



The 1956 Revolution In Hungary And The French Position Towards It

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ABSTRACT

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, against Soviet control and hegemony, one of the major crises of Soviet President Khrushchev's term, sent the Red Army to Hungary, to crush the revolution and keep the latter within the Soviet sphere of influence, when Hungary objected to this situation, it launched demonstrations led by university students. The Soviet Union responded by sending tens of thousands of its troops to Budapest, to end the demonstrations that broke out against the Soviet Union. As for the position of the French government and its motives regarding the Hungarian issue of 1956, it was kind of mysterious. Apparently, the French government intervened to achieve its own interests at the time. The timing of the Hungarian Revolution was appropriate for France to distract European countries from their intervention in the Suez issue.

Keyword: Hungarian Revolution of 1956, French policy towards the Hungarian issue.

Introduction

On October 23, 1956, a popular anti-communist revolution broke out in Hungary, and that revolution centered in the capital, Budapest. The events were as complex as they were full of paradoxes, and the complexity of the revolution appeared primarily because of the difference between the leaders of the revolution and its followers. Because most of the leaders were members of the counter-revolutionary communist elite who paved the way for what happened in 1956, because of their perception that a peaceful, negotiated transition to a new pluralistic political system would retain some of the features of a socialist economy. Although the Soviet Union was able to crush the Hungarian Revolution, history describes it as a national uprising against Soviet imperialism. As for the French position, France interacted with the Hungarian issue and received numbers of Hungarian refugees after the elimination of the revolution, but all of this was for the sake of special interests belonging to the French government, namely to distract the Soviet Union from the problems of the Middle East at that time, especially the Suez issue, and all the aid provided by the French government was To Hungary according to planned plans. In addition, they receive refugees in order to exploit them as a large and employable workforce.

Hungarian Revolution 1956

After the end of World War II in 1945, the Soviet Union took complete control of Hungary. The Russian army found in Hungary an almost complete vacuum of political power, and it was politically isolated in the first months following the end of hostilities because it had no local representatives abroad and no friends among itself. The victorious countries were thus occupied by the Soviet Union and Hungary remained under strict Russian control (1).

Despite this, Hungary did not become a communist state directly after it was liberated by the Soviet army in 1945. The communists remained a minority in Hungary until February 1947, when a law was issued for the Russians to keep their forces in Hungary for an indefinite period of time. This improved the position of the Hungarian Communist Party and was able to The party was unable to eliminate its political opponents until Ferenc Nagy (1903-1979) was elected Prime Minister in 1946, and during his reign the country came under the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party. In early 1948, the Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship was signed in Moscow between the Hungarian government and the Soviet government. According to that treaty,

Hungary became a one-party state and adopted the Stalinist political structure. The role of the State Security Service (AVH) was effective in imposing Stalinist values until the State Security Service eliminated Political opponents in order to strengthen the position of the Communist Party in the country, despite the fact that its methods are brutal and that it terrorizes the local population (2).

Many leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party were Jews. However, the communist doctrine rejected religion, and the Soviet regime was known for its anti-Semitism. As a result, Matyas Rakosi was the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party. The Soviet Union was considered the savior of the people of Hungary from the injustice and oppression of capitalism, (3) in addition to Emo Giro, the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party and Gabor Peter, the Chief of Police. Politically, there are mostly Jewish leaders in the State Security Service, and although Jews held high-ranking positions, anti-Semitism was at its most intense. This can be proven by the fact that Hungarian Jewish leaders rejected their Jewish identity until they were able to make progress in their careers as leaders in the country. Under the control of the Soviet authorities (4).

From that standpoint, the revolution began, but before that we must address Poland's relationship with the Soviet Union in 1956, and the extent of its impact on the revolution in Hungary. This was when Wladislaw Gomulka, President of Poland, joined the position of First Secretary of the United Polish Workers' Party. On October 21, 1956, which was a shock and a turning point for both countries, at the same time the reform movement was strengthened in the city of Poznan in Poland during the eighth plenary session of the Polish United Workers' Party on October 19-21, when Wladyslaw Gomulka, a comrade, was elected. Fairly hardline partisan, (5) despite Soviet rejection. The plenum was attended by Nikita Khrushchev, (6) along with Anastas Mikogan, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. They threatened Poland with military intervention if Gomulka's election was confirmed, but the latter made it clear to Khrushchev that his new role as First Secretary would not change Poland's relations with Poland. Soviet Union, but Khrushchev remained adamant on not confirming Gomulka's election. (7).

As a result, students and some politicians believed that the situation in Poland was bad, and in order to gain the opportunity to become independent in matters of politics and internal economics, the Polish Revolution began to spread throughout the country. In such a context, Soviet repression arose, and as a result of the totalitarian control over Hungarian society, there was a mass protest that led to the revolution in Hungary, (8) when the Hungarian University Students Organization (MEFESZ), an independent organization that opposed the Stalinist leadership at the time, carried out these protests. (9).

Accordingly, another group of students from the Hungarian University of Szeged, affiliated with that organization, opposed the government by formulating demands and publishing statements on October 2, 1956, as well as forming student groups in other universities throughout Hungary. After that, the Student Council at the Technical University of Budapest voted in favor of joining MEFESZ, and spokesmen were sent on its behalf to deliver the decisions to universities, factories, and other local and central offices. They actively sought to use demonstrations and strikes to assert themselves, with students from all grades joining in demanding reforms including a multi-party system, free elections, civil rights, national economic independence and the restoration of Hungarian national holidays (10).

After that, demonstrations took place to promote these ideas and began in Budapest on October 23, 1956. (11) The beginning of the demonstration began at the memorial to General Behm, the Polish revolutionary who led the Hungarian Revolution to victory against the Habsburg and Tsarist military units in 1849. On that day, tens of thousands gathered. Of the demonstrators, including students, (12) workers and workers, and a second group gathered in front of the parliament building, (13) demanding that Imre Nagy (14) become the new leader of the country, as Nagy was first secretary from 1953-1955, but he was Removal from his job; Because his reform policy was considered a threat by the Soviet authorities. (15).

But Nagy was still emerging as a reformist in 1956, and was considered a potential alternative to lead the country and weaken the influence of the Soviet authorities on domestic politics and the economy. Indeed, Nagy became Prime Minister (16) on October 24, 1956, and on October 28, the military attack to suppress the demonstrations was canceled at Nagy's request, which enabled him to declare a truce and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Budapest. He also declared that the revolution was national and democratic, and by October 30, Naji announced that democratic parties could achieve the demands of the revolution until he was able to form them again. (17).

On November 1, 1956, Nagy quickly accelerated his call for reform and called for free elections under a multi-party system, (18) in addition to announcing Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, (19) in protest against the movements of Soviet forces. In Ukraine and Romania towards Hungary, he also declared Hungary a neutral state. (20) On November 2 of the same year, Nagy sent a telegram to Dag Hammarskold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to press for international recognition of Hungary as a neutral state and to raise Hungary's issue on the agenda. (21) In addition to sending official letters to this effect to the heads of foreign diplomatic missions in Budapest, he wanted to remove any Soviet claim to the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary, and the declaration of neutrality by Hungary did not have the desired diplomatic impact abroad (22).

French policy towards the Hungarian question

The position of both Great Britain and France (23) was to support the Hungarian position, but in a specific sense. After the sudden deterioration in relations between the Western powers due to the Suez Crisis,

discussions about Hungary among its representatives in the United Nations took place in an increasingly calm atmosphere. Instead of condemning Soviet intervention, the British and French mainly wanted to exploit the Hungarian crisis for their own interests, which in this case fundamentally deviated from those of the United States. At that point, the British and French tried to move the Hungarian question from the Security Council to the emergency session of the General Assembly, which was convened to discuss the Suez issue in 1956. They expressed the hope that the General Assembly's handling of the two crises simultaneously would reduce international blame for their activities. In fact, given the lack of veto power in the General Assembly, moving the Hungarian question there may have helped the reformist and revolutionary elements in Hungary; Because the Soviets would not be able to block a resolution against the invasion. However, the only goal of the United States of America at that stage, given the restrictions imposed on its influence in Eastern Europe, was to resolve the Middle East crisis. Therefore, they did everything in their power to thwart the British and French strategy, and until November 4, they succeeded in blocking the draft proposal for the Hungarian issue in the Security Council and preventing the matter from being referred to the General Assembly through the "Uniting for Peace" procedure (24).

When the United Nations responded to the request of Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy to mediate between Hungary and the Soviet Union in order to reach solutions that satisfy both parties. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was discussing the situation of Hungary with the leaders of Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, Khrushchev announced that he had decided to send forces to Budapest on November 4. These forces were estimated at 150,000 men and 2,000 tanks, which destroyed all of Hungary, forcing some of Budapest's residents to seek refuge in countries close to Hungary. As for Nagy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, he took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, but was later handed over to the Soviet authorities. He was tried and executed in June 1958, and Janos Kadar (25) announced a new Hungarian government on November 4, 1956 (26).

The Soviet suppression of the revolution led to the departure of more than 200,000 Hungarians, representing 2% of the total population. One hundred and eighty thousand took refuge in Austria, while 20,000 went to Yugoslavia. Austria, which was neutral at the time, guaranteed the protection of refugees from Soviet oppression. Yugoslavia could be chosen first: for proximity. The geographical location of the border for some refugees found it more convenient to travel through Hungary to reach Austria instead. Second: It was a political position for these refugees. Yugoslavia during the era of Joseph Tito (27) represented an alternative to Soviet communism, as it was a communist state outside the Warsaw Pact and not subject to direct Soviet influence (28).

Moreover, Jozef Tito supported the Hungarian Revolution in its early days, (29) and Imre Nagy was valued as a contradiction to previous Hungarian leaders. Some of the Hungarians who took refuge in Yugoslavia wanted to show that they were not anti-communists and certainly not counter-revolutionary fascists, as the Soviet authorities called them, but they wanted to an extent. There is no similar situation to Yugoslavia for Hungary. The French and British governments also followed the events in Hungary with great interest while their residents declared their solidarity with the Hungarian people at the time (30).

In light of this, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 highlighted the growing dissatisfaction throughout Europe due to Soviet hegemony. From this standpoint, representatives of the French government expressed their sympathy with the revolution and condemned the Soviet policy of repression applied at that time in Hungary. The revolution also posed a serious threat to the Soviet bloc. Western countries strongly condemned the Soviet use of force, but had not been in a position to act since their involvement in the Suez Crisis in 1956. They had accordingly tried to avoid statements that might cause tensions with the Soviet Union, and some claimed that the West had encouraged the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution to rise up against Soviet control, only to be left in the lurch. However, it is difficult to imagine what the West could have reasonably done (31).

The United Nations subsequently provided the ideal framework for such a policy. However, later bringing the Hungarian issue to the forefront in the United Nations seemed necessary to the French Foreign Ministry, as well as to the British Foreign Office, which was keen to mitigate the repercussions of the almost universal international condemnation of their Suez policy. The policy of caution and non-interference was also evident in the absence of any initiative by French diplomacy to influence events within the Soviet bloc. The activities of the Quai d'Orsay, located in the building of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were limited to collecting, transmitting and interpreting information. Although French diplomats did a good job of it (32).

Therefore, this French solidarity was translated into protests and solidarity marches in the streets. On the initiative of the French League of the Atlantic Society, a very wide range of political organizations called for an assembly on November 7, 1956, at the Arc de Triomphe (l'Arc de Triomphe) at 6 p.m. About 30,000 people organized a solidarity demonstration with the participation of many members of Guy Mollet's French government, many representatives of the National Assembly, and former prime ministers (33).

At the end of the demonstration, about 5,000 participants, mostly young people, surrounded the offices of the French Communist Party and its newspaper *L'Humanité*. A large number of people were injured in the clash and three were killed, and in that context the Hungarian issue presented an excellent opportunity to obtain internal political advantages. The Socialists began a vigorous campaign against the Communists, who had endangered themselves by the Hungarian tragedy and tried to alienate their voters. We may even suspect political reasons behind the large government solidarity efforts (led by the Socialists) and the assistance

provided to Hungarian refugees. Thus Guy Mollet's French government used Hungarian aid as an instrument of domestic policy (34).

Thus, we showed above how the French government used the Hungarian crisis in order to divert attention from the Suez Crisis of 1956. In November 1956, the Soviet Union had to bear heavy burdens on another front of the struggle for peace and progress. In parallel with the fighting in Hungary, Britain committed France and their aggressive action by attacking Egypt. The nationalization of the Suez Canal posed a serious threat to capitalist profit. It was an encouraging example of national liberation struggles in colonial countries. The major imperial powers considered the Middle East an important strategic region. The imperialist military bases constituted a direct threat to the security of the socialist countries and to the peoples of the Western countries that struggled for their national independence. The drive to regain control of the Suez Canal and launch a military strike reflected imperialist interests. This aggression was also designed to teach the national liberation movements a harsh lesson. For similar reasons, the United States administration implicitly supported the retaliatory measures taken by Britain and France. During the summer and fall, while negotiations seeking a peaceful solution to the Suez Canal problem were underway inside and outside the United Nations. In addition, the British and French governments were busy preparing for military action. They used Israel as bait in September and October. Accordingly, Israel caused severe tension in the Middle East through a series of provocative actions against Jordan. Britain pretended that it wanted to adopt retaliatory measures against Israel, but in reality, France, after an agreement with Britain, delivered weapons to Israel. The two governments jointly developed a scenario for their subsequent military action. On October 23, French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau went to London, where the plans were approved, and then they began the attack on Egypt. On October 25th, Israel carried out an internal military mobilization and launched an attack on Egypt 4 days later, specifically on October 30. The British and French governments issued an ultimatum to the warring parties to defend unhindered traffic along the Suez Canal, and demanded that Israel and Egypt withdraw their forces to a distance of 16 kilometers on both edges of the waterway. This strange ultimatum required Egypt to withdraw its forces to a distance of 161 kilometers from its borders. Egypt rejected that ultimatum.(35) On October 31, as a result, the British and French forces (and Israel) announced their tripartite aggression against Egypt and attacked it by air and sea (36).

It penetrated the Suez Canal area, where the British and French aggressors expected early success. They timed their attack carefully. They were convinced that the allies of the national liberation movement willing and able to provide assistance to them, the system of socialist states, were busy with the revolution in Hungary. The coincidence of the dates of the tripartite aggression against Egypt and the Hungarian counter-revolution is evidence of the accuracy of the timing. Both events began on October 23. On October 28, when the British advanced the so-called "Hungarian Question." To the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, they were encouraging Israel to launch an attack on Egypt. On October 31, when the Hungarian reaction celebrated victory, the British and French imperialist attack on Egypt began. With the Hungarian Uprising center stage and the issue exploited, Guy Mollet's French government used the same tactics it had used in internal affairs. The government contributed to mobilizing public opinion against the Communists through a national and charitable celebration organized by the French Ministry of the Interior, as well as exploiting the opportunities provided by the media (especially radio). The largest such event was the "National Day" scheduled for November 18 for the cause of the Hungarian people. We do not find any trace of the influence of popular pressure on French foreign policy decision-making regarding the Hungarian question. Because of the great repercussions in France following the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion, the French spoke about the events in Hungary in their speeches in various international forums, especially in the United Nations (37).

Of the 200,000 refugees who left Hungary, France granted asylum to about 13,000 between November 1956 and December 1957. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was officially welcomed by countries that opposed the Soviet regime, including France. The French government ruled out military intervention to support the Hungarian population in the early days of the revolution, but sought to benefit from the situation, including asylum for refugees, and there were international and national political and economic considerations linked to the support provided to refugees. The Hungarian Revolution provided an opportunity for the French government to attempt to destabilize the Soviet Union. The French government signaled its hostility to Soviet intervention in Hungary not only by accepting refugees into France but also through other humanitarian measures. In the early days of the revolution, the French government decided to provide relief to the Hungarians who had fought against the Soviet authorities (38).

Within France, in order to weaken the party, the French Communist Party was represented as being linked to the suppression of the revolution, (39) and as a result, the parties of the left and right tried to blame the French Communist Party for the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, (40) while it was in fact a political maneuver to win voters and encourage... Defections from the French Communist Party As far as the French Communist Party was concerned, the French Communist Party supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary (41).

These considerations affected the treatment of the refugees, who were considered freedom fighters by the SFIO and the right, but were described as fascists by the French Communist Party and its newspaper L'Humanité. Therefore, various political elements of the Hungarians were used to achieve their own goals, and the main point was that the Hungarian refugees were considered assets by the French government. This was demonstrated in the (1945 law) when it linked labor and demographic needs and is still considered a national asset in practice. Hungarian refugees were seen as a potential labor force and France wanted to resettle them

permanently. The asylum policy related to Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia is a clear example of this. The French government promised that refugees coming from Hungary are like migrant workers and not forced immigrants in the way it deals with them. The refugee policy was designed in accordance with the general immigration policy in accordance with the 1945 decree in order to meet the needs of refugees in sectors that suffer from a labor shortage. However, preparations were not made to receive the Hungarian refugees by order of the French government, which sometimes led to misunderstandings between the authorities and the refugees, and this led to them being housed in refugee camps. Resentment arose among large groups of refugees who felt like prisoners in their new surroundings (42).

On October 26, 1956, Christian Pinault, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced to the press that France did not seek to exploit the situation in Hungary to achieve military and political gains. However, on the same day, Joseph Paul Boncour, the French ambassador to Hungary expressed his concerns with Benno, noting that the Hungarian rebels, despite their extreme enthusiasm, were already clearly disadvantaged (44).

In that context, the collusion between the French and British governments regarding the support provided to Hungary followed the logic of the alliance. France requested that the Hungarian situation be included on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (45) on October 26, 1956, and the matter was discussed two days later. On October 31, the bombing of Suez began. In order to allay the criticism that France and Britain faced in the wake of that intervention, the two governments attempted to place the Hungarian question on the agenda of the UN Extraordinary Assembly on 1 November, which had initially been called to discuss the Suez question. The representative of the United States of America at the time believed that the French and British representatives wanted to discuss the matter to divert attention from the Suez crisis. Since the situation in Hungary seemed to have calmed down following the departure of Soviet forces in the meantime, discussions were only resumed on 3 November. The theory that France and Britain used the Hungarian situation to their own advantage has been supported by historians ever since. French and British attempts to divert attention from the Suez issue at the United Nations met with little success (46).

On November 1, 1956, Francois Seydoux, the French ambassador in Vienna, proposed to Christian Pineau to make the relief coming from France visible to the Hungarians by adding a clear symbol of France to each parcel, such as its flag. He called on the French politician Joseph Paul Boncour to inform the Hungarian population by all means at his disposal. With French relief efforts. The French government hoped that the Hungarians who were receiving supplies through the Austrian Red Cross would recognize it and consider it an encouragement to continue the revolution. Instead of openly supporting the revolution, the French government, under the guise of humanitarian aid, tried to exploit the situation in Hungary to destabilize the Soviet authorities and weaken their influence. This was the motive behind choosing the Red Cross to distribute supplies. There are two reasons: First: It was a reliable and experienced relief organization. Second: Since it is a non-governmental organization, it cannot be suspected of working for the benefit of French interests. Although the humanitarian organizations tried to remain apolitical and independent, the governments treated them as a tool for their foreign policies during the period. The Cold War and humanitarian work for Hungarian refugees was no exception (47).

Then Operation Fischer (Whirlwind) began against the Hungarians,(48) in the morning hours of November 4, when strategic airfields, highway intersections and bridges were secured. As the Soviets faced resistance from the Hungarian Army, their barracks were among the main targets. With the help of the Hungarian State Security, Soviet forces occupied the Parliament in Budapest, which became a symbol of the revolution. In a dramatic radio broadcast at 5.20am, Imre Nagy told the world to intervene and ask for help, before turning to the Yugoslav embassy. Kadar also broadcast, announcing that the popular movement had degenerated into an eastern uprising, that he had formed a new government, and that he had strongly requested the Soviet Union to intervene. The 2nd Guards Mechanized Division occupied the northern and central parts of Budapest, including the Parliament and the Danube Bridges, while the 99th Division operated in the southeast. In the west, the 128th Division was forced to occupy the castle and the Gellért Hills, meeting stiff resistance. Soviet forces usually operated in small task forces consisting of a company of 100 or 150 soldiers in armored carriers supported by about a dozen tanks. They quickly occupied military installations and disarmed Hungarian Army and National Guard units, and local fighting broke out repeatedly, and some pockets of resistance held out for about a week. The area around the Corvin Cinema was one of the fiercest points of resistance, with a massive artillery firepower being gathered against it. Mortar shells were also used against some workers' accommodation, killing more than 100 civilians in their apartments. By November 6, more than 30,000 Soviet soldiers were in Budapest, and the outcome of the fighting was never in doubt. The Hungarian officers in charge tried to keep their men out of that miserable battle, while local rebel groups continued to resist from time to time. Across the country, Soviet forces overcame resistance from the Army, National Guard, and local groups. There were no intense battles, and Soviet forces usually tried to force the rebels to withdraw (49).

After the suppression of the revolution on 4 November, French general policy was to criticize Cadar's government, thus meeting the expectations of the French people, with the exception of the Communists. Internationally, French foreign policy towards Hungary and the Soviet Union was to diplomatically boycott both countries in line with other NATO countries, and to discuss the situation in the UN General Assembly. Sending supplies to the Hungarian population, and then granting asylum to the Hungarian refugees, also followed this line of diplomatic action. Thus the first reactions of the French government were to exploit the situation in Hungary to engage in propaganda under the guise of humanitarianism. The joining together of

France and Britain can be linked to the fact that both countries were involved in Suez, and that the Hungarian Revolt could serve as a distraction, as the move in Suez was subject to international criticism. French humanitarian work in Hungary was motivated by the Cold War. This was a way to weaken the Soviet Union's international standing and its influence in Hungary (50).

One of the reasons for France accepting Hungarian refugees, even those coming from Austria and Italy, was France's need for migrant workers, (51) to support its prosperity in the post-war period, in addition to the existence of many reasons for accepting refugees. There was a real need to protect them from sources of persecution behind the Iron Curtain – but they were also desirable immigrants who could meet the demands of the labor market. Hungarians were generally young, healthy and could be placed in jobs almost immediately. France, Britain, Canada, West Germany and Norway have not set any limits on the number of people who can be accepted. The United States of America, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Italy set quotas, but they exceeded them. Skilled workers and professionals among Hungarians were particularly desirable for the benefit gained from their education and training. The willingness of Western countries to grant them asylum not only satisfied public sentiment to provide assistance to the persecuted in the Soviet bloc; It also asserted that communist criticism of Western refugee resettlement was opportunistic and was done so that Western countries could enrich themselves. In December 1956, the majority of Hungarian refugees in France were scattered in the provinces. Their number (550) were concentrated in Paris, and all of them were waiting for their status to be determined as refugee camps. After that, the government of Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet, a staunch anti-communist, allowed Hungarian militants to organize and incite against the government in Budapest, ignoring the objections of the Hungarian diplomatic mission in Paris, especially since the refugees were a new generation of exiles who reinvigorated the entrenched French Hungarians with regime change ambitions at home. In February 1957 A conference of Hungarian exiles was held (52).

Which was formed under the name of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council (Conseil Revolutionnaire Hongrois) in Strasbourg with the approval of the French government and claimed to be the legitimate representative of the Hungarian people. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs also encouraged these aspirations in the hope that they would lead to the emergence of a new Hungarian political class from exile. However, it was cautious about being seen as... It was seen as fueling rebellion. For Guy Mullet's government, the events in Hungary in 1956 provided convincing evidence of Soviet totalitarianism and its military power to keep its satellite states in line. It was also noted that the Hungarian uprising allowed both France and Britain to attract international attention away from their failed intervention in Suez (53).

Moreover, the French authorities prepared the Hungarian refugees better than their counterparts from Egypt after the Soviet invasion; Because of their common European identity, although they included among their ranks many members of the Jewish community, (54) the decision to accept all Hungarian refugees in this context was described as a political coup in their favor (55).

The crushing of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviets on the one hand, and the Suez Crisis on the other, served as ammunition for both the anti-communist political forces and the communist political forces with which they continued to confront for a long time. Despite patriotism. The Assembly rarely dealt with matters of foreign policy under the Fourth Republic, and the Hungarian uprising occupied an important place in the debates in October and October 1956. Parliamentary tools were used extensively: three motions for questioning and four motions for decision were made. The Foreign Affairs Committee also focused on the Hungarian question. The French intervention also provided a good opportunity for the Soviet Union to take a public stance against the French Communist Party, and accordingly the Communist Party's position was almost unanimously condemned. In the face of these intense attacks, the Communist representatives attacked the government's colonial policies, especially the French-British intervention in Suez. On November 7, the Speaker of the National Assembly adjourned the session for 15 minutes due to the disturbances in the hall. The use of outdated arguments that had nothing to do with the issue being discussed proved that this was a deeper conflict (for example, Communist MPs often referred to World War II: "Hitler", "collaborator", "Gestapo" etc., It was a term he often used.) However, most of the deputies tried to express their solidarity with the Hungarian people by the resolution of 7 November 1956, The National Assembly bows before those who sacrificed their lives in Hungary for the independence of their country as well as in defense of freedom and the sacred rights of humanity: and expresses She expressed her admiration for the unwavering courage of the people of Hungary. The Hungarian nation demonstrated its devotion to true political and social democracy, standing up to an oppressor whose actions were against humanity; The Assembly requests the Government to do everything in its power, in cooperation with other free nations, to assist Hungarians who have remained in their country or have fled; The government should take all possible steps so that free countries do everything in their power to prevent the deportation of Hungarians who participated in the revolution."(56).

At the same time, it is necessary to see the limits of the repercussions of the Hungarian uprising in France. After a few weeks of the Soviet intervention on November 4, until the end of December 1956, public interest in the Hungarian tragedy declined significantly. The French political establishment had already withdrawn the Hungarian issue from the agenda. Despite the extraordinary speed of reaction, the reverberations of the Hungarian crisis in France did not bring about any lasting or fundamental changes, neither in public opinions nor in the country's political life. The direction of the French Communist Party, led by Maurice Torrez, succeeded in overcoming its difficulties within a few weeks. The Communist Party's position in French political life did not actually change: it retained its representatives and its electoral base. The behavior of the French

government in the diplomatic sphere after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution was fully consistent with the general trend of Western policy at that time. The main effort remained the collection, transmission and interpretation of information. In addition to the presence of a group of factors that affected the French position at the time, it was the country's position in the international system. Given the close relations between France and the "Western camp," it seems natural for the French government to publicly express its condemnation of the Soviet Union and the Kádár government,⁽⁵⁷⁾ which came to power in Hungary as a result of the crushing of the revolution. With the aspirations of the public, French diplomacy expressed its disagreement, during discussions of UN General Assembly resolutions, with its bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union and Hungary by adopting a diplomatic boycott of NATO countries ⁽⁵⁸⁾.

And through the support given to Hungarian political émigré organizations. But French decision-makers did not want to go beyond a certain point. In short, they continued to play diligently by the rules of the Cold War, particularly adhering to the inviolable taboos of spheres of influence. This wisdom was translated into the general position and orientation of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in that area: it did not attempt to exert its influence on the course of the Hungarian revolutionary events, or in their aftermath. Consequently, the bulk of the French government's diplomatic activities were carried out outside the region directly affected by the crisis, in the negotiating halls of the United Nations and NATO. At the United Nations, where the Hungarian question was on the agenda of the General Assembly for more than six years, until December 1962, the goal set by the French government became more and more clear: in cooperation with the Americans, it wished to make a major effort to influence world public opinion, Especially in third world countries by showing the "true face" of the Soviet Union. NATO, in addition to consultations between foreign ministries, was used to coordinate the policies of its member states. Even if Paris enthusiastically participated in the diplomatic boycott against Moscow and Budapest, it was characteristic of its behavior that the retaliatory measures taken by NATO towards the Soviet Union in January 1957 were removed, without keeping any account of Western public opinion. However, they kept the Kadar government in isolation for a long time, even knowing that it was just a puppet government. The continuation of the boycott against the Hungarian officialdom seemed to carry less risk, and cause less harm, to the police forces. Despite this reservation, the French government did not intend to completely sever relations, carefully avoiding any action that would jeopardize operations with the presence of the French mission in Budapest ⁽⁵⁹⁾.

There was also some caution in dealing with the issue of political immigration. For example, although the French authorities allowed the Hungarian Revolutionary Council to hold its founding conference in Strasbourg in early January 1957, at the same time they declared unequivocally that they would not allow refugees to obtain or transport weapons on French territory. This gesture could have led to open conflict with the Soviet Union. Finally, the French representative in NATO opposed the idea of announcing the fact that the Alliance was deliberating on the Hungarian question. Regarding assistance to refugee students, the Quai d'Orsay stated the following: It is better to avoid any direct action on the part of NATO. The second factor also influenced French diplomatic behavior, which is the intention to coordinate its actions within the framework of cohesive multilateral cooperation, which means cooperation Close relations with the United States of America and Great Britain. Accordingly, French diplomats held extensive discussions with their allies about relations with the Kádár government, the reception of Hungarian refugees, and measures aimed at providing humanitarian aid to the population of Hungary. If the French initiative had not been supported by the NATO Allies, it would have been abandoned (Quai d'Orsay) in the building of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was the fate of the French proposal to provide economic aid to Hungary in the first month of 1957. Once the Suez Crisis passed, its impact declined. Gradually, the French decision influenced the Algerian problem, and the Algerian problem took on a more prominent role, as the war there continued until 1962. The policy followed in Algeria somewhat limited the scope for French maneuvering in the United Nations. In general, we mean that the bipolar system in international relations did not stop. Not only was he a decisive factor in French diplomacy towards Hungary in the wake of the revolution, but his role was ⁽⁶⁰⁾.

The French strategic and interests in the Middle East were the tactical and temporary driver of French policy and the beginning of the settlement of the Hungarian crisis. ⁽⁶¹⁾ The division of the world into separate spheres of influence meant a policy of non-interference, and even a passive position, for the French government. The policy of peaceful subversion of the socialist countries, which meant encouraging them to pursue more independent foreign policies from the Soviet Union, and more liberal policies at home, through economic, political and cultural contacts, was the main line from which France never deviated. However, more active measures were not envisaged. The proposal to neutralize Hungary presented in the National Assembly on December 18, 1956 cannot be considered serious political moves. France's international weight did not allow such major initiatives to be effective. In the same way, similar statements made by Jean-Paul Boncourt, the French Minister to Hungary, addressed to Xu Enlai, Premier of the Chinese Council of Ministers in January 1957 in Budapest, were in fact nothing more than a simple attempt to demonstrate "the power of France." Proactive policy without any major risks ⁽⁶²⁾.

Other factors, namely the impact of the Suez Crisis, the subsequent Algerian War, and the Hungarian Revolution, ⁽⁶³⁾ were not without influence on French foreign policy, especially at the United Nations. However, these conflicts played a secondary role and were of a tactical nature compared to the current European situation. The very intense reaction from French society and the French political establishment had only a limited impact on the decision-making process on the Quai d'Orsay. Admittedly, French diplomats felt

for Hungary a sympathy similar to that expressed by the larger public. However, the significant emotional reaction and individual displays of sympathy had no impact on the final policy (64). Finally, the Hungarian crisis remained outside the scope of French attention. Its representatives only acted directly in the United Nations, NATO, and in working for Hungarian refugees. In other words, Paris focused its activities in areas in which it could operate without fear of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. French diplomacy considered continued disarmament and détente its primary goal, and therefore it saw that maintaining dialogue with the Soviet Union was more important than providing support for the liberation of the peoples of East and Central Europe. This position was clearly expressed when Imre Nagy, the former Hungarian Prime Minister, was executed; The two issues will not be linked, as said by Etienne de Croy Chanel, Permanent Representative of France to NATO, who stated to the Council on June 20, 1958, "The dialogue between East and West belongs to a different page, its level is too high for us to bear being guided only by our emotions." He published the opinion, which "We would probably understand him if we stopped dialogue with the Soviet Union today because of the execution of Naji. He would probably rebuke us for doing so. Therefore, we do not believe in severing ties." It is clear from this that the French government of Guy Mollet no longer considered the Hungarian Revolution to be of fundamental importance, neither internally nor diplomatically. During cabinet meetings during the Hungarian Revolution, this issue was discussed only once. The first decision regarding the Hungarian Revolution was taken on November 7 when they decided to accept refugees. From November to December 1956, during discussions with the most important allies of the French government, the issue of Hungary was rarely mentioned. In a meeting between German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Guy Mollet on November 6, the main topic of discussion was European integration. During his visit to US President Eisenhower, (65) on November 8, Hervé Alphand, the French ambassador to Washington, stressed the necessity of strengthening the alliance between the United States of America, Great Britain, and France, because the Suez Crisis shook the United States of America at that time, and Hungary was not mentioned. Finally, the British-French negotiations focused on the Suez Crisis and its consequences. There is no doubt that the Hungarian Revolution was not of fundamental importance either for France or elsewhere. The Western European Union Council and NATO Council meetings at ministerial level on 10 December, 11 and 14 December (both in Paris) expressed similar positions. Besides Guy Mollet's government, other Western governments were also aware of the fact that their possibilities to influence the revolutionary events in Hungary were actually limited in contrast to their general views (66).

Conclusion

The Hungarian crisis in 1956 was outside the scope of French attention. Despite providing aid and receiving Hungarian refugees, French representatives did not act directly and clearly except through the United Nations. In addition, the French government's focus was on refugees and the areas in which they could work without confrontation with... Soviet Union.

We conclude that the 1956 revolution in Hungary is no longer a source of concern for France, as evidenced by the fact that during the era of Guy Mollet's French government, there was no importance in discussing the Hungarian issue during the meetings that took place at that time. The issue was rarely mentioned, and the meetings that took place at that time focused on the crisis. Suez and its results. As for the Hungarian Revolution, it was not of primary importance to France and other European countries, but they found in it a way to divert attention from the Suez crisis.

Margins

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14. Imre Nagy (1896-1958): reformist communist leader, prime minister during the 1956 revolution. In 1917 he was captured during the war in Russia, showed enthusiasm for the communist cause, and participated in the council government formed by Béla Kun (1919), the first attempt at communist rule in Hungary. After its fall, he was exiled to the Soviet Union, where he spent many years, after which he returned to Hungary in 1944 to protect the Soviet forces (he had joined the Communist Party in 1921 and practiced secret struggle until he fled to Austria in 1928). Appointed Minister of Interior (1945). In 1947, he became Chairman of the National Council. Then, as soon as Stalin died and the anti-Stalinist movement arose, Nagy became Chairman of the Ministerial Council, succeeding the Stalinist Rakosi. But as soon as it returned to the hands of the Hungarian Stalinists again, Imre Nagy was removed from the government, returning to it in the atmosphere of the 1956 revolution, and becoming an inspiration for many movements in it, while he was at the head of the government during the days of the revolution in October 1956. For more, see: Masoud Al-Khund, *Historical Geographical Encyclopedia*, vol. 20, publisher, Beirut, 2004, p. 200.
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49. Erwin ASchmidl and Laszlo Ritter, *the Hungarian Revolution 1956*, Osprey Publishing, 2006, p.24-25.
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54. Hugh McDonnell, *Europeanizing Spaces in Paris 1947-1962*, Liverpool University Press, London, 2016, p.86.
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