated in response to the crises, especially the Palestinian attacks crisis. Previous research did not elaborate on these typologies. Additionally, applying image repair theory across the geographic borders of the Palestinian Presidents was in line with Cheng et al. (2013). They argued that studying the management of crisis across borders support the notion about the effectiveness of image repair framework in explicating crisis situations in a cross-cultural context. Moreover, Len-Ríos (2010) argued that studying image repair theory was mostly in the United States and just a few studies examined implementing image repair strategies in other cultures and countries. This study fills this gap by examining the coverage of foreign media on image repair strategies used by Palestinian Presidents.

Combining image repair as public relations theory with framing as journalism theory is a crucial matter for this study. Framing allowed to test and understand the typologies of image repair strategies in response to different types of crises. Freyenberger (2013) discussed that framing the image of politicians influence their image positively or negatively and affect the perception of the public about those

politicians. Also, framing the crisis by media may influence the perception of the public about of organisations and individuals (Cho & Gower 2006).

Framing analysis provides useful insights for crisis managers to choose suitable strategies of crisis response to reduce the damaged image of an organisation or individual (An & Gower 2009). Thus, understanding how the media framed crisis, and how the public perceived the crisis is helpful to choose the proper image repair strategies. The individuals or organisations that their images were threatened can use framing to repair their image.

Combining those theories allows anticipating or speculating the perception of Malaysian public about the Palestinian Presidents. Kunczik (1997) discussed that probably newspapers are the strongest shaper of the image. Also, Druckman (2001) argued that frames in communication which refers to images, presentation style, phrases, and words influence the frames in thought which refers to the cognitive understanding of public about a specific situation.

5.4.2 Practical implications

Previous research (Dardis & Haigh 2009; Smudde & Courtright 2008) discussed using image repair theory as a retrospective framework rather than prospective. Although the current study used image repair theory in a retrospective manner it has contributed to the prospective manner. This study provides practitioners with potential prescriptive measures of image repair strategies not only by describing these strategies but through inferring them.

This study did not only look backward by analysing what already occurred with Palestinian Presidents, yet it gave several suggestions for practitioners about using image repair strategies in similar circumstances of crises. Evaluating the strategies used by the Palestinian Presidents to respond to different types of crises gives practitioners and crisis managers more opportunities to choose the suitable strategies with each type of crises. Thus, it gives practitioners a prospective vision to

achieve reasonable expectations and knowledge about the most suitable strategies to be used with crises.

Previous studies (Benoit 2006, 1997a, 2014b; Benoit et al. 1991; Benoit & Nill 1998; Liu 2007; Zhang & Benoit 2004) studied image repair strategies fragmentary in a single crisis context and specific place and time. This study examined the strategies holistically in several contexts and types of crises and examined each crisis in a different time and place. Matching those strategies with crises and testing them in several environments enhances their test. It also improves the knowledge of practitioners about how those strategies functioned.

Framing different types of crisis by media in this study can benefit practitioners and their organisations. Observing the framing of crises by certain media could provide practitioners and their organisations by valuable information, especially if the media frame was in line with how they wanted that crisis to be framed. Additionally, if the media frame was not in a positive tone, so the organisations and practitioners can approach an alternative media to comment on the crisis (Mehta 2012). Also, framing the crisis by media provides crisis managers by clear insights about choosing a suitable crisis response to repair the damaged image of individuals or organisations (An & Gower 2009).

5.4.3 Methodological implications

Several methodological implications resulted from this study. Those highlighted implications affect the result of study and support its accuracy. Combining both image repair and framing theories in the same instrument allows promoting the image repair strategies used by the Palestinian Presidents. It also allows anticipating the perception of Malaysian public about Palestinian Presidents without using other methods such as survey or experiment.

Mixed-methods are important since each method has its own weakness, and combining both quantitative and qualitative methods make up that weakness and offer novel insights for image repair and crises communication. The cross-validation of

both quantitative and qualitative methods supports the results and the implications of the study for public relations practice. Mixed methods have several advantages and significance for understanding the nature of the phenomenon and the issue under study. Also, using mixed methods enhances the validity and generalisation of study (Wimmer & Dominick 2011; Stacks 2011; Zachariadis et al. 2013).

5.5 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

Despite the noteworthy results and several broad implications in this research for public relations, crises communication, and political communication, but this study has its own limitations. More opportunities are offered for future research can be retrieved from the limitations of this study. The limitations of this research included using only one medium which was newspapers. This study did not include other mediums such as TV newscasts, radio, podcasts, social media websites, and internet news stories. Focusing only on the newspaper medium might not have totally encompassed all the available sources of media about the issue of this study. The *New Straits Times* might not report all the stories on the image repair strategies used by Palestinian Presidents in their response to different types of crises. Other mediums probably reported other strategies and types of crises faced by the Palestinian Presidents in a different way.

Another limitation of the study was choosing one representative newspaper, since the study was not a comparative study between several newspapers in Malaysia. The rationale for choosing NST for this study was explained earlier in the Methodology Chapter. Choosing only an English language newspaper and ignoring other Malay, Chinese, and Tamil newspapers was another limitation for this study. One of the limitations was related to data collection process due to the malfunction of most microfilm machines while the other machines were not working properly. The malfunction of machines has extended the time for data collection and caused several problems for the researcher.

5.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future research might involve studying other media forms or mediums such as TV, radio, social media, internet news stories, etc. For future research, another potential area for study might include other newspapers to show the varieties in coverage between them which might reveal different unique results.

Further investigation is warranted on studying other newspapers since Malaysian newspapers come in different languages including, English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil which represent different ethnics and political views. Involving other mediums might provide other stories on the Palestinian Presidents and might reveal more image repair strategies used by them to respond to different crises from what was resulted from this study.

5.7 CONCLUSION

Three types of crises were faced by the two presidents, namely political, social, and economic as reported by the *New Straits Times*, unlike other crises that were faced by other personalities due to the circumstances faced in Palestine. The response to these crises was in correspondence to the strategies postulated in the Benoit's Image Repair Strategies. The study found that corrective action and denial strategies were elaborated in the response to the crises, especially the political crisis. Previous literature had not provided an elaboration of the hierarchy of these typologies.

The most dominant slant by NST towards Palestinian Presidents was neutral slant. Then the next dominant slant was positive, followed by negative, and balanced respectively. There were no significant differences in the slant used by NST towards each Palestinian President. This study analysed the news found in NST and these news items mostly came from different sources but reported in NST.

The results of this study can be applicable to other countries or other people. This study contributed to the body of knowledge by combining image repair and framing theories. Promoting image repair strategies used by Palestinian Presidents

came by framing them in the *New Straits Times*. It was the *New Straits Times* that reported the crises and identified the strategies used. Promoting crises response strategies by Malaysian media shows the journalistic support to the public relations effort to confront with crises.

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APPENDIX A
CODING BOOK

**MALAYSIAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF PALESTINIAN PRESIDENTS’
IMAGE DURING CRISES 1996-2016**

Introduction:

This empirical study is conducted to examine the Malaysian media coverage about image repair effort used by Palestinian presidents during crisis time. The study aimed also to find out which slants were used by Malaysian media, and the types of crises that affected those presidents.

Procedures and Instructions:

The aim of designing this coding book is to assist the coding process and analysing the contents of the attached news stories/ articles. The coding book includes a list of all the variables, and detailed explanations about the coding of these variables. The coding of those news stories will be in a precise manner. An agreement and understanding between coders must be achieved prior to beginning the process of coding and categorisation. Ensuring the reached high level of agreement requires applying intercoder reliability. The coders must study thoroughly the coding book before starting the coding process.

The following steps should be taken in the content analysis as described below:

- Before analysing the news stories/articles, coders should study this coding book methodologically and should consistently refer back to this coding book for more guidance and clarification during the coding process.
- Firstly, coders are required to identify the potential related news stories/articles to the topics under study through paying attention to their headlines, sub-headlines, pictures and its captions, and any other icons related to the topic.
- Coders should read the whole news stories of the topics under study and identify the related elements as specified in the coding book after identifying the potential news stories.
- Coders might write directly on the news stories hardcopies and mark them by highlighter, pencil or pen to identify types of crises, image repair strategies, and news slants.

- Coders are responsible for categorising all data gathered accurately and correctly as possible.
- Finally, coders are required to transfer the results to the coding sheet.

The following details and definitions are important for the coders when selecting and analysing the newspapers stories under study:

A1	Coder's Name	Write the name of the coder as assigned in coding sheet (e.g.: "A", "B", or "C") before analysing the news stories.
A2	Unit/ Story Number	The whole newspaper story is considered as one unit of analysis. The serial number should be as "A1, B1, or C1". The alphabetical order refers to the coders name in section 1.
A3	Name of President	Record the name of President as: -Yasser Arafat - Mahmoud Abbas
A4	Story Title/ Headline	Record the headline exactly as mentioned in the newspaper.
A5	Date of News	Record the date of publication for each newspaper story in the format yyyy/mm/dd.
A6	Story Page	Record the page number that the selected newspaper story appeared in it.
B7	Media Attention Score	It includes 5 items. Each of these items in the form of a measurement. Record yes= if the story included that item, and No= if the story did not. For B7a Record yes= if the story included that item, and No= if the story did not. And for B7a1 add the number of pictures attached to the news story. For B7b add the number of paragraphs of the news story.

B8	Story Source	<p>Record the source of stories as the assigned code below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - local news sources - international news sources - Others <p>B8a. Identify the source of news story.</p>
B9	Story Type	<p>Record the type of stories as the assigned code below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -straight news -opinion -features - editorials -letter to the editor - Others. B9a identify the other types of story.
B10	Newspaper Section	<p>Record the section of newspaper stories as the assigned code below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Front page -National - Letters - World news - Business - Sport - Life & times <p>B10a: identify if the story was attached in other sections.</p>
B11	Slant of News Story	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Positive: when the report is positive or sympathetic. - Negative: when the report is critical or unsympathetic. - Balanced: when the report included both aspects or positive & negative words. <p>Neutral: when the report did not include positive or negative.</p>

		B11a. Indicate the statement that included the slant/tone of story.
B12	Type of Crisis	Record if any type of crisis was used to be categorised under the assigned code below: - Political - Social -Economic - Others - Non crisis B12b. Indicate the statement that included the type of crisis.
C13	Type of Response by Presidents	Record the type response by Presidents as stated in the assigned code below: A= Proactive B= Reactive C= Others C13a. Indicate the statement that included the type of response by presidents.
C14	Image Repair Strategies: Denial -Simple Denial - Shift the Blame Evasion of responsibility - Provocation - Defeasibility - Accident - Good Intentions Reducing offensiveness - Bolstering	For C14 Record yes= if any of sub-strategies were used, and No= if any of sub-strategies were not used. C14a Indicate the statement that included the image repair strategies. C14b Tick the main used image repair strategy if any. C14c Write the main keyword for main image repair strategy. C14c1 Add the word counts number for the main strategies used. C14d Indicate whether the used journalistic approaches by presidents were war or peace.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimization - Differentiation - Transcendence - Attack accuser - Compensation <p>Corrective Action</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Correct/ solve problem - Prevent problem recurrence <p>Mortification</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Confessing/ admitting - Apology/ beg for forgiveness 	
C15	Other Strategies	<p>C15: Record yes: if other strategies were determined, and No: if no other strategies were determined.</p> <p>C15a: Identify the other strategies used.</p>
C16	Remarks/Additional Comments	<p>Please note anything about the newspaper story that you consider useful and worthwhile for this study but could not be included in the coding sheet, due to its limited coding categories.</p> <p>This might be unexpected relevant or interesting information that to the analysis.</p>

APPENDIX B
CODING SHEET

A1. Coder name:	A2. Unit/ Story Number:
A3. Name of President: <input type="checkbox"/> Yasser Arafat <input type="checkbox"/> Mahmoud Abbas	A4. Story Title/ Headline:
A5. Date of News:	A6. Story Page:

B7. Media Attention Scores	Yes	No
B7.1 Length of story headline is 2 columns or more in width.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B7.2 Length of headline is more than half the page.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B7.3 Story is placed above the fold/ measured centre of a page.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B7.4 Story occupied ¾ of a column or more.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B7.5 Story appeared on the front page.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B7a. Story included attached pictures to the Story.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _____ B7a1
B7b. No. of paragraphs in the Story: _____		

B8. Story Source: <input type="checkbox"/> Local news sources <input type="checkbox"/> International news sources <input type="checkbox"/> Others	B8a. Identify
---	---

B9. Story Type:
 Straight news Opinion Editorials Letter to the editor OthersB9a

B10. Newspaper Section
 Front Page National Letters World News
 Business Sport Life & Times Others: IdentifyB10a

B11. Slant of News Story: <input type="checkbox"/> Positive <input type="checkbox"/> Negative <input type="checkbox"/> Balanced <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral	B11a. Statements:
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B12. Type of crisis: <input type="checkbox"/> Political <input type="checkbox"/> Social <input type="checkbox"/> Economic <input type="checkbox"/> Others <input type="checkbox"/> Non Crisis	B12a. Specify	B12b. Statements:
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<p>C13. Type of Response by Presidents: <input type="checkbox"/> Proactive <input type="checkbox"/> Reactive <input type="checkbox"/> Others</p>	<p>C13a. Statements:</p>																																																																								
<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: left; border-bottom: 1px solid black;">C14. Image Repair:</th> <th style="text-align: center; border-bottom: 1px solid black;">Yes</th> <th style="text-align: center; border-bottom: 1px solid black;">No</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="3">C14.1 Denial</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.1a Simple denial</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.1b Shift the blame</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">C14.2 Evasion of responsibility</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.2a Provocation</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.2b Defeasibility</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.2c Accident</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.2d Good intentions</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">C14.3 Reducing offensiveness</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.3a Bolstering</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.3b Minimization</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.3c Differentiation</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.3d Transcendence</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.3e Attack accuser</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.3f Compensation</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">C14.4 Corrective action</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.4a Correct/ solve problem</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.4b Prevent problem recurrence</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">C14.5 Mortification</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.5a Confessing/ admitting</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C14.5b Apology/ beg for forgiveness</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C15. Other strategies</td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C15a. Identify.....</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	C14. Image Repair:	Yes	No	C14.1 Denial			C14.1a Simple denial	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.1b Shift the blame	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.2 Evasion of responsibility			C14.2a Provocation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.2b Defeasibility	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.2c Accident	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.2d Good intentions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.3 Reducing offensiveness			C14.3a Bolstering	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.3b Minimization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.3c Differentiation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.3d Transcendence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.3e Attack accuser	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.3f Compensation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.4 Corrective action			C14.4a Correct/ solve problem	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.4b Prevent problem recurrence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.5 Mortification			C14.5a Confessing/ admitting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C14.5b Apology/ beg for forgiveness	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C15. Other strategies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	C15a. Identify			<p>C14a. Statements:</p> <p>C14b. Image Repair Frame (Main): <input type="checkbox"/> Denial <input type="checkbox"/> Evasion of responsibility <input type="checkbox"/> Reducing offensiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Corrective action <input type="checkbox"/> Mortification</p> <p>C14c. Keyword for Main Image Repair Frame: </p> <p>C14c1 Word Counts: _____</p> <p>C14d. Journalistic Approach: <input type="checkbox"/> War <input type="checkbox"/> Peace <input type="checkbox"/> Others</p>
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C16. Remarks/Additional Comments:

APPENDIX C

VALIDITY LETTER



الجامعة الإسلامية العالمية ماليزيا
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA
يُونِيْوِيسِيْٓتِيْ اِسْلَامِيْٓ اِنْدَاوِنِيْسِيَا
(Company No. 101067-P)

كلية معارف الوحي والعلوم الإنسانية
KULLIYAH OF ISLAMIC REVEALED KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN SCIENCES

Our Reference: IIUM/301/G/13/17/1/ IbnKhalidun/

Date: 15/3/2019

VALIDITY OF CODING SHEET

This is to confirm that I have checked the coding sheet submitted by Mohammed F.M. Arandas (Matric No. P82368) and I find it is appropriate to be used in his PhD dissertation entitled "Malaysian Media Coverage of Palestinian President's Image During Crises 1996-2016."

Thank you,

PROF. DATO' SRI DR. SYED ARABI IDID

Co-supervisor,

Holder of Ibn Khaldun Chair, Kulliyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge & Human Sciences

Office Address: Kulliyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences (KIRKHS)
International Islamic University Malaysia, P.O Box 10, 50728 Kuala Lumpur
Tel : 03-6196 5053 / 5051 Fax : 03-6196 4870
Email: irkhs@iiu.edu.my Website: www.iiu.edu.my/irkhs



APPENDIX D**NEWS STORIES ON THE PALESTINIAN PRESIDENTS**

1. Editor: Arafat routinely tramples on press freedom. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 1 January: 17.
2. Arafat: Hamas bombmaker killed by Israel. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 8 January: 18.
3. Arafat's Challenger casts for protest vote. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 19 January: 22.
4. Israeli troops kill three Palestinians in West Bank. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 20 January: 20.
5. PLO chief takes 85pc of vote in historic Palestinian presidential election
Landslide victory for Arafat. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 22 January: 1.
6. Palestinian polls bring hope and worry. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 22 January:
10.
7. Mixed reaction to Palestinian polls. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 22 January: 22.
8. Arafat: state of Palestine could emerge in 1997. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 25
January: 22.
9. Jihad mourners call for Arafat's blood. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 25 January:
23.
10. Arafat and PLO leaders fail to reach decision on meeting. 1996. *New Straits
Times*, 7 February: 20.
11. Fearless Khalil a daunting role model. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 8 February: 6.
12. Arafat to be sworn in today. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 12 February: 19.
13. Arafat sworn in as Palestinian President. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 13 February:
20.

14. Explosions in Israel kill 25, injure 80. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 26 February: 1.
15. Arafat condemns bombings. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 26 February: 14.
16. Israel eases closure of Gaza Strip. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 1 March: 18.
17. Israel spurns talks with Hamas. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 2 March: 16.
18. Israeli army thwarts attack. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 3 March: 18.
19. 19 die in mirror- image attack on bus in Israel. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 4 March: 20.
20. Israelis may have lost faith in Peres and Arafat. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 7 March: 13.
21. Arafat taking tough action against Hamas. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 7 March: 20.
22. Israel, PLO work to stop bombings. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 8 March: 18.
23. Summit to save Middle East peace. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 9 March: 22.
24. Palestinians arrest two Hamas leaders. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 10 March: 19.
25. PLO arrests the head of Hamas wing. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 11 March: 20.
26. Peres praises crackdown by Palestinian Authority. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 23 March: 22.
27. Working hard for durable peace in the Middle East. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 31 March: 8.
28. Arafat, Israel has declared war. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 2 April: 23.
29. Arafat slams Peres over proposal. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 3 April: 22.
30. Arafat sacks police commander. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 5 April: 24.
31. Arafat, Hamas resolve dispute over police raid. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 6 April: 22.
32. Raids will wreck peace, Israel warned. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 15 April: 21.
33. Arafat urges amending charter. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 23 April: 21.

34. Israel urged to renounce ideas of expansionism. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 13 May: 23.
35. Palestinian Cabinet sworn in. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 19 May: 19.
36. Arafat backs Israeli peace map. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 26 May: 24.
37. Arafat calls emergency meeting to discuss impact of polls. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 1 June: 20.
38. Arafat shocked by defeat. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 2 June: 16.
39. Fear new Israeli regime may halt peace process. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 3 June: 1.
40. Arafat urges Israel to keep peace on track. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 4 June: 24.
41. Us congress rapped for applauding Netanyahu. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 13 July: 18.
42. Arafat snubs Netanyahu's envoy. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 17 July: 22.
43. Arafat in Syria for Talks with Assad. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 26 July: 22.
44. Arafat denounce court ruling on Temple mount. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 29 July: 21.
45. Arafat accuses Israeli PM of sabotaging peace. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 7 August: 22.
46. Arafat and Hussein discuss peace process. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 8 August: 24.
47. Arafat, Peres meet at Israel-PLO relations fray. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 23 August: 24.
48. Israeli President to meet Arafat. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 26 August: 22.
49. Arafat calls for general protest strike. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 29 August: 22.
50. Arafat accuses Israel of bugging. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 3 September: 20.
51. Arafat in Tokyo to seek cash, support for peace. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 11 September: 20.

52. Israel won't 'toss out Hebron accord'. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 14 September: 19.
53. Arafat: Israel faking peace efforts. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 15 September: 19.
54. Clinton calls for Washington meeting of Arab and Israeli leaders Summit to save peace process. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 1 October: 1.
55. Middle East summit opens at White House. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 2 October: 22.
56. Arafat, Netanyahu still remain at odds. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 3 October: 22.
57. Israeli army on alert ahead of peace talks. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 4 October: 20.
58. Arafat to meet Israeli President for talks. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 8 October: 22.
59. Arafat in Israel to pursue peace. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 9 October: 22.
60. Angry Arafat rejects Israel's Hebron plan. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 17 October: 22.
61. Israel, PLO fail to clinch deals, Ross going home. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 29 October: 22.
62. Arafat first to register as voter. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 13 November: 20.
63. Arafat: Israel out to subvert peace deals. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 18 November: 21.
64. Arafat wants new economic agreement with Israel. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 21 November: 22.
65. Show of defiance by Netanyahu. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 27 November: 24.
66. Israel could annex Gaza, West Bank. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 28 November: 24.
67. Arafat, Netanyahu agree to pursue peace talks. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 17 November: 24.

68. Israel accepts limited Palestinian state. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 21 December: 18.
69. Arafat- Ross talks 'fruitful'. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 23 December: 21.
70. Palestinians close in on Hebron deal. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 28 December: 19.
71. Israel on verge of signing Hebron deal. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 29 December: 20.
72. Hebron accord may be signed today. 1996. *New Straits Times*, 31 December: 22.
73. Hebron deal held up by single issue. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 3 January: 16.
74. Israel, PLO unable to clinch deal. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 4 January: 18.
75. Arafat blames Netanyahu for delaying Hebron deal. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 5 January: 17.
76. Hush-hush talks fail to seal Hebron deal. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 6 January: 22.
77. Secret summit fails to seal Hebron deal. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 7 January: 24.
78. Netanyahu sabotaging peace process. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 12 January: 19.
79. Hussein in Bed to save peace talks. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 13 January: 21.
80. Palestine and Israel sign Hebron accord. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 15 January: 1.
81. Depth of West Bank pullouts possible key stumbling block. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 16 January: 22.
82. After Hebron, Arafat sets sights on Jerusalem. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 19 January: 18.
83. We want peace, Arafat tells Jewish settlers. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 20 January: 24.

84. Arafat says he will set up State despite opposition. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 23 January: 20.
85. Arafat, Netanyahu upbeat. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 3 February: 18.
86. 'Netanyahu to approve Jerusalem housing plan'. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 21 February: 22.
87. Palestinian Cabinet warns Israel over Jerusalem. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 24 February: 22.
88. Arafat in Brussels for talks with EU leaders. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 25 February: 20.
89. Arafat Condemns decision to build settlement. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 28 February: 22.
90. Top Israeli officials in corruption case may be indicted. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 1 March: 24.
91. Israelis hit Hizbollah area. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 3 March: 22.
92. 'I am truly worried,' says PLO leader. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 7 March: 24.
93. Peace process in danger say Arafat, Hussein. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 10 March: 22.
94. Arafat wants more US involvement. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 12 March: 22.
95. Netanyahu 'fed up' of accusations. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 13 March: 22.
96. Israeli Cabinet approves plans to build in East Jerusalem. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 15 March: 20.
97. Storm over Israeli threat to exile Arafat. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 17 March: 24.
98. Palestinians protest move by settlers. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 21 March: 24.
99. Palestinian group warns of more attacks. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 22 March: 20.
100. Israeli open fire at Palestinians. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 23 March: 20.

101. Israel comes under attack at OIC summit. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 24 March: 21.
102. PLO rejects Israeli demands on security. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 25 March: 24.
103. PLO's Fatah gears up for protests. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 26 March: 24.
104. Talks with Arafat very thorough, say US envoy. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 28 March: 24.
105. Arab states rethink relations with Israel. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 31 March: 24.
106. Netanyahu talks only if bombing stops. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 3 April: 22.
107. Netanyahu off to US for talks . 1997. *New Straits Times*, 7 April: 24.
108. Israel comes under NAM fire. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 8 April: 22.
109. Israel responsible for Gaza bombings, say Palestinians. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 5 May: 14.
110. Arafat pessimistic over US envoy's mission. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 6 May: 22.
111. Arafat meets Weizman over deadlock. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 7 May: 22.
112. Arafat wants Pope to save peace process. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 23 May: 20.
113. Egypt 'on Palestinian side'. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 28 May: 23.
114. Arafat: Israeli PLO summit not on agenda. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 29 May: 24.
115. Israel acts to end deadlock. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 22 July: 19.
116. Peace process on the move again. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 24 July: 21.
117. Arafat delays decision on Mass quitting. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 3 August: 16.
118. US efforts to jump start peace talks fail. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 12 August: 21.

119. Arafat warns Israel of new Intefada. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 17 August: 20.
120. Israel further eases sanctions but Arafat not satisfied. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 20 August: 22.
121. Arafat fainted after a heated argument. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 22 September: 22.
122. Arafat Cabinet pledges to stop Hamas violence. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 28 September: 21.
123. PLO, Israel hold top-level talks to revive peace process. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 23 October: 22.
124. Peace talks on collision course. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 4 November: 22.
125. Arafat's health: 'Israeli rumours'. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 18 November: 22.
126. Netanyahu 'no' to Palestinian state. 1997. *New Straits Times*, 30 November: 19.
127. Netanyahu: Pullback terms not a trick. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 17 January: 16.
128. Arafat seeks more land in meeting with Clinton. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 23 January: 14.
129. Arafat offers Clinton assurances on charter. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 24 January: 14.
130. Arafat seeks Arab summit on Mid-East. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 27 January: 14.
131. Israelis celebrate Passover by laying claim to city of Hebron. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 14 April: 18.
132. Arafat: Hamas playing into Israeli hands. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 20 April: 19.
133. Arafat meeting Albright in surprise talks in London. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 19 May: 17
134. Arafat urges US to reveal 'initiative'. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 25 May: 20

135. Israel Cabinet rejects US proposal. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 26 May: 19.
136. Netanyahu: Accord likely by end of July. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 29 June: 22.
137. Arafat: We have run out of patience. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 2 July: 20.
138. Arafat's Cabinet to continue with programmes. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 11 August: 18.
139. Arafat to attend UN meeting. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 6 September: 20.
140. Clinton meets Arafat, Netanyahu. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 29 September: 19.
141. Threat to topple Netanyahu over Mideast peace deal. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 30 September: 18.
142. Albright notes progress, sets Mideast summit. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 9 October: 19.
143. Israelis, Palestinians prepare for summit. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 12 October: 22.
144. Mid-East summit opens in hope. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 16 October: 18.
145. Peace talks enter decisive stage. 1998. *New Straits Times*, 9 October: 19.
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